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BANKING MARKET STRUCTURE AND BANK INTERMEDIATION 
STRATEGIES IN EMERGING MARKETS: THREE ESSAYS 
 
By Mohammed Amidu 
 
This thesis focuses on bank market structure and the effect of changes to this structure 
on intermediation strategies using a dataset that covers many regions of the world. 
Employing different estimation techniques and methodologies, and using a novel 
approach to each line of research, this thesis provides the following robust results: 
first, increase banking competition weakens the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
This is because an increase in the degree of market power increases the response of 
bank lending to the monetary policy stance. Second, competition increases stability as 
banks diversify across and within their business activities. Third, the high net-interest 
margin and relatively low insolvency risk among banks in developing countries could 
be attributed to a high degree of market power and the use of internal capital financing. 
 
  The thesis makes the following contributions to the literature: first, in order to gain 
new insights and provide new dimensions to the existing literature, each of the three 
core chapters employs an estimation strategy that is new in the literature and which 
offers more scope for investigation. For instance, the positive influence of revenue 
diversification on the competition-stability nexus is new in the literature. Second, this 
thesis is first in considering how various measures of market power and a variety of 
bank funding strategies impact on banks performance. Furthermore, considering the 
banking structure-risk-lending channel hypothesis in assessing banks’ response to 
monetary shocks is also new in the monetary policy transmission literature.  
 
  In conclusion, this thesis gives rise to important public policy recommendations. 
First, the strong link between market imperfections and the effectiveness of monetary 
policy indicators requires regulation that can resolve and offset the adverse effects of 
further increases in the degree of bank market power on the effectiveness of monetary 
transmission. Second, given the results of the role of diversification on the 
competition-stability relationship, there is no evidence to support regulatory initiative 
that restricts banks diversification activities. The third and final recommendation is on 
the concept of market power: bank market power in itself is not detrimental to 
banking activities, but the level and the application of it could negatively affect bank 
insolvency risk. Therefore, supervisory, regulatory and competition authorities should 
coordinate to put in place a comprehensive framework that allows banks to have a 
considerable amount of market power that is robust and consistent with any 
competition policy.   iv  v
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1.1 AIM 
The aim of this thesis is to offer new insight into bank market structure, 
intermediation strategies and stability. To this end, this study provides distinctive 
analyses of the relationship between market structure, lending and stability of banks 
in emerging and developing countries. In addition, a unique evaluation of overall bank 
performance, focusing on funding strategies and the degree of competition among 
banks concludes this work. 
 
1.2    OVERVIEW 
Banking sector under-performance including financial crises over the past three 
decades has resulted in sizeable output losses in both developed and developing 
economies. In developing economies, the output losses have been rather more 
detrimental to subsequent economic growth. This is because banks and other related 
financial intermediaries have failed to perform their important developmental function, 
by providing firms, entrepreneur, and households with essential finance. Also, the 
losses have hindered and reduced investments which are necessarily needed for 
economic growth, financial development and poverty alleviation. The impact, severity 
and the systemic nature of the 2007 financial crisis has revived interest in overall 
banks performance and intermediation strategies in both industrialised and non-
industrialised economies. Moreover, the crisis has shown the need for a co-ordinated 
policy response across countries in order to prevent the occurrence and the spread of 
financial stress in the future. 
 
Motivated by this upsurge in public policy interest in bank lending, the need to ensure 
solvency of individual institutions so as to prevent/or stop the systemic financial crisis 
and the need to assess the various channels of instability, this empirically driven study 
aims to discover the linkages between bank market structure, individual bank 
intermediation strategy as well as performance. Thus this work makes the following 
specific and direct contributions to the literature: 
 
First, employing a variety of econometric methodologies and techniques and a large 
data sample, this work improves and deepens the understanding of the relationship   4
between market structure, bank lending and monetary policy transmission of banks in 
developing countries. It not only analyse the effect of standard bank-specific 
characteristic (i.e. variables capturing bank size, liquidity and capitalization are 
considered the standard indicators in the bank lending channel literature) on bank 
lending, but explores the extent to which banks’ market structure and insolvency risk 
affect monetary policy transmission through the lending channel. The argument in 
support of the banking structure-risk-lending channel hypothesis is that monetary 
policy does not only affect bank reserves but also impacts on marginal cost through 
interest rates paid on bank liabilities. More so, banking market structure determines 
how banks’ marginal cost shocks could be passed to prices and lending. In addition,  
analysing the implication of the degree of bank market power and the changes in the 
banks’ financial condition for loan supply and monetary policy transmission is 
important in that: the changes in developing countries’ bank market structure, 
liberalization of financial sector, and the emergence of financial innovation could 
increase the perception and the risk pricing of bank behaviour (Borio and Zhu 2008); 
and that traditional variables may not provide an accurate assessment of banks’ 
capacity, ability and willingness to grant additional loans (Altunbas et al., 2010). 
 
Second, this thesis for the first time in the banking literature investigates the role of 
revenue diversification on the relationship between competition and stability of banks 
in developing economies. This thesis extends previous research, and in doing so, 
provides a new direction to the literature by focusing on the influence of 
diversification in the competition-stability relationship. The fact that competition may 
exert pressure on banks to diversify their business activities and the fact that these 
activities may affect bank insolvency risk, has not been previously considered worth 
further investigation. The result that competition benefits from diversification 
provides valuable insight for regulatory authorities, banking supervisors, market 
participants and indeed the general public about the role of revenue diversification in 
the competition and stability relationship.  
 
Third, using a panel dataset, this thesis further investigates how different 
measurements of market structure affects bank funding strategies and performance. It   5
provides additional insight by examining the complex interlocking of three key 
variables that are very important for bank regulators: the degree of market power, 
funding sources and banks’ performance. This analysis is particularly novel as the 
current credit turmoil has highlighted the importance and resilience of bank funding 
structure to banking crises.  
 
1.3     STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis is structure along two distinctive public policy debates related to banking, 
whereby one problem is further decomposed into two different analyses. As a result of 
this, one chapter is devoted to each of the three different lines of research. However, 
what is common to these three distinct lines of research is their focus on the effect of 
bank market structure. Banking market structure connotes to the different attributes of 
a market, including the number and distribution of banks (Bauer and Cromwell (1989), 
and Besanko et al. (2007)), specific characteristics of the banks within the market 
(Bikker and Haaf 2002) and the characteristics of the market itself (De Nicolo et al., 
2004). Throughout this thesis market structure or bank market structure connotes the 
competitiveness or non-competitive environment in which the sample banks operate. 
 
Chapter II is the starting point of the thesis and it contains an analysis of the 
relationship between bank market structure, insolvency risk and lending channel using 
panel dataset of 978 banks across 55 developing/emerging economies. Following a 
detailed review of the literature on bank market structure, the association between 
market structure and bank lending, and the current literature on risk and monetary 
policy, this chapter empirically test whether change in monetary policy stance 
increases sensitivity of lending of banks with: 1) high degree of market power; and 2) 
low level of insolvency risk. This chapter presents robust evidence in support of a 
stronger relationship between market imperfection, bank’s risk conditions and the 
effectiveness of the monetary policy instruments. 
 
Chapter III builds upon the initial findings of chapter II and extends the analysis of 
market structure to bank performance and insolvency risk. In light of this, Chapter III 
contains an empirical investigation of the effect of revenue diversification on the   6
competition and stability relationship, as previous studies have not considered the role 
of diversification in the competition stability nexus. The results are consistent with 
previous studies that suggest that greater competition among banks increases banking 
stability by showing robust evidence for this positive link when revenue 
diversification of banks’ activities are controlled.  
 
Chapter IV employs a different approach to analysing bank performance and stability, 
by focusing on bank funding structure and variety of degree of market power. 
Employing the systems generalised methods of moments estimator (system GMM), 
the study analyses how funding strategies of banks with market power affect their net-
interest margin, return on their assets as well as their insolvency risk. The results 
suggest that the performance of banks with market power is significantly more 
sensitive to internally generated funds than they are to deposit and wholesale funding.  
 
Furthermore, the high degree of market power does not only increase the net-interest 
margin and profitability level of banks in emerging and developing countries, it also 
reduces their insolvency risk. Relating bank funding strategy to insolvency risk, the 
results suggest that banks that depend heavily on internal and deposit funding are 
safer than those that finance their assets with wholesale funds. The results thus 
provide support to the existing findings that banking strategy that relies 
predominantly on attracting non-deposit funding is more risky and less resilient to the 
crisis. 
 
Chapter V draws an overall summary to this thesis and identifies and provides policy 
implications emanating from the findings of the three core chapters. It also 
acknowledges inherent limitations of the current research and brings to light areas for 
future research.    7
Chapter II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BANK COMPETITION, 
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND 
THE LENDING CHANNEL OF 
BANKS IN EMERGING 
MARKETS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   8
Bank competition, financial stability and the lending channel 
of banks in emerging markets 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses the extent to which the level of bank competition and 
insolvency risk affect monetary policy transmission through the lending channel. 
Using a large panel dataset of 978 banks of 55 countries, and employing the Lerner 
index model as a measure of market structure, the results show that an increase 
banking sector competition weakens the effectiveness of monetary policy on bank 
lending. The results also show that banks with low insolvency risk have the financial 
strength to provide new loans. These findings are robust to a broad array of sensitivity 
checks including control of alternative measurements of the Lerner index, different 
samples and different methodological specifications. By extension, these results have 
important policy implications for regulators in assessing the effectiveness of monetary 
policy transmission mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   9
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of any economic policy according to Friedman (2008) is to advance the 
economic well-being of a nation’s citizens and to strengthen the institutions through 
which they interact to achieve this welfare. Some of these institutions are financial 
intermediaries which firms as well as households rely on to finance their projects. 
This chapter examines the role of bank market structure and its risk conditions in 
monetary policy transmission. Banking market structure connotes to the different 
attributes of a market, including the number and distribution of banks (Bauer and 
Cromwell (1989), and Besanko et al. (2007)), specific characteristics of the banks 
within the market (Bikker and Haaf 2002) and the characteristics of the market itself 
(De Nicolo et al., 2004). For the purpose of analysing the extent to which bank market 
structure and insolvency risk affect monetary policy, this chapter employs Lerner 
index as a proxy for market power. The Lerner index represents the price mark-up 
over marginal cost and it is the only measure of competition calculated at the bank 
level (Berger et al. 2009).  
 
The standard view of a transmission mechanism focuses on the effect of monetary 
policy on interest rates and through interest rates on lending and credit. According to 
this standard view as explained through the interest rate channel, a change in the 
monetary policy stance affects long-term interest rates and the exchange rate, and this 
alters relative prices in the economy, the price of future consumption and investment 
relative to the price of present consumption, and the prices of foreign goods in terms 
of domestic goods (Bean et al. 2002).
1 In contrast, the bank lending channel of 
monetary policy transmission focuses not only on the impact of monetary policy on 
demand for loans, but more important on the supply of loans. However, to support the 
existence of a lending channel, there is a need for evidence that monetary policy 
tightening causes a shift in the supply of loans and that there are certain categories of 
borrowers who depend on bank loans for their finances.  
 
                                                 
1 The interest rate channel cannot fully explain the intensity, timing and composition of responses of 
real variables to variations in monetary policy (Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2007). Bernanke and Gertler (1995) 
provide an exposition of what the interest rate channel theory fails to explain.   10
Studies on the bank lending channel, either country specific or cross-country, have 
centred on the identifying its existence, on gauging its potency and its overall 
importance, on identification of shifts in loan demand from shifts in loan supply, and 
on the types and distributional effects (Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Kashyap and 
Steins (1995, 2000), Kishan and Opeila (2000), Altunbas et al. (2002),  Ehrmann et al. 
(2003), and Brissimis and Delis (2009)). Little attention has been given to the effect 
of banking structure and bank risk conditions on the response of bank lending to 
monetary policy. The argument in support of the banking structure-risk-lending 
channel hypothesis is that monetary policy not only affects bank reserves either 
through the traditional open market operations or reserve requirements, but also 
impacts on marginal cost through interest rates paid on bank liabilities. More so, 
banking market structure is important as the degree of market power determines how 
banks’ marginal cost shocks could be passed to prices and lending. Vanhoose (1985) 
shows that monetary policy designed to target an interest rate automatically impacts 
on the monetary aggregate as a result of changes in bank market structure. In addition, 
(Borio and Zhu 2008) contend that changes in the banking system coupled with 
changes in the prudential regulation could have increased the effect of banks’ 
perception, pricing and risk management behaviour (especially in the developing 
countries). Thus, proper understanding of the industrial organisation of local financial 
markets is necessary for a detailed analysis of monetary transmission mechanisms 
(Toolsema, 2002).  
 
From an empirical point of view, studies which examine the relationships between the 
level of competition and the effect of monetary policy on bank lending are those of 
(Adams and Amel (2005), Gunji et al. (2009) and Olivero et al. (2011)). Adams and 
Amel (2005) use US data to investigate the impact of local bank concentration on 
monetary policy transmission and find that the impact of monetary policy on loan 
originations is weaker in more concentrated markets. Gunji et al. (2009) and Olivero 
et al. (2010) test the impact of H-statistic (competition measurement) on the 
transmission of monetary policy and their result show that increased competition in 
the banking industry leads to a smaller policy effect on bank lending. However, the 
concentration ratio does not necessarily measure the level of competition (Claesens   11
and Laeven 2004) and it cannot be used to explain differences in market structure.  
Secondly, H-statistic is seen as an aggregate phenomenon emanating from the 
collective interaction of set of a market participants. In contrast, Lerner index is an 
individual phenomenon which results from the behavioural pricing strategy of a 
particular bank (Gutierrez de Rozas 2007).
2 Thirdly, the use of aggregate data that 
rely on the short-term responses of bank lending may not be very informative in view 
of the fact that banks may be prevented from quickly adjusting the stock of their loans 
following a monetary policy shock, due to loan commitments (Brissimis and Delis, 
2009).   
 
In addition to investigating the changes in the sensitivity of bank lending to changes 
in monetary policy as a result of differences in the market structure that a bank 
operates, this chapter also examines the effect of risk on the banks’ reaction to 
monetary policy.  
 
It is well established in the new empirical industrial organisation literature that, there 
is a well-established relationship between market structure and interest rates charged 
on loans and deposits. Using for example the structural-conduct-performance 
hypothesis, studies reveal that in a market where banks are concentrated, lending 
reduces as a result of high lending rates. Also, deposit rates decline where a bank has 
excessive market power in a deposits market (Hannan and Prager (1998), Berlin and 
Mester (1999), Black and Strahan (2002) and Kahn et al. (2005)).
3 Also, due to 
innovation in the financial system, variables such as bank size, liquidity and equity 
may not be enough to assess banks’ ability to provide additional loans (Altunbas et 
al., 2010).  
 
                                                 
2 The Lerner index is a measure of market power or price mark-up over marginal cost. It provides a 
separate value for each bank in the industry. Conversely, the H-statistic is an indicator of competition 
and it is based on the price elasticities of inputs cost in a reduced-form revenue equation. It provides a 
single value for the whole industry (Gutierrez de Rozas 2007). Thus using H-statistics to investigate 
the effect of bank market structure on the lending channel to changes in monetary policy may not be 
appropriate. 
3 Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) summarise the impact of concentration on the pricing behaviour of 
banks using the ‘structure performance hypothesis’ (i.e. ability of a bank with market power to extract 
higher rent) and ‘efficient structure hypothesis’ (i.e. lower operating cost).   12
The aim of this chapter is to blend the above research with that of a study on monetary 
policy transmission. To the best of my knowledge this thesis is first in monetary 
policy transmission literature to consider banking structure-risk-lending channel 
hypothesis in assessing banks’ response to monetary policy shocks. Apart from an 
extension in the scope of current literature, this chapter also makes the following four 
important contributions with respect to the established literature and in particular 
regarding developing and emerging economies: First, a Lerner index is constructed as 
a proxy for bank market power and test its sensitivity with core deposits on bank loan 
growth.
4 This is to investigate whether banks with a high degree of market power are 
constrained by the availability of loanable funds which is a necessary condition for the 
existence of a bank lending channel (Jayaratne and Morgan 2000). Secondly, the 
Lerner index is interacted with the monetary policy stance to examine the response of 
market structure to monetary policy changes. Specifically, bank loan growth is 
regressed on the Lerner index, the stance of monetary policy and the interactions 
between these variables. The third contribution emanates from the use of 978 
individual banks’ balance sheet data across 55 developing countries for the period 
2000-2007. Favero et al. (1999) indicate that microeconomic data makes it possible 
for one to identify the presence of a credit channel. The fourth innovation of this 
chapter lies on investigating the effect of insolvency risk on the banks’ response to 
monetary policy and macroeconomic shocks.  
 
Analysing the implication of the degree of bank market power and the changes in the 
banks’ financial condition for loan supply and monetary policy transmission is 
important for two reasons: the changes in developing countries’ bank market structure, 
ever increasing liberalization of the financial sector, and the emergence of financial 
innovation in these markets could have changed the perception and the risk pricing 
behaviour of banks (Borio and Zhu 2008) and that traditional bank-specific variables 
may not provide an accurate assessment of banks’ capacity, ability and willingness to 
grant additional loans (Altunbas et al., 2010).  
 
                                                 
4An alternative version (i.e. funding-adjusted Lerner index) is also constructed as a robustness check of 
the earlier version (i.e. conventional Lerner index).     13
The results show that a decline in the level of competition increases the response of 
bank lending to monetary policy stance, providing evidence in support of a stronger 
relationship between market imperfection and the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy instrument. Also, bank risk, as measured by Z-score, suggests that highly 
solvent banks operating in emerging markets are not more sensitive to monetary 
policy shocks in extending credits in the short-run. The overall implication of this 
finding is that bank market structure and risk conditions need to be considered in 
addition to the traditional bank-specific indicators (bank size, liquidity and 
capitalisation) in assessing banks ability to finance economic activities. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows; section (2.2) reviews the extant 
literature on the lending channel, market structure and risk-taking behaviour of banks, 
section (2.3) discusses the research methodology as well as the measurement of key 
variables used in the study, section (2.4) contains the data while section (2.5) 
discusses the empirical results and robustness tests and finally, section (2.6) concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature  review 
 
This section provides a review of related literature on the relationship between bank 
lending channel, market structure and insolvency risk. It begins with a theoretical 
overview of the principles underlying a bank lending channel and then follows with a 
discussion of the empirical literature including methods and results on the micro-
bank-specific and macro-country-level variables that affect loan delivery. The section 
concludes with a review of the extant literature on bank risk and monetary policy. 
 
2.2.1  Bank lending Channel 
The theoretical principles underlying the bank lending channel posit the effect of 
monetary policy on the real economy through direct impact on the supply of bank 
loans. The mechanism is that, tightening of monetary policy shrinks banks’ reserves 
and reduces banks’ access to loanable funds and credit (Lensink and Sterken, 2002). 
The lending channel according to (Bernanke and Blinder (1988), and Kashyap and 
Stein (1995)) operates on certain premises: bank loans and publicly issued bonds are   14
imperfect substitutes for firms and that capital structure matters for such firms since 
they cannot offset a decline in the supply of loans by financing their investment with 
external borrowings. The other condition is that bonds and loans are not perfect 
substitutes for banks and that, the central bank must be able to alter the quantity of 
reserves available to banks in order to influence the supply of loans. This condition is 
key in that, banks must not be able to completely insulate their lending activities from 
the shocks to reserves, either by switching from deposits to non-reservable sources of 
finance such as certificate of deposits (CD), commercial paper or equity (Bernanke 
and Blinder 1988).  The implication of a bank lending channel of monetary policy 
transmission is that, it has distributional effects on varying levels of bank 
characteristics with small, illiquid and less capitalised banks most affected. However, 
some studies have cast doubt on the existence and implications of the bank lending 
channel. Romer and Romer (1990) argue that, large multinational firms and private 
banks may neutralise the effects of a monetary contraction by replacing a decrease in 
bank loans and reserves with other forms of funds by issuing equity and CDs 
respectively. Disyatat (2010) contends that the importance placed on policy-induced 
changes in deposits is misplaced and that the lending channel works through the effect 
of monetary policy on banks’ balance sheet strength and risk perception. 
 
Given the lack of consensus on theories underlying the relevance of the lending 
channel, perhaps empirical studies provide evidence on the existence, relevance, 
distribution and implication of a bank lending channel. Empirical studies in the U.S. 
show that a bank lending channel exists and that the transmission is through bank size 
(Kashyap and Stein 1995); bank size and liquidity (Kashyap and Stein 2000) and bank 
size and the level of capital (Kishan and Opiela 2000).  However, recent studies 
suggest that the bank lending channel within the US is declining in strength 
(Loutskina and Strahan, (2009), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008), and Ashcraft (2006)). 
(Loutskina and Strahan, (2009) results suggest that the increased securitization of the 
mortgage secondary market has reduced the effect of lender financial condition on 
credit supply. Employing quarterly data between 1989 and 2005 (Cetorelli and 
Goldberg 2008) find that bank lending channel within United States has declined in 
strength as banking becomes more globalized. Ashcraft (2006) reveals that banks   15
loans do not play a significant and independent role in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in U.S. On cross-country studies (mainly in continental Europe), 
there are mixed results on distributional effects of monetary policy. Altunbas et al. 
(2002) find that capitalization level and the size of the bank affect a bank’s reaction to 
monetary policy change in the Euro area. Ehrmann et al. (2003) show that apart from 
banks’ liquidity, neither capital nor size play a role in distinguishing bank lending in 
the Euro area countries. Brissimis and Delis (2009) who use bank panel data for six 
OECD countries find no significant evidence supporting the distributional effect of 
the bank lending channel. 
 
2.2.2  Bank market structure and lending channel 
Though these studies as reviewed in section 2.2.1 examine the effects of monetary 
policy changes on bank lending, no attempts have been made to control for 
differences in banking markets and bank risk condition that have been shown to affect 
bank lending. Again, the literature drawing on industrial organisation has shown that 
banks in more concentrated markets tend to adjust prices less completely in response 
to changes in input costs than banks in more competitive markets. Cerqueiro (2008) 
finds that in a market where banks are concentrated, the lending rate increases by 
more than 70 basis points and that concentrated markets seem to attract low-quality 
loan applicants. Black and Strahan (2002) show that fewer enterprises are created in 
more concentrated banking markets. Kahn et al. (2005) who examine the relationship 
between bank consolidations and dynamics of insurer loan interest rates point out that 
interest rates quoted by banks for personal and automobile loans are higher in 
concentrated markets. On deposits rates, Hannan and Prager (1998) show that they 
decline by a greater percentage as a result of substantial increase in local market 
concentration. Berger and Hannan (1989) suggest that banks in most concentrated 
environments pay a range of 25-100 basis points less on their deposits compared to 
those operating in less concentrated markets.  
 
Though monetary policy affects marginal cost through interest rates paid on bank 
liabilities, there exists a thin literature directly analysing the relationship between the 
bank lending channel and the level of competition. Adams and Amel (2005) use US   16
data to investigate the impact of local bank concentration on monetary policy 
transmission and find that the impact of monetary policy on loan originations is 
weaker in more concentrated markets. Gunji et al. (2009) test the impact of H-statistic 
on the transmission of monetary policy and the results show that competition in the 
banking industry leads to a smaller policy effect on bank lending. This chapter 
contends that monetary policy shifts bank marginal costs by influencing the interest 
rates that banks pay at the margin for loanable funds and that the effect of monetary 
policy depends on the competitive environments in which banks operate. In the 
standard model of the firm, the adjustment of prices and output according to Vives 
(1999) is a function of the curvature of demand and cost functions and of market 
competition. Goldberg and Knetter (1997) argue that in the case of perfect 
competition where equilibrium price is set to marginal costs, changes in marginal 
costs will be transmitted to reflect in the price. However, as the degree of competition 
decreases, two theoretical possibilities may occur according to Freixas and Rochet, 
(1997): in the first case, as the degree of competition decreases, output becomes less 
sensitive to changes in marginal costs and price changes in response to a marginal 
cost shock become restrained. As a result, the sensitivity of bank lending to the 
monetary policy stance decreases as the market becomes less competitive. In the 
second case, under certain demand and cost curvature conditions, price becomes more 
sensitive to changes in marginal costs as the degree of competition decreases. Alencar 
and Nakane (2004) who disagree with the positions of earlier studies investigate 
monetary policy on both perfect and monopolistic competition and their simulation 
results show that increased bank competition causes the economy to be more sensitive 
to interest rates. Also, Vanhoose (1985) shows that if the central bank targets 
monetary aggregates and uses the security rate as a policy instrument, then a change 
in competition causes no significant effect on the deviation of money from the target.  
 
As policy implications on these theoretical models are not conclusive, it is imperative 
to assess empirically the degree of bank market power in developing economies so 
that authorities get a better understanding of the potential effectiveness of monetary 
policy. To this end, the chapter first analyses these questions: What is the degree of 
competition in developing countries?  Does this make monetary policy less effective?   17
Using new empirical industrial organisation methodology, the Lerner index is 
constructed to analyse the response of a monetary policy shock to bank lending. 
 
2.2.3  Bank risk condition and monetary policy 
The shift of part of the banking sector activities from the traditional ‘originate-to-
hold’ to an ‘originate-to-distribute’ model of banking has impacted on the way banks 
grant credit and react to monetary policy shocks (Altunbas et al. (2009), Loutskina 
and Strahan, (2009), and Hirtle, (2008)). Literature on the transmission mechanism 
under bank risk condition has focused on banks’ incentive problem emanating from 
bank mangers. Borio and Zhu (2008) contend that financial innovations in addition to 
the changes to Basel II are likely to enhance the impact of the perception, pricing and 
management of risk on the behaviour of banks. Rajan (2005) on his part, suggests that 
more market-based pricing and the stronger interaction between banks and financial 
markets increase the incentive structure driving banks, especially to a stronger link 
between monetary policy and financial stability effects. Thus bank risk condition as 
perceived by so called ‘market investors’ affect banks’ ability, capacity and 
willingness to supply loans. This is because, the riskiness of the credit portfolio 
reduces a bank’s profits, capital and lending. Altunbas et al. (2010) find that banks 
with a lower expected default frequency (EDF) cannot only offer a higher amount of 
credit, but also are able to shield their lending from monetary policy changes. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that euro area investors in banks debt are 
quite sensitive to bank risk and more sensitive after the introduction of the common 
currency (Sironi 2003).  
 
Clearly banks’ risk conditions matter for the supply of loans especially following 
monetary policy shocks. Thus this chapter considers banks’ insolvency risk together 
with the competitive structure and other bank-specific variables in analysing the 
functioning of the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in the 
context of developing and emerging economies. 
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2.3  Construction of key variables 
 
2.3.1  Degree of market power 
This chapter employs the Lerner index to measure the degree of competition among 
banks. One advantage of the Lerner index is that it can be estimated using bank-
specific variables. The index captures more information about the actual price-setting 
behaviour of banks in relation to their cost structure than the size of banks measured 
in terms of deposits, relative size of balance sheets or income generated (Hawtrey and 
Liang 2008). It also provides information on whether or not banks can pass on 
additional costs to borrowers as a result of monetary policy shocks. The construction 
of the Lerner index follows that of (Berger et al. 2009) as: 
 
it TA it TA it TA it P MC P index erner L , , , / ) (                         (2.1) 
 
The Lerner index in equation (2.1) suggests the extent to which the monopolist’s 
market power allows it to fix a price above marginal cost. The primary assumption is 
that the flow of goods and services produced by banks is proportional to total assets 
(Fernandez de Guevara et al. 2005). With this assumption, the price is constructed to 
include both interest and non-interest income, where  it TA P , is the price of the total 
assets.  it TA MC , is the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output. The 
it TA MC ,   is derived from the following translog cost function as: 
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Where Cost is the bank’s total costs including financial and operating cost; 
i TA represents a proxy for bank output measured as total assets, and  1 W ,  2 W and   19
3 W indicate the input price of deposit funds, labour and capital and these are 
respectively calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money 
market funding, labour cost to total assets
5, and other operating and administrative 
expenses to total assets. The cost function is estimated separately using a panel data 
for each country in the sample. This allows for the parameters of the cost function to 
vary from one country to another, reflecting different technologies. Fixed effects are 
also introduced to capture the influence of variables specific to each bank. Once the 
cost function is estimated, marginal cost is evaluated by taking the first derivative 
with respect to the output for each bank in the sample. Hence, the marginal cost is 
calculated for each banking firm as:
6 
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The index is interpreted as follows: a Lerner index with higher value implies higher 
pricing power and less competitive market conditions
7.  
 
2.3.2  Choices in the measures of monetary policy  
A prerequisite for this analysis is a good indicator of the stance of monetary policy. 
However, the literature is still not conclusive on the best indicator of monetary policy 
stance. In the banking literature, the conventional variable used as a stance of 
monetary policy is the rate of growth of one or more monetary aggregates, for 
example M1, M2 or the monetary base. The rate of growth of monetary aggregates 
has been criticised as financial innovation and deregulation render it ineffective 
(Bernanke and Mihov 1998). Cross-country studies on monetary policy choices are 
also limited. This is because, various countries use different monetary policy 
instruments.  However, following Shambaugh (2004), this chapter utilises the 
respective countries short-term interest rates as the monetary policy indicator. Short-
                                                 
5 Due to the absence of data on total number of employees, the unit cost of labour is expressed in terms 
of total assets.  
6 See Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005) for the detailed estimation process. 
7 In theory, the marginal cost concept is the derivative of the coefficient of output, and that the 
it MC  
computed in equation (2.3) is adjusted to attain variability across bank, i  and in period, t .   20
term interest rates appear to be a good indicator as the correlation test shows a 
negative relationship with core deposits. Figure 2.1 also supports a strong negative 
correlation between short-term interest rates and the share of deposits in total short-
term bank financing. An increase in short-term interest rates leads to a corresponding 
decrease in the share of deposits in short-term finance. This result is consistent with 
the argument that banks rely more on uninsured debt (Ashcraft 2006). The choice of 
short-term interest rates as a monetary policy stance is therefore a good measure to be 
used in the panel data regression analysis of the relationship between market structure, 
financial stability and bank lending channel since the bank lending channel operates 
through changes in the mix of deposits in bank liabilities. 
 
Figure 2.1 
Banks’ short-term finance mix and short-term interest rate 
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  Source: WDI, Bankscope and author’s own calculation 
   Data is aggregated averaging across years, 2000-2007 
 
2.3.3  Measurement of bank condition risk 
This chapter uses Z-score to investigate the effect of bank risk conditions on banks’ 
response to monetary policy. Z-score measures the number of standard deviations that 
a bank’s profit must fall to drive it into insolvency. It is a measure of risk that is 
monotonically associated with a bank’s probability of failure and has been widely 
used in the empirical banking and finance literature (Boyd et al. 2009). According to 
Roy (1952), Z-score does not require bank profit to be normally distributed in order to 
be a valid probability measure, it requires the existence of what (Roy 1952) called the 
first four moments of the return distribution. It is calculated as: 
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Where, ROA is the return on assets of a bank,  TA E /  represents a bank equity to total 
assets ratio and  ROA  is an estimate of the standard deviation of return on assets. 
According to De Nicolo et al. (2004), the bank stability indicator increases with 
higher profitability and capitalization levels, and decreases with unstable earnings 
reflected by a higher standard deviation of return on assets. Thus from an economic 
point of view, the Z-score initially measures the probability of a bank becoming 
insolvent when the value of assets becomes lower than the value of debt. This means 
that a higher (lower) Z-score implies a lower (higher) probability of insolvency risk. 
 
2.3.4  Other controlled variables 
Previous empirical studies on the bank lending channel of monetary policy 
transmission have identified the size of the bank (Kashyap and Stein, 1995), the 
capitalization (Kishan and Opiela (2000), and van den Heuvel (2002)), and liquidity 
level of banks (Stein 1998) as bank-specific variables that affect bank lending. In 
addition to these bank-specific characteristics, (Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), 
Gambacorta (2005), and Ashcraft (2006)) also identified securities, internal capital 
and binding leverage as variables that impact on loan growth. 
 
The size of a bank, the capitalization level and liquidity position have been found to 
have an impact on loan growth. Well capitalised and liquid banks are in a better 
position to shield their loans from monetary policy changes. This they do according to 
(Brissimis and Delis 2009) by resorting to the high amount of equity funds available 
and equally by using their buffer of liquid assets. In the case of the size of a bank, the 
larger banks are able to raise external funds from the capital market at lower cost for 
loan supply. The natural logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy for bank size; the 
ratio of total equity capital to total assets is used as a measure of capitalization, while 
liquidity is measured as total liquid assets as a percentage of total assets. Internal 
capital is the internally generated funds and its definition is in line with (Houston et 
al., 1997) as the sum of net profit before extraordinary items and loan loss provisions   22
relative to bank loans at the end of the period. Bank securities holding is measured as 
the total investment of banks in securities divided by total assets and the binding 
leverage is approximated by an equity ratio of less than 4 percent. 
 
Inflation and nominal GDP growth are included as explanatory variables to control 
for demand effects, to allow the estimation to capture business cyclical movements 
and to segregate the monetary policy component of short-term interest changes 
(Gambacorta 2005). Consumer price index is used as a measure of inflation while a 
change in growth rate of gross domestic product is used as a measure of GDP growth.  
 
2.4  Data and descriptive statistics 
 
2.4.1 Data  sources 
Both micro and macro data are used. Bank level data was taken from the Bankscope 
database. Series are yearly-covering a sample of 978 banks across 55 developing 
countries during 2000–2007. As the study focuses on intermediation of banks in 
emerging economies
8, unconsolidated balance sheet data are opted for whenever 
possible even though in some cases the study has to depend on consolidated 
statements because of data unavailability. The sample includes all commercial banks, 
cooperative banks, development banks, savings banks, real estate and mortgage banks 
for which annual data is available for some period or the years during the period 
2000-2007. To ensure that banks that are important players in the deposit and/or loan 
markets are not omitted in the study, medium and long term credit banks and 
specialised government institutions are included as they remain important in these 
countries. This is after necessary adjustments are made for differences in accounting 
and reporting standards across countries. Observations with out-liers such as zero and 
/or negative capitalisation are dropped. Also, observations for capitalization above the 
98
th percentile were dropped. In addition, loan growth rate observations above 99
th 
                                                 
8 The selection of these countries is based on 2008 GNI per Capita. The groups are: low income (LIC) 
$975 or less; lower middle income (LMC), $976- 3, 855; upper middle income (UMC), $3,856-11,906; 
and high income, (HIC), above $11, 906. This study selects banks in countries whose GDP per income 
level is between LIC and UMC as our emerging economies. In addition, grouping of countries into 
different regions such as Africa; Asia, Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) and Latin 
America follows that of World Bank Development indicators classifications (source: World Bank data 
2010).   23
percentile of the distribution were equally dropped. This is to correct for mergers, 
acquisitions and start ups during the study period. Macro data is obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank Development Indicator. The series includes GDP growth, average policy 
interest rate, the Treasury bill rate, interbank rate and money market rate. 
 
2.4.2  Descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlation coefficients 
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for seven bank activity variables, one 
variable for degree of competition and two stability variables for 978 banks across 55 
countries. The data is averaged across years and reported showing the trend of the key 
variables from 2000 to 2007. The banks are grouped into four regions in accordance 
with World Bank Development indicators: Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC), and Latin America. Loans to assets ratio measuring 
bank loan portfolio size has been increasing during the period. It increased by 147% 
(between 2000 and 2004a ratio of 19.19% to 49.18%) and then fell marginally in 2007 
to 42.78%. On a regional trend, it is the banks in CEEC that saw their loan portfolio 
increase by an average of 301% from a ratio of 12.83 in 2000 to a ratio of 51.39 in 
2004. In the same period, investment in bank securities also increased by a similar 
margin. That is, a ratio of 15.03 in 2000 increased by 146% to a ratio of 36.92 in 2004. 
However, it is the Latin American banks that led the growth in securities holdings, 
followed by Asian banks.  Sub Saharan African banks growth in securities 
investments of 93%, is the lowest in the sample. The funding source pattern also 
shows a similar trend. Deposits as a percentage of bank liabilities increased by 148% 
(a ratio of 30.34 to 75.34) from 2000 to 2004, and then fell to 63.28 in 2007. Again, it 
is the CEEC banks that had a significant growth in liabilities during the period. These 
figures suggest that banking activities (measured by loan to assets ratio, securities to 
assets ratio and deposits to liabilities ratio) in emerging markets followed a similar 
trend, increasing between 2000 and 2004, then falling marginally thereafter to 2007. 
 
On the bank-specific variables, the size of the bank proxied by the US dollar amount 
of total assets has been relatively stable during the period under study. Asian banks 
are the biggest in terms of size. The average bank size of an Asian bank in 2007 is   24
US$41,622 million and the smallest banks are found in Africa with average size of 
US$647million in 2007. In this chapter, equity to assets ratio is used as a measure of 
capitalization level of the selected banks. The capitalization level of the banks has 
been increased more than a 100 fold. An equity ratio of 6.45 in 2000 increases to a 
ratio of 13.94 in 2004. Liquidity has improved while internal generated funds 
measured as the sum of net profit before extraordinary items and loan loss provisions 
relative to bank loans at the end of the period has also increased. The rise of internal 
funding (especially among Asian banks) shows the importance that banks in emerging 
economies attach to these sources of funding. The competitive structure proxied by 
the Lerner index has been increasing steadily. A six and three quarter  percent price 
mark up over marginal cost in 2000, increased to a 23.55% mark up in 2005, then fell 
slightly to 19.26% in 2007. Overall, figures from the Lerner index vary across 
countries by over 18% on average, with African banks pricing their products at 
around 20% on average over marginal cost. It should be noted that the competitive 
environments of emerging markets has improved since 2005. Two variables have 
been used to measure risk of the selected banks. Z-score measures insolvency risk 
while non-performing loan ratio is used as a measure of credit risk. Insolvency risk 
has been improving with the Asian banks scoring the highest with an average figure 
(2000-2007) of 20.79 across the 8 year period. The non-performing loans figures are 
also indifferent. There has been a considerable fall in the non-performing loan ratio. 
These two variables suggest an improvement of the financial stability of the selected 
samples over the period, 2000-2007.  
 
Pair-wise correlation coefficients are used in this chapter as a first step to test the 
relationship between the key variables. The results are presented in table 2.2. The 
correlation coefficient between Lerner index and loans is negative and statistically 
significant indicating that banks in emerging markets increase loan to asset ratio in a 
more competitive environment. The reverse holds with securities as the Lerner index 
is positively correlated with investment in securities. On the correlation between Z-
score and loan to assets ratio, one notes that stable banks increase their loan portfolio 
as the correlation coefficient is positive. Next is the pair-wise correlation coefficient 
between bank lending and the selected bank-specific characteristics. Whereas bank   25
size has a positive relationship with bank lending, equity ratio and liquidity have a 
negative and statistically significant relationship. These results show that improving 
capitalization and liquidity levels do not necessarily translate to increased bank 
lending in emerging markets. The sign and the magnitude of the relationship between 
capitalization and liquidity on one hand and Z-score on other hand suggest that banks 
in emerging markets use their capitalization and liquidity position to enhance their 
stability. Thus, banks in the selected sample hold more capital and liquid assets as a 
buffer for stability instead of supplying credit. Furthermore, the pair-wise correlation 
between bank loan supply on one hand and interaction of monetary policy indicators 
with Lerner index, Z-score, size, equity and liquidity on the other hand is positive and 
statistically significant. The results of these tests suggest that large, stable, liquid and 
well-resource banks with market power are better able to buffer their lending against 
monetary policy shocks.   
 
Regarding macroeconomic variables, the correlation coefficient between monetary 
policy stance and bank lending is negative and statistically significant indicating that 
bank decrease lending during tightening of monetary policy. This result is also 
consistent with monetary policy theory on lending channel that banks reduce loan 
supply during monetary tightening (Bernanke and Blinder 1988). Next is the 
correlation between GDP growth and bank lending which is negative. Similar result is 
found on the relationship between bank lending and inflation. These findings suggest 
that bank lending decreases during economic booms and high inflation. 
  
2.5 Regression  results 
 
This chapter subsection presents regression results in four parts. The first part 
analyses the relationship with loan growth and the growth of core deposits. The 
results from the first part are then used in the second to test the response of bank 
lending to the monetary policy stance. The third part tests the impact of bank risk 
condition on loan growth. Finally several variations are made to the benchmark 
estimator in order to confirm robustness and this is presented in the fourth subsection. 
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2.5.1  Sensitivity of loan growth to core deposits growth and market power 
Before examining how bank market structure responds to changes in monetary policy 
stance, the sensitivity of loan growth to core deposits growth is analysed in a context 
similar to that of investment-cashflow sensitivity analysis. This approach has been 
used by Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) and Ashcraft (2006) to test whether bank 
lending is constrained by the availability of core deposits, a necessary condition for 
the existence of a bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. While these 
studies focus on measuring financial constraints of a standalone bank and bank 
affiliation with a multi bank holding company respectively, this analysis focuses on 
cross-country banks with the degree of market power. For the estimation of loan 
growth to core deposit growth, the following empirical model is employed: 
 
c it c it c it c it c it c it deposits X X Lerner deposits loans , , , , 2 , 1 0 , ) ln( * ) ( ln ) ( ln               
   it tc c it c it M deposits Lerner        , , ) ( ln *       (2.5) 
 
The above is a regression of annual loan growth for bank i for period t in country 
, c c it loans , ) ln(  , on core deposit growth of a bank i for period t in country  , c  
; ) ln( ,c it deposits   the degree of market power, proxied by the Lerner index, c it Lerner ,  
the vector of bank-specific characteristic for period t in country  , c c it X , ,  the 
interaction of these bank characteristics with deposit growth,  c it c it deposits X , , ) ln( * ; 
the interaction of Lerner index with deposit growth,  c it c it deposits Lerner , , ) ( ln * ; the 
vector of macroeconomic variables,  tc M  are included to capture for differences in the 
level of economic development and cyclical movements; and  it   is the error term. The 
bank specific characteristics are the natural logarithm of total assets, the ratio of 
securities to assets, internally generated funds and the standard binding leverage 
requirements. Following Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) equation (2.5) is 
estimated using country and time fixed effects and clustering at the bank level. Fixed 
effects are used to control for other bank-specific characteristics that remain relatively 
stable over the sample period. The regression results are presented in table 2.3. 
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The key result in table 2.3 is that the Lerner index interacts with deposits in a negative 
and significant way implying that developing countries banks with market power are 
less sensitive to core deposits. Similar results are found for larger banks and banks 
with standard capital. The economic significance of these results are that, the effects 
for banks with market power are 26.20 times that of the effect for log assets (bank size) 
and 1.57 times the effect for binding leverage in minimising the sensitivity of loan 
growth to growth of core deposits. The results also show no significance or sensitivity 
of banks investments in securities and internal capital to that of lending growth to 
deposit growth. A special mention is made on the relationship between banks 
investment in securities and loan growth. The coefficient on security holdings is 
negative and statistically across all specifications indication a trade-off between bank 
lending and securities. A fall in banks investment in securities increases loan growth. 
On the whole, the result suggests that banks with market power reduce their 
sensitivity of lending to deposits on average by 40%. 
 
Further investigation is conducted on whether regional differences in bank loan 
growth are affected by financing mix. The results are reported in table 2.4 and broken 
down into columns on the basis of the continental location of the banks. Africa refers 
to the selected banks in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia for banks in Asia-Pacific, Europe 
for selected banks in Central and Eastern European countries and America for banks 
located in Latin America. The results are similar in magnitude and significant to those 
reported in table 2.3. The coefficient of the interaction of core deposit growth with the 
Lerner index (of 44.5, 51.2, 77.0 and 47.0 for Africa, Asia-Pacific, CEEC and Latin 
America respectively) indicates that lending by CEEC banks with market power are 
the least sensitive to core deposit growth.  Possible explanations could be the relative 
development of the capital markets as well as the availability of wholesale funds in 
that region. The deposit growth interaction with the log of total assets produces mixed 
results. While the size of a bank does not explain financing constraints in African 
banks, the result is positive and statistically significant in Asian and Latin American 
banks, and negative and significant among CEEC banks. These results demonstrate 
that not all large banks in developing countries have market power. It is only banks in 
CEEC that have the power to reduce the sensitivity of lending to deposit growth by   28
8.7%. More so, measures of securities, internal capital and binding leverage have the 
expected sign with the exception of binding leverage that has a positive coefficient for 
Asian banks and securities having a negative sign for African banks. This finding 
suggests that African banks with investment in securities are less sensitive to core 
deposits. 
 
2.5.2  Response of bank-lending to monetary policy stance 
With both the results of table 2.3 and the regional analysis in table 2.4, showing loan 
supply for developing countries’ banks with market power being less sensitive to the 
availability of core deposit funds, the response of lending to bank market structure 
and changes in macro variables are examined. The following model is used to 
estimate this relationship: 
 
it tc c it c it tc c it c it c it M X X M Lerner loans loans                    * ) ln( ) ln( , 3 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,    (2.6) 
 
Here, the annual loan growth of bank i for period t in country  , c c it loans , ) ln(  , is 
regressed against its lags,  1 , ) ln(   c it loans , on the bank market structure proxied by the 
Lerner index,  c it Lerner , , on a set of macrovariables,  tc M  , on the vector of bank-
specific characteristic for period t in country  , c c it X , ,  the interactions of these 
characteristics and macrovariables,  tc c it M X  * , , and the error term. The 
macrovariables are changes in short-term interest rates, a proxy for monetary policy 
stance; a change in annual output growth, a measure of GDP growth and a change in 
inflation which is measured by Consumer Price Index (CPI). The interaction with 
GDP growth and inflation is to take account of differences in changes in loan demand 
as a result of changes in output. The regression results are presented to table 2.5. The 
findings are reported in three columns, where column 1 is the monetary policy 
indicator, column 2 is GDP growth and inflation is reported in column 3. 
 
The effect of monetary policy shocks on bank lending is significantly more pronounced 
among banks in column 1. This outcome suggests that, tightening of monetary policy 
stance reduces bank lending in developing countries. The finding is consistent with   29
monetary policy theory and confirms existing empirical research that shows bank 
lending increases when policy induced interest rates falls. For example, a one unit 
decrease in interest rates as a result of monetary expansion will lead to an increase in 
bank lending by more than 5 unit points ceteris paribus. Concerning the effect of the 
degree of market power on bank lending, the result shows that developing countries 
banks with market power supply more loans. A similar result is found for bank size. 
Larger banks tend to extend more loans when demanded. The estimations with 
Capitalization as a bank characteristic show a significant and negative linear 
relationship between bank equity position and the supply of bank loans among selected 
banks. The negative and significant relationship indicates that banks in developing 
countries are more inclined towards stabilizing their capital position than using the 
funds to supply new loans to borrowers. The relationship between bank lending and 
liquidity is also unambiguously negative and significant implying that fewer loans are 
supplied when banks increase their liquidity level. The possible explanation for this 
result is that banks in developing countries accumulate liquid resources for stability 
rather than for intermediation.  
 
The interaction of Lerner index and monetary policy on one hand and its effect on the 
supply of loans on the other hand, show a negative and statistically significant 
relationship. The implication of a negative coefficient is that monetary policy is more 
effective in an environment of imperfect markets. That is, in tightening the monetary 
policy indicator, the monetary authorities in developing countries will succeed in 
reducing the supply of bank loans in a less competitive banking market. This result 
provides evidence in support of a stronger relationship between market imperfection 
and the effectiveness of the monetary policy instruments. Regarding the interactions 
with other bank-specific characteristics, the study finds that the size of a bank, the level 
of equity and liquidity position positively interact with the monetary policy indicator on 
bank lending. Well capitalised and liquid banks are in a better position to shield their 
loans from monetary policy changes. They achieve this by resorting to a higher amount 
of equity funds as well as using their buffer of liquid assets. With regard to size, the 
positive interaction with monetary policy stance demonstrates how bigger banks in 
developing countries are able to raise external funds from the capital markets in   30
financing their loan supply during monetary policy shocks. Moreover, and in line with 
the bank lending channel, large, liquid and well-resource banks are better able to buffer 
their lending activity against external shocks (Kishan and Opiela (2000), Gambacorta 
and Mistrulli (2004), and Altunbas et al. (2010)). Thus bigger, well capitalised and 
liquid banks in developing countries react less when there is a monetary shock. 
Tightening of monetary policy could therefore have less effect on the supply of bank 
loans. In sum, specific to my dataset for developing countries, the bank lending channel 
operates through the structure of the local banking market. 
 
The regression results in columns 2 and 3 of table 2.5 (where the macrovariable is GDP 
growth and inflation respectively), show a similar linear relationship result to that of 
column 1 (monetary policy stance). That is, there is a positive coefficient for the Lerner 
index and that of bank size while equity and liquidity have a negative relationship. 
However, the coefficient on the interaction term on Lerner index and bank size is less 
significant in columns 3 and 4, meaning that loan growth does not respond to the 
interaction between banking structure and the size of a bank to GDP growth and 
inflation. Conversely, the effect of equity and liquidity on the response of bank lending 
to changes in the rate of inflation is negative and positive respectively. This means that 
an increase in the liquidity position of banks reduces the negative consequence of an 
increase in the rate of inflation. The reverse position holds for an increase in the 
capitalization level of banks in relation to an increase in the rate of inflation. 
 
Having identified a differential response of bank lending to changes in macrovariables, 
the next step is to examine whether there are regional differences of bank lending 
behaviour in response to changes in monetary policy stance. Similar to table 2.4, 
banks are grouped into four regions: Africa; Asia-Pacific; Central and Eastern 
European Countries and Latin America. The regression results are reported in table 
2.6. In all cases as expected the monetary policy indicator has a negative coefficient 
for all the groupings, though relatively insignificant among Asian and Latin American 
banks. Thus tightening of the monetary policy indicator reduces bank lending in 
respective countries. On the interaction term with the Lerner index, though the results 
have a negative sign, it is only significant and pronounced in African and Latin   31
American banks. The effectiveness of monetary policy is weak in Asia and CEEC 
where the level of competition is high enough to influence the changes of a monetary 
policy shock on bank lending.   
 
2.5.3  Effect of insolvency risk on banks’ response to monetary policy stance 
As the above results provide evidence in support of a stronger relationship between 
market imperfection and the effectiveness of the monetary policy instrument, this 
section further investigates the impact of bank’s insolvency risk on the loan growth. 
Ideally, market-risk based indicators could be employed as a measure of bank risk. A 
few authors, for example (Altunbas et al., 2010) use the expected default frequency 
(EDF) as a measure of risk-taking. Even though such a database is not available for 
large sample of banks in emerging markets, the underlying assumption in the use of 
EDF is that its changes reflect a change in the bank risk taking which may not hold 
especial during a crisis (Tabak et al., 2010). In this regard, an accounting-based risk 
measure is used. Z-score is used as a bank risk condition in the following equation: 
 
it c it tc c it c it tc c it it c it M Risk M X X M Risk loan loans                       * * ) ln( ) ln( , 4 , 3 , 2 1 , 2 1 1 0 ,    (2.7) 
 
The above model specification is similar to that used in (Altunbas et al. 2010) and 
designed to examine whether bank with different levels of credit and insolvency risk 
react differently to monetary policy. In equation (2.7) the annual loan growth of bank i 
for period t in country  , c c it loan , ) ln(  , is regressed against its lags,  1 , ) ln(   c it loan , on  
bank risks,  c it Risk , , on a set of macro variables,  tc M  , on the vector of bank-specific 
characteristic for period t in country  , c c it X , ,  the interactions of these characteristics 
and macro variables,  tc c it M X  * , , the interaction of bank risk and macro variables, 
tc c it M Risk  * , , and an error term. Here the bank-specific characteristics are the bank 
size, liquidity and capitalization. The macro variables are changes in short-term interest 
rates, a proxy for monetary policy stance; a change in annual output growth, a measure 
of GDP growth and a change in inflation which is measured by Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). The interaction with GDP growth and inflation is to take care of differences in 
changes in loan demand as a result of changes in output. The regression results are   32
presented in table 2.7. The findings are reported in columns, where column 1 is the 
monetary policy indicator, column 2 is GDP growth while column 3 is inflation. 
 
On the issue of bank solvency, there is some level of evidence that the level of bank 
stability influence banks’ capacity to provide lending. The coefficient of Z-score is 
positive and statistically significant across all specifications. This implies that lower 
risk banks have financial strength to supply more loans. A unit fall in insolvency risk of 
a bank other factors being equal, will increase bank lending by more than 2 percent. 
The result further suggests that stable banks can attract external finance that enables the 
bank to have a positive consequence on bank loan supply. Similar results of the effects 
of bank size, capitalization level and liquidity on bank lending, though the magnitude is 
slightly different to the results reported in table 2.5. The interaction term between Z-
score and monetary policy has a negative sign suggesting that low insolvency risk 
banks in emerging markets are less able to reduce the sensitivity of loan growth to a 
change in monetary policy. There are several reasons in the literature why stable banks 
might reduce their lending during monetary shocks: deteriorating balance sheet of 
borrowers (Bernanke et al. 1996), future risk perception and outlook of banks (Disyatate 
2010), pro-cyclicality of banks’ equity, leverage and the funding sources (Shin 2008), 
increasing effect of lending standards on supply of loans and economic activities 
(Berrospide and Edge 2008).  
 
Graphical presentation is employed to further analyse the response of bank risk 
condition to monetary policy stance. Figure 2.2 depicts loan growth of the selected 
developing/emerging economies’ banks; figure 2.3 shows bank risk condition 
measured by (Z-score), while figure 2.4 illustrates the monetary policy indicator, 
measured using short-term interest rates.  Figure 2.5 represents the interaction term 
between Z-score and monetary policy stance and the loan growth. A rise in the 
insolvency risk of banks from 2001 to 2004 corresponds with a fall in growth of bank 
loans. The same period saw an inverse relationship between loan growth and the 
monetary policy indicator. These relationships confirm the theoretical propositions of 
bank lending channel that supply of bank loans decreases when monetary policy 
stance is tightened. Similarly, bank capacity to supply loans falls when they have high   33
insolvency risk. The relationship between the interaction term of Z-score and 
monetary policy stance on one hand, and the loan growth on the other is negative 
implying that stable banks are less sensitive in their response to the tightening of 
monetary policy stance. However, 2006 onwards depicts a positive relationship 
suggesting that banks with lower insolvency risk are not only able to extend large 
amounts of loans, but also able to insulate their supply of loans from monetary policy 
shocks. It also explains how banks in emerging economies analyse their insolvency 
risk over a lengthy period and response appropriately to policy shocks. This simple 
pictorial analysis is by no small means sufficient enough to suggest that the causality 
between bank risk conditions, monetary policy stance, and the loan growth in the 
selected countries is time bound, and cannot be captured by regression analysis. 
Therefore, there is the need for further empirical tests especially cross-section country 
specific analysis, but this is beyond the scope of current research. 
 
Figure 2.2 
Loan growth of selected banks in the emerging economies    
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Figure 2.3 
Insolvency risk of banks in the sample 
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      Data is aggregated across the years 
 
Figure 2.4 
Short-term interest rate of emerging economies 
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  Data is aggregated across the years 
 
Figure 2.5 
Response of bank risk condition to monetary policy stance        
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Next in this section is to analyse the effect of bank insolvency risk on lending as a 
result of changes in the economic and business cycle which may be due to diverse 
perceptions of this risk. That is, the introduction of additional interaction terms by 
combining insolvency risk measure with the growth rate in nominal GDP and 
inflation rate. The results reported in column 2 of table 2.7 indicate that the interaction 
term of Z-score with GDP growth is negative and statistically significant, while other 
coefficients remain unchanged. On the interaction between Z-score and inflation 
(reported column 3 of table 2.7), the result as expected is positive and significant 
indicating that stable banks are more sensitive to inflation changes and this affect the 
supply of loans. Thus a change in the inflation level has less influence on bank 
lending for banks with low insolvency risk. 
 
2.5.4  Response of bank resource allocation to a monetary policy 
This subsection of the chapter focuses on change to bank resource allocation in 
response to a monetary policy shock. Specifically it identifies and test for the 
existence of a lending channel in emerging markets. In order to correctly identify a 
monetary contraction, a reduction should not only be observed in loans but also 
securities holdings of banks (Gambacorta 2005).  A reduction in bank loans resulting 
in an increase in the securities portfolio could be the result of a reallocation of bank 
assets which is independent from exogenous monetary shocks. The empirical 
specification designed to test for the existence in bank lending is based on (Kashyap 
and Stein 1995) as: 
 
tc c it c it tc c it c it c it c it MP X X MP Lerner Risk Y Y             * ) ln( ) ln( , 3 , 2 1 , 3 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,               
  it c t c t c t c it c t c it Infla GDP MP Lerner MP Risk           , , , , 5 , , 4 * *              (2.8) 
 
The model given in equation (2.8) includes interaction terms that are the product of  the 
monetary policy stance with the Lerner index (a measure of degree of market power), Z-
score (a measure of insolvency risk), and a vector of bank specific characteristics.  c it Y ,  
is the loans or securities of bank iin period tin country c. 1 ,  c it Y  is the observation on 
the same bank in the same county in the previous year.  c it Risk , is the insolvency risk   36
while  c it Lerner , is the measure of market power, the bank-specific characteristics c it X ,  
are the bank size, liquidity and capitalization.  c t MP,  is the monetary policy indicator. 
GDP growth,  c t GDP,  and inflation,  c t Infla , are included in the model to control for 
demand effect, cyclical movements as well as serving to isolate the monetary policy 
component of short-term interest rate changes. The regression result is presented in 
table 2.8. The findings are reported in two columns, where column 1 has loan growth as 
the dependant variable and column 2 has securities growth as the dependent variable. 
 
Here, the analysis focuses on measuring the effects of monetary policy tightening on 
banks’ securities holding. This test is necessary as reduction in bank lending in the 
aftermath of monetary tightening might simple reflect a reallocation of bank assets, with 
banks increasing their security holdings. A bank lending channel exists if a contraction 
in deposits leads not only supply of bank loans, but also security holdings decrease 
(Kashyap and Stein (1995), and Stein (1998)). The result of the monetary policy stance 
on securities is negative meaning that tightening of monetary policy will lead to a 
significant reduction in bank securities holdings. This result has three implications 
(Gambacorta 2005): first of all, bank security holdings are actually used by banks to 
shield their loan portfolio. Second, the reallocation of resources from loans to security 
holdings following a monetary policy contraction does not reject the existence of a bank 
lending channel. Thirdly, the decline in bank security holdings could be greater for 
smaller and poorly capitalised banks. This is because both small and less capitalised 
banks may have a greater need to sell their securities to obtain the additional funds to 
finance their lending. These further results for equation (2.8) on securities coupled with 
the results for equation (2.5) on the sensitivity of loan growth to core deposits growth 
supports the existence of a bank lending channel in emerging economies.  
 
2.5.5 Robustness  tests 
To test the robustness of the benchmark results, some variations are made to the 
estimation of equation (2.6). The first is the regression using both random effects and 
system generalised method of moments estimators (system GMM). For the system 
GMM, dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step System General Method of Moment, 
Windmeijer-correct standard error, small sample adjustments, and orthogonal deviation   37
estimators are employed. It also addresses any endogeneity issues related to benchmark 
estimations. Several diagnostic tests are conducted to ensure that the models are fits and 
the estimations are precised and consistent. Table 2.9 reports the results and the 
diagnostic tests.
9 The regression results in terms of the sign of the variables of interest, 
monetary policy stance and the Lerner index are the same irrespective of the estimation 
techniques used (Fixed effects, random effects or system GMM). However, the 
magnitude is slightly higher when using random effects and System GMM on the 
monetary policy indicator. One percent increase in short-term interest rates (the proxy 
for monetary policy stance) ceteris paribus will reduce supply of loans by 0.5% and 
3.5% using random effects and system GMM respectively. A similar result is found for 
the Lerner index and all the interactions except the interaction term with liquidity that 
has an insignificant result when the random effects estimation method is used. Thus 
tightening of monetary policy is more effective in less competitive environments.  
 
The second robustness test concerns the construction of the Lerner index, a proxy for 
the measurement of the degree of market power. An alternative to the conventional 
version of Lerner index (which previous studies have relied upon) is explored as a 
measure of market structure. Maudos and De Guevara (2007) contend that the 
conventional Lerner index has a weakness in that the market power could have 
emanated from the deposit market because of the inclusion of funding costs in 
equation (2.2). Therefore, an alternative version of Lerner index; the funding-adjusted, 
is employed to account for market power which may not have been previously 
obtained in the deposit market and which according to (Turk Ariss 2010) may provide 
a better basis for investigation of the implication of the degree of market power on the 
bank lending channel in emerging markets. The findings are reported in table 2.10. 
Employing the funding-adjusted version of Lerner index has very little difference on 
the effect on bank loan supply. The interaction term is still negative and statistically 
significant implying that an increase in the degree of market power increases the 
effect of change in monetary policy stance. In other words, the result of the Lerner 
                                                 
9 Diagnostic tests are made and reported in table 2.9: (1) The instruments count, (2) The Hansen test for 
over identification restriction which the null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous (3) The 
Arellano-Bond tests for first and second order serial correlation in the residuals which the null hypothesis 
is that there is no serial correlation and (4) The F-test for joint significance of instruments. 
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index is the same irrespective of the version of the Lerner index used. Monetary 
policy is more effective in a less competitive market. The other variables equally 
carry the same sign and are of relatively similar magnitude in their coefficients. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on the existence and importance of 
the relationship between bank market structure and risk conditions on one hand and 
bank lending channel for monetary policy transmission on the other. Considering the 
banking structure-risk-lending channel hypothesis in assessing banks’ response to 
macroeconomic shocks is new in the monetary policy transmission literature. The 
study is conducted in the context of emerging and developing economies. Two stage 
procedures are used: first is the construction of a Lerner index as a proxy for the 
degree of bank market power and second is to use the result to test its relationship 
with the loan growth and the growth of core deposits. This is to investigate whether 
banks with market power are constrained by the availability of loanable funds which 
is a necessary condition for the existence of a bank lending channel. The findings are 
consistent in that the Lerner index interaction with deposits is negative and significant 
implying that developing country banks with market power are less sensitive to core 
deposits. 
 
With these results, the effect of annual bank loan growth on bank market structure, on 
monetary policy stance and on the interactions between the degree of market power 
and monetary policy shocks is investigated. The result is that the coefficient of the 
interaction term is significantly negative in all the estimations demonstrating the 
effect of the choice of monetary policy indicator on loan growth rates of banks. The 
core result is that banks in developing markets with high degree of market power are 
less sensitive to changes in monetary shocks to supply loans. In less competitive 
banking environments, the effectiveness of monetary policy stance on the supply of 
loans is 12.40 times more than for larger banks and 1.87 times more than for liquid 
banks in mitigating the adverse effects of monetary policy shocks. In other words, in 
tightening monetary policy indicators, the authorities in developing countries will   39
succeed in reducing the supply of bank loans if the banking environment is less 
competitive. 
 
On the issue of bank solvency, there is some level of evidence that the level of bank 
stability influence banks’ capacity to provide lending. The positive relationship 
between bank risk condition indicator and loan growth implies that lower risk banks 
have financial strength to supply more loans. The result further suggests that stable 
banks can attract external finance that enables the banks to have positive consequence 
on the bank loan supply. Interestingly, the finding reveals that banks characterised by 
low insolvency risk are unable to supply more loans when monetary policy stance is 
tightened.  
 
Several variations are made to the model in order to test its robustness. This includes 
regional groupings, the alternative construction of Lerner index (funding-adjusted 
version), the model specifications and different estimation techniques. The results are 
similar to the canonical model and thus provide empirical evidence in support of the 
argument that bank market structure and the risk conditions influence the effect of 
monetary policy transmission mechanism.   
 
Finally, this chapter makes these recommendations for policy makers: as the chapter 
underscores the significance of the need for effective institutional and regulatory 
frameworks that can resolve and offset the negative consequences of further increases 
in bank market power on the effectiveness of monetary policy through the bank 
lending channel. These regulatory and institutional measures are needed to deal with 
the effects of the current crisis on financial development as well as economic growth.  
 
The main implication of this chapter is that, bank risk conditions and that of its market 
structure need to be considered in addition to traditional indicators (i.e. bank size, 
liquidity and capitalisation) in assessing banks’ capacity, ability and willingness to 
finance economic activities. 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics averaged for the period 2000-2007 
    2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005 2006 2007 
  Aggregate  0.1991 0.4195 0.4396 0.4691  0.4918 0.4746 0.4592 0.4278 
  Africa  0.2751 0.3919 0.3953 0.4459  0.4656 0.4324 0.4112 0.3541 
Loans to assets  Asia  0.1730  0.3739  0.4316 0.4603  0.5410 0.4731 0.4459 0.4296 
  CEEC  0.1283 0.4090 0.4658 0.5033  0.5139 0.5265 0.5171 0.5033 
  Latin  America  0.1605 0.5182 0.4973 0.4743  0.4827 0.4890 0.4846 0.4709 
  Aggregate  0.1503 0.3266 0.3549 0.3574  0.3692 0.3358 0.3071 0.2653 
  Africa  0.1869 0.3097 0.3543 0.3511  0.3617 0.3247 0.3045 0.2721 
Securities to asset  Asia  0.1302  0.2796  0.2953 0.3163  0.3908 0.3190 0.2763 0.2388 
  CEEC  0.1366 0.3963 0.4027 0.3831  0.3740 0.3498 0.2907 0.2422 
  Latin  America  0.1086 0.2953 0.3289 0.3611  0.3641 0.3495 0.3542 0.3001 
  Aggregate  0.3034 0.6785 0.7041 0.7347  0.7534 0.7306 0.6829 0.6328 
  Africa  0.3815 0.6080 0.6223 0.6742  0.6769 0.6748 0.6325 0.5856 
Deposits to liabilities  Asia  0.2593  0.5219  0.5740 0.6157  0.7496 0.6350 0.5687 0.5411 
  CEEC  0.2428 0.7943 0.8509 0.8504  0.8498 0.8340 0.7650 0.6995 
  Latin  America  0.2581 0.7615 0.7504 0.7734  0.7774 0.7622 0.7445 0.6949 
  Aggregate  1,147.9 2,672.6 3,376.8 4,162.3  5,186.7 5,498.6 6,107.3 7,198.6 
  Africa  333.8 459.7 553.6 737.7  865.1 496.3 524.2 647.1 
Bank size ($m)  Asia  6,238.2  14,562.5  19,020.4  23,874.8  30,508.8  32,658.3  35,669.5  41,622.2 
  CEEC  383.3  1,300.1 1,472.9 1,669.5  1,967.0 2,386.9 2,868.5 3,503.4 
  Latin  America  579.2  1,403.7 1,664.1 1,866.4  2,106.2 2,462.7 2,877.5 3,434.4 
  Aggregate  0.0645 0.1304 0.1322 0.1361  0.1394 0.1340 0.1220 0.1074 
  Africa  0.0776 0.1200 0.1182 0.1264  0.1338 0.1327 0.1143 0.0999 
Equity  ratio  Asia  0.0617 0.0949 0.0865 0.0978  0.1110 0.0874 0.0747 0.0611 
  CEEC  0.0488 0.1382 0.1433 0.1352  0.1318 0.1254 0.1166 0.0984 
  Latin  America  0.0617 0.1630 0.1744 0.1810  0.1792 0.1781 0.1748 0.1641   41
    2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005 2006 2007 
  Aggregate  0.1554 0.3436 0.3607 0.3650  0.3704 0.3430 0.3177 0.2774 
  Africa  0.2021 0.3567 0.3916 0.3796  0.3866 0.3544 0.3365 0.2924 
Liquidity  Asia  0.0845 0.1857 0.2015 0.2152  0.2656 0.2504 0.2290 0.2215 
  CEEC  0.1312 0.4103 0.3963 0.3773  0.3631 0.3263 0.2897 0.2384 
  Latin  America  0.1401 0.3271 0.3517 0.4144  0.4147 0.4021 0.3746 0.3363 
  Aggregate  0.0365 0.0917 0.1044 0.0942  0.0864 0.0823 0.1262 0.0795 
  Africa  0.0505 0.0716 0.0658 0.0854  0.0879 0.0631 0.0712 0.0596 
Internal  Fund  Asia  0.0096 0.0368 0.0515 0.0695  0.1407 0.1431 0.0238 0.0198 
  CEEC  0.0173 0.1391 0.1016 0.1246  0.0940 0.0748 0.2700 0.3203 
  Latin  America  0.0518 0.1024 0.2192 0.0860  0.0388 0.0922 0.1051 -0.1711 
  Aggregate  0.0675 0.1325 0.1679 0.2101  0.2336 0.2355 0.2320 0.1926 
  Africa  0.1045 0.1151 0.1777 0.2553  0.2566 0.2448 0.2630 0.2481 
Lerner index  Asia  0.0301  0.1210  0.1714 0.1848  0.2402 0.1931 0.1435 0.1236 
  CEEC  0.0377 0.1418 0.1673 0.1897  0.2170 0.2214 0.2049 0.1720 
  Latin  America  0.0579 0.1621 0.1465 0.1637  0.2060 0.2633 0.2635 0.1536 
  Aggregate  7.1889 16.454 16.738 17.534  19.050 17.932 16.332 14.912 
  Africa  7.0308 11.232 11.216 13.468  14.049 13.563 12.397 10.706 
Z-score  Asia  10.339 17.255 17.882 18.747  29.979 26.203 23.725 22.256 
  CEEC  6.5297 23.453 24.164 22.831  22.196 20.590 18.306 16.740 
  Latin  America  6.3990 16.847 16.926 17.674  17.809 17.783 16.804 16.155 
  Aggregate  0.1970 0.0445 0.0522 0.0441  0.0404 0.0312 0.0313 0.0261 
  Africa  0.0277 0.0413 0.0427 0.0387  0.0405 0.0337 0.0375 0.0286 
Bad  loans  Asia  1.4022 0.0614 0.0689 0.0667  0.0663 0.0323 0.0260 0.0223 
  CEEC  0.0180 0.0272 0.0269 0.0214  0.0191 0.0162 0.0158 0.0203 
  Latin  America  0.0128 0.0638 0.0950 0.0714  0.0528 0.0462 0.0435 0.0315 
Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation. The data set comprises of 978 banks in 55 countries 
Note: All the calculations are in percentages except bank size which is in million of US dollars   42
Table 2.2 
Pair-wise correlation coefficient between selected variables 
 
Pair wise correlation coefficient estimated on sample of 978 banks across 55 countries during the period 2000-2007. * implies significant at 5% or more. Loan to assets ratio is used as a 
measure of bank loan portfolio. Securities are calculated as total securities divided by total assets. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index with the higher scores indicating a 
higher degree of pricing power. Z-score is defined as ) ( / ) / ( ROA TA E ROA Z    , where ROAis the rate of return on assets,  TA E / is the total equity to total assets. Size is natural 
log of total assets. Equity ratio measures the capitalization level of selected banks and liquidity is calculated as total liquid assets divided by total assets. Short-term interest rate is included to 
capture the stance of monetary policy. The GDP growth accounts for the differences in economic developments across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The 
monetary policy (ΔMt ) is interacted with various measures of financial constraints (including Lerner index, Z-score, size, equity and liquidity). 
 
 Loan  to 
asset 
Securiti
es to 
assets 
Lerner 
index 
Z-
score 
Size Equity  Liquidity  Lerner 
index * 
ΔMt 
Z-score 
* ΔMt 
Size* 
ΔMt 
Equity 
*ΔMt 
Liquidity 
*ΔMt 
Monetary 
policy 
GDP 
growth 
Inflation 
Loan to assets  1.000                             
Securities to assets  -0.856*  1.000                        
Lerner  index  -0.057*  0.123*  1.000                      
Z-score  0.136*  -0.086*  0.117*  1.000                    
Size  0.175*  -0.077*  0.050*  0.186*  1.000                  
Equity   -0.124*  0.123*  0.131*  0.098*  -0.426*  1.000               
Liquidity -0.686*  0.612*  0.069*  -0.10*  -0.207* 0.038*  1.000                 
Lerner index* ΔMt  0.029* -0.031*  -0.066*  -0.052  0.015 0.013 -0.035* 1.000               
Z-score* ΔMt  0.038* -0.024  0.058*  -0.056  0.063*  -0.048 -0.031*  0.654*  1.000             
Size* ΔMt  0.051* -0.038*  0.083*  0.011  0.025*  -0.007  -0.044* 0.634* 0.819*  1.000           
Equity* ΔMt   0.059* -0.047*  0.067*  -0.011  0.060*  -0.11*  -0.031* 0.511* 0.655*  0.553* 1.000        
Liquidity* ΔMt  0.087* -0.075*  0.061*  0.024  0.050*  -0.020  -0.097* 0.630* 0.754*  0.815* 0.652*  1.000       
Monetary policy  -0.14*  0.048*  0.001  -0.12*  -0.090* 0.042*  0.127*  0.137*  0.129*  0.208* 0.128*  0.229*  1.000     
GDP growth  -0.04*  0.038*  0.081*  -0.02*  0.070*  -0.015 0.045*  0.024  0.129*  0.110*  0.026* 0.062*  -0.055*  1.000   
Inflation -0.18*  0.043*  0.026*  -0.20* -0.302* 0.137*  0.243*  0.035*  0.017  0.038* -0.006  0.015  0.527*  0.068*  1.000 
Source: Bankscope, World Development Indicators and author’s own calculation 
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Table 2.3 
The sensitivity of loan growth to deposit growth and bank market power 
 
The dependent variable is loan growth which is defined as a percentage change in total loans. The 
deposits growth is measured as a percentage change in total deposits. The degree of market power is 
proxied by the Lerner Index. The natural logarithm of total assets which valued in US dollars is proxied 
for bank size. Securities is calculated as total securities divided by total assets and Internal fund is 
measured as the sum of net profit before extraordinary items and loan loss provisions relative bank 
loans at the end the period. Binding leverage is approximated by equity ratio of les than 4%. The 
deposit growth is interacted with various measures of financial constraints (including Lerner index, log 
of total assets, securities, internal capital and the binding leverage). Inflation is the rate of inflation 
based on the CPI. Growth in total output is proxied for GDP growth. All regressions are estimated 
using country and time fixed effects and clustering at bank level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% level respectively 
 
  1 2 3  4  5  6 
Deposit  growth  0.426*** 0.397*** 0.277***  0.324***  0.364***  0.633*** 
  (0.019) (0.042) (0.026)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.063) 
Lerner  index  0.039*** 0.028*** 0.027***  0.028***  0.0301***  0.042*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Log assets  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003 -0.003  -0.003 -0.0004 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Securities  -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.139***  -0.133***  -0.139***  -0.140*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Internal capital  -0.033  -0.029  -0.027 -0.025  -0.029 -0.043** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Binding leverage  -0.060*  -0.082** -0.081**  -0.092**  -0.101***  -0.059* 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Lerner index*deposit growth  -0.40***          -0.454*** 
  (0.047)        (0.0517) 
Log assets*deposit growth    -0.015**        -0.028*** 
    (0.007)      (0.008) 
Securities*deposit  growth    0.094      0.106* 
    (0.057)      (0.060) 
Internal  capt*deposit  growth      -0.118    0.115 
      (0.091)    (0.102) 
Binding lev*deposit growth          -0.256***  -0.491*** 
        (0.070)  (0.079) 
Inflation  -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005  -0.000  -0.0005 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
GDP  growth  0.0006  -0.0003  -0.0001 -0.0003  -0.0004 0.0007 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant 0.100***  0.098***  0.107*** 0.110***  0.111*** 0.079** 
  (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Observation  4649 4649 4649  4649  4649  4649 
Country  fixed  effects  Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering level  Bank  Bank  Bank Bank  Bank Bank 
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Table 2.4 
The sensitivity of loan growth to deposit growth and market power: Regional Analysis 
The dependent variable is loan growth which is defined as a percentage change in total loans. The 
deposits growth is measured as a percentage change in total deposits. The degree of market power 
is proxied by the Lerner Index. The natural logarithm of total assets which valued in US dollars is 
proxied for bank size. Securities is calculated as total securities divided by total assets and 
Internal fund is measured as the sum of net profit before extraordinary items and loan loss 
provisions relative bank loans at the end the period. Binding leverage is approximated by equity 
ratio of les than 4%. The deposit growth is interacted with various measures of financial 
constraints (including Lerner index, log of total assets, securities, internal capital and the binding 
leverage). Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. Growth in total output is proxied for 
GDP growth. The results are presented in columns, basing on the continental groupings. Africa 
refers to banks selected in Sub-Saharan African countries; Asia for banks in Asia-pacific, Europe 
for selected banks in Central and Eastern European countries and America for selected banks in 
Latin America countries. All regressions are estimated using country and time fixed effects and 
clustering at bank level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 Africa  Asia  Europe  Latin 
America 
Deposit  growth  0.7702*** -0.418***  1.0420*** -0.1036 
  (0.1804) (0.1799)  (0.1104) (0.1357) 
Lerner index  0.0527*  0.0149  0.0877***  0.0280 
  (0.0292) (0.0118)  (0.0183) (0.0196) 
Log assets  -0.0210*  0.0362***  0.0149**  -0.0007 
  (0.0114) (0.0068)  (0.0064) (0.0089) 
Securities  -0.1206*** -0.150***  -0.1117*** -0.194*** 
  (0.0394) (0.0172)  (0.0217) (0.0278) 
Internal capital  -0.1343*  0.0902  -0.2573***  0.0463 
  (0.0741) (0.0924)  (0.0410) (0.0310) 
Binding  leverage  0.0254 -0.0179  0.0369 0.0097 
  (0.0963) (0.0468)  (0.0498) (0.0670) 
Lerner index*deposit growth  -0.4452***  -0.512***  -0.7702***  -0.470*** 
  (0.1385) (0.1374)  (0.1264) (0.0828) 
Log assets*deposit growth  -0.0039  0.0534***  -0.0870***  0.1083*** 
  (0.0263) (0.0212)  (0.0170) (0.0214) 
securities*deposit growth  -0.5377***  0.5553***  0.6081***  0.2659*** 
  (0.1941) (0.1048)  (0.1156) (0.1032) 
Internal capital*deposit growth  0.3247  -0.4779  -0.8847***  0.5482*** 
  (0.3160) (0.8555)  (0.2579) (0.1463) 
Binding leverage*deposit growth  -0.9900***  0.9732***  -0.7466***  -0.371*** 
  (0.3063) (0.1728)  (0.1590) (0.1412) 
Inflation 0.0192***  -0.0044  -0.0080***  0.0053 
  (0.0058) (0.0030)  (0.0031) (0.0054) 
GDP growth  -0.0144**  0.00008  -0.0097  0.0019 
  (0.0074) (0.0046)  (0.0062) (0.0078) 
Constant 0.1946***  -0.259***  -0.0155  0.0700 
  (0.0757) (0.0624)  (0.0508) (0.0689) 
Observation  1020 877  1528 1224 
Country  fixed  effects Y Y  Y Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering  level  Bank Bank  Bank Bank 
   45
Table 2.5 
The response of Loan growth to macro variables  
 
The dependent variable is loan growth which is defined as a percentage change in total loans. This 
is regressed against the degree of market power, bank characteristic and interaction of these 
variables with macro variables. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index. The 
bank characteristics include the natural logarithm of total assets which valued in US dollars is 
proxied for bank size; equity measures the capitalization level of selected banks and liquidity is 
calculated as total liquid assets divided by total assets. The macro variables (ΔMt) are short-term 
interest rate; a measure of monetary policy stance, inflation is the rate of inflation based on the 
CPI and growth in total output which is proxied for GDP growth. All regressions are estimated 
using country and time fixed effects and clustering at bank level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
  Macro variables 
  1 2  3 
  Monetary policy  GDP growth  Inflation 
ΔMonetary policy  -0.5047***  -0.0156  0.0203 
 (0.1602)  (0.0281)  (0.0242) 
Lerner index  0.0245**  0.0233**  0.0394*** 
 (0.0121)  (0.0121)  (0.0119) 
Log assets  0.0227***  0.0237***  0.0167*** 
 (0.0056)  (0.0056)  (0.0056) 
Equity -0.2827***  -0.2943***  -0.3758*** 
 (0.0386)  (0.0379)  (0.0378) 
liquidity -0.1053***  -0.0992***  -0.1127*** 
 (0.0147)  (0.0149)  (0.0148) 
Lerner index*ΔMt -0.5408***  0.0029  -0.0059 
 (0.1329)  (0.0133)  (0.0082) 
Log assets*ΔMt 0.0436*  -0.0011 -0.0002 
 (0.0238)  (0.0009)  (0.0005) 
Equity*ΔMt 1.2054***  0.0312  -0.0509*** 
 (0.2044)  (0.0257)  (0.0180) 
liquidity*ΔMt 0.2890*  0.0033  0.0177** 
 (0.1646)  (0.0108)  (0.0090) 
Loan growth-1 -0.1209*** -0.1417***  -0.1225*** 
 (0.0161)  (0.0159)  (0.0160) 
GDP growth  0.0105**  0.0115**  0.0103** 
 (0.0047)  (0.0059)  (0.0047) 
Inflation 0.0006  0.0015  0.0032 
 (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0037) 
Constant -0.0147*  -0.0210  0.0311 
 (0.0394)  (0.0402)  (0.0399) 
Observation 3963  3900  3935   
Country fixed effects  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering level  Bank  Bank  Bank 
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Table 2.6 
Response of Loan Growth to monetary policy stance: Regional Analysis 
 
Loan growth is the dependent variable that is regressed against the monetary policy stance, the 
degree of market power, a set of bank characteristic and interaction of these bank characteristics 
variables with monetary policy stance. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index. 
The bank characteristics include the natural logarithm of total assets which valued in US dollars is 
proxied for bank size; equity measures the capitalization level of selected banks and liquidity is 
calculated as total liquid assets divided by total assets. Short-term interest rate is proxied for 
monetary policy stance. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI and the growth in total 
output which is proxied for GDP growth. The results are presented in columns, basing on the 
continental groupings. Africa refers to banks selected in Sub-Saharan African countries; Asia for 
banks in Asia-pacific, Europe for selected banks in Eastern and Central European countries and 
America for selected banks in Latin America countries. All regressions are estimated using 
country and time fixed effects and clustering at bank level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% level 
respectively 
 
  Africa Asia  Europe America 
ΔMonetary policyt -1.5372***  -0.4073  -1.2889**  -0.3223 
  (0.5492) (0.7633) (0.6040)  (0.2552) 
Lerner  index  0.0062 0.0172 0.0333  0.0316** 
  (0.0245) (0.0137) (0.0218)  (0.0277) 
Log  assets  0.0320*** 0.0513*** 0.0183**  0.0362*** 
  (0.0119) (0.0091) (0.0083)  (0.0155) 
Equity -0.19859**  0.1240***  -0.2713***  -0.4431*** 
  (0.0940) (0.0446) (0.0673)  (0.0877) 
liquidity  -0.1211*** -0.0855*** -0.0675**  -0.1150*** 
  (0.0298) (0.0198) (0.0287)  (0.0311) 
Lerner index* ΔMonetary policy  -0.9503**  -0.4141  -0.1254  -0.5449*** 
  (0.3924) (0.5721) (0.4150)  (0.2136) 
Log assets *ΔMonetary policy  0.1571**  0.0920  0.0883  0.0177* 
  (0.0671) (0.0784) (0.0727)  (0.0465) 
Equity *ΔMonetary policy  2.8497**  -1.8229  2.0032*  0.8897*** 
  (1.0989) (1.9867) (1.1701)  (0.3141) 
liquidity *ΔMonetary policy  0.9297**  -0.8335  0.8593*  0.3327* 
  (0.4567) (0.8226) (0.4781)  (0.2808) 
Loan growth-1  -0.0812*** -0.2618*** -0.0620**  -0.2147*** 
  (0.0295) (0.0376) (0.0266)  (0.0373) 
GDP  growth  0.0106 0.0105 -0.0093 0.0233** 
  (0.0084) (0.0078) (0.0079)  (0.0138) 
Inflation 0.0098  -0.0009  -0.0058  0.0166 
  (0.0061) (0.0044) (0.0043)  (0.0084) 
Constant -0.0015  -0.4066***  -0.0000  -0.1262 
  (0.0691) (0.0775) (0.0676)  (0.1108) 
Observation  886 748 1289 1040 
Country  fixed  effects  Y Y Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering  level  Bank Bank Bank  Bank 
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Table 2.7 
Effect of insolvency risk on banks’ response to monetary policy stance 
 
The dependent variable is loan growth which is defined as a percentage change in total loans. This 
is regressed against insolvency risk, bank characteristic and interaction of these variables with 
macro variables. The insolvency risk is proxied by the Z-score. The bank characteristics include 
the natural logarithm of total assets which valued in US dollars is proxied for bank size; equity 
measures the capitalization level of selected banks and liquidity is calculated as total liquid assets 
divided by total assets. The macro variables (ΔMt) are short-term interest rate; a measure of 
monetary policy stance, inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI and growth in total 
output which is proxied for GDP growth. All regressions are estimated using country and time 
fixed effects and clustering at bank level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicates statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% level respectively. 
  Macro variables 
  1 2  3 
  Monetary policy  GDP growth  Inflation 
Δ Monetary policyt -0.0542***  -0.0085*  -0.0151*** 
 (0.0169)  (0.0049)  (0.0051) 
Z-score 0.0235***  0.0371***  0.0142*** 
 (0.0074)  (0.0091)  (0.0080) 
Size 0.0193***  0.0162***  0.0186*** 
 (0.0054)  (0.0060)  (0.0057) 
Equity -0.4451***  -0.4806***  -0.3899*** 
 (0.0487)  (0.0667)  (0.0536) 
liquidity -0.1050***  -0.1297***  -0.1161*** 
 (0.0147)  (0.0237)  (0.0185) 
Z-score *ΔMt -0.0073**  -0.1488*  0.1677*** 
 (0.0028)  (0.0870)  (0.0467) 
Size *ΔMt 0.0070***  -0.0254  0.0015 
 (0.0020)  (0.0347)  (0.0186) 
Equity *ΔMt 0.1009***  -0.0328  -1.213*** 
 (0.0218)  (0.7042)  (0.3334) 
liquidity *ΔMt 0.0130  0.3336  0.0841 
 (0.0164)  (0.2854)  (0.1398) 
Loan growth-1 -0.1309***  -0.1329***  -0.1459*** 
 (0.0156)  (0.0156)  (0.0155) 
GDP growth  0.0123***  0.0297***  0.0147*** 
 (0.0046)  (0.0084)  (0.0047) 
Inflation 0.0014  0.0030  -0.0102*** 
 (0.0028)  (0.0030)  (0.0036) 
Constant -0.0304  -0.0166  0.0240 
 (0.0417)  (0.0443)  (0.0436) 
Observation 4048  4048  4048 
Country fixed effect  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed effect  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering level  Bank  Bank  Bank 
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Table 2.8 
Response of bank resource allocation to a monetary policy stance 
The dependent variable in column (1) is loan growth which is defined as a percentage change in 
total loans and that of column (2) is the growth of bank securities which is measured as a 
percentage change in total securities holdings. These are regressed against risk, the degree of 
market power and bank characteristic and interaction of these variables with monetary policy 
stance. The insolvency risk is proxied by the Z-score. The degree of market power is proxied by 
the Lerner Index. The bank characteristics include log of total assets which valued in US dollars is 
proxied for bank size; equity measures the capitalization level of selected banks and liquidity is 
calculated as total liquid assets divided by total assets. GDP growth and inflation are included to 
control for demand effect, cyclical movements as well as serving to isolate the monetary policy 
component of short-term interest rate changes. All regressions are estimated using country and 
time fixed effects and clustering at bank level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
  Column (1)  Column (2) 
Δ Monetary policyt -0.0463***  -0.5320*** 
 (0.0171)  (0.0868) 
Lerner index  0.0148  -0.0996 
 (0.0136)  (0.0682) 
Z-score 0.0219**  0.0147 
 (0.0087)  (0.0427) 
Size 0.0231***  0.00393 
 (0.0057)  (0.0288) 
Equity -0.4334***  -0.4240* 
 (0.0527)  (0.2416) 
liquidity -0.1061***  0.4927*** 
 (0.0148)  (0.0752) 
Lerner index* ΔMonetary policy  -0.0288**  0.1002 
 (0.0128)  (0.0656) 
Z-score *ΔMonetary policy  -0.0062**  0.0469*** 
 (0.0030)  (0.0159) 
Size *ΔMonetary policy  0.0070***  0.0372*** 
 (0.0020)  (0.0105) 
Equity *ΔMonetary policy  0.0849***  0.1513 
 (0.0235)  (0.1201) 
liquidity *ΔMonetary policy  0.0157  0.2938*** 
 (0.0166)  (0.0839) 
Loan growth-1
a -0.12947***   
 (0.0159)   
Securities growth-1
b   -0.1389*** 
   (0.0128) 
GDP growth  0.0104**  -0.0063 
 (0.0047)  (0.0243) 
Inflation 0.0013  0.0092 
 (0.0028)  (0.0147) 
Observation 3994  4110 
Country fixed effect  Y  Y 
Time fixed effect  Y  Y 
Clustering level  Bank  Bank 
a,Loan growth-1 and 
bsecurities growth-1 were not used as regressors in column  2 and 1 respectively. This is 
because the objective of this section is to test for the existing of bank lending channel in emerging markets. More 
so, the effect of investment in securities on loan growth is reported in table 2.3 and 2.4 and explained accordingly.   49
Table 2.9 
Robustness checks of regression results 
The dependent variable is loan growth and is regressed against the degree of market power, bank 
characteristic and interaction of these variables with macro variables. The degree of market power is 
proxied by the Lerner Index. The bank characteristics include the natural logarithm of total assets 
which valued in US dollars is proxied for bank size; equity measures the capitalization level of selected 
banks and liquidity is calculated as total liquid assets divided by total assets. The macro variables (ΔMt) 
are short-term interest rate; a measure of monetary policy stance, inflation and growth in total output 
which is proxied for GDP growth. For the estimation, random effect and dynamic panel-data 
estimation, Two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-correct standard error, small-sample adjustments, and 
orthogonal deviation are used. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% level respectively. On SYS GMM we tests: (1) 
Observation (2) The instruments count, (3) The Hansen test for over identification restriction which the 
null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous (4) The Arellano-bond tests for first and second order 
serial correlation in the residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. (5) The 
F-test for joint significance of instruments. 
  Macro variables  Macro variables 
 Monetary 
policy 
GDP 
growth 
Inflation Monetary 
policy 
GDP 
growth 
Inflation 
  Bank-level RE  System GMM 
ΔMonetary policy  -0.544***  -0.053** -0.002  -3.576***  -0.396** -0.087 
  (0.156) (0.026) (0.023) (1.183) (0.176) (0.089) 
Lerner index  0.035***  0.036**  0.045***  0.032  0.012  0.032 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.034) (0.016) (0.042) 
Log assets  -0.011***  -0.011***  -0.012*** -0.003  -0.009*  -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Equity -0.143***  -0.131***  -0.178*** -0.254**  -0.194  -0.277** 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.122) (0.156) (0.140) 
liquidity -0.027***  -0.018** -0.030***  0.083**  0.047*** 0.057*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.036) (0.017) (0.018) 
Lerner index*ΔMt -0.629***  -0.005  -0.013**  -0.443  0.057*  -0.076** 
  (0.127) (0.012) (0.008) (0.862) (0.034) (0.034) 
Log assets*ΔMt  0.055**  -0.000 -0.000 0.189* -0.000 -0.002 
  (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.107) (0.002) (0.001) 
Equity*ΔMt 1.28***  0.007  -0.055***  4.256***  -0.027  0.030 
  (0.198) (0.024) (0.017) (1.284) (0.112) (0.111) 
liquidity*ΔMt  0.1519  0.004 0.014 2.511**  -0.065**  0.043 
  (0.154) (0.010) (0.008) (1.218) (0.029) (0.040) 
Loan growth-1 -0.002  0.005  -0.006  0.140***  0.135***  0.136*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.057) (0.051) (0.050) 
GDP  growth  0.017*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.048*** 0.038**  0.032* 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
Inflation 0.008***  0.008***  0.013*** 0.015  0.017**  0.022* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) 
Diagnostics tests        
No. of observations  3963  3900  3935  3935  3823  3906 
Number of instruments        106  107  106 
Hasen     101.09  99.78  101.88 
P-value     0.161  0.204  0.148 
AB2       1.52  2.69  1.52 
P-value     0.129  0.007  0.128 
F-test     10.22  12.07  15.82 
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Table 2.10 
Response of Loan Growth to Macro variables: Alternative measure of Lerner index 
 
The dependent variable is loan growth which is defined as a percentage change in total loans. This 
is regressed against the degree of market power, bank characteristic and interaction of these 
variables with macro variables. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner (funding 
adjusted) Index. The bank characteristics include the natural logarithm of total assets which valued 
in US dollars is proxied for bank size; equity measures the capitalization level of selected banks 
and liquidity is calculated as total liquid assets divided by total assets. The macro variables (ΔMt) 
are short-term interest rate; a measure of monetary policy stance, inflation is the rate of inflation 
based on the CPI and growth in total output which is proxied for GDP growth. All regressions are 
estimated using country and time fixed effects and clustering at bank level. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% 
level respectively. 
 
  Macro variables 
  Monetary policy  GDP growth  Inflation 
ΔMonetary policyt -0.2968*  -0.0171  0.0315 
 (0.1680)  (0.0284)  (0.0241) 
Lerner (funding adjusted) version -0.0221  -0.0168  -0.0168 
 (0.0163)  (0.0162)  (0.0161) 
Log assets  0.0244***  0.0260***  0.0191*** 
 (0.0055)  (0.0055)  (0.0056) 
Equity -0.2741***  -0.2834***  -0.3586*** 
 (0.0377)  (0.0371)  (0.0371) 
liquidity -0.1022***  -0.0929***  -0.1084*** 
 (0.0147)  (0.0149)  (0.0148) 
Lerner index(funding adjusted) *ΔMt -0.5982***  0.0157  -0.0155 
 (0.1771)  (0.0151)  (0.0100) 
Log assets*ΔMt 0.0559**  -0.0024*  0.0007 
 (0.0262)  (0.0014)  (0.0009) 
Equity*ΔMt 1.0194***  0.0296  -0.0367** 
 (0.1865)  (0.0264)  (0.0177) 
liquidity*ΔMt 0.2643  -0.00009  0.0168* 
 (0.1660)  (0.0110)  (0.0091) 
Loan growth-1 -0.1102***  -0.1282***  -0.1110*** 
 (0.0161)  (0.0158)  (0.0160) 
GDP growth  0.0122**  0.0131**  0.0121** 
 (0.0047)  (0.0059)  (0.0048) 
Inflation 0.0013  0.0023  0.0038 
 (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0037) 
Constant -0.0123  -0.0272  -0.0216 
 (0.0388)  (0.0392)  (0.0452) 
Observation 3929  3865  3904 
Country fixed effects  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering level  Bank  Bank  Bank 
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Does bank competition and diversification lead to greater stability? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
A tension exists in the literature as to whether or not competition contributes to 
banking stability. On one side, proponents of the so called ‘charter value’ hypothesis 
argue that banks with greater market power are able to protect their charter value 
because they are not income constrained. On the other side, are those who hold the 
view that banks in uncompetitive markets are prone to originate riskier loans which 
are detrimental to their stability. Using a panel dataset of 978 banks, Panzar and Rosse 
(1987) H-statistic and the Lerner index as measures of the degree of competition in 
the banking sector, and employing three stage least squares (3sls) estimation 
techniques, this chapter provides additional empirical insight into these conflicting 
views by arguing that competition affects banks’ solvency not only through the 
traditional channels, but also through decisions to diversify their business activities. 
The core finding is that competition increases stability as diversification across and 
within both interest and non-interest income generating activities of banks increases. 
The results are robust to an array of controls including alternative methodology, 
variable specifications and the regulatory environments that banks operate in.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Competition in banking is important for the efficiency of production of financial 
services, the quality of financial products and the degree of financial innovation 
(Vives (2001), and Claessens and Laeven (2004)). The literature has identified six 
reasons why competition in the financial sector is important: firstly, for firms and 
households to access financial services (Beck et al., 2004), secondly, for external 
financing (Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Claessens and Laeven (2005)), thirdly, for 
efficient management of financial intermediaries (Berger and Hannan 1998), fourthly, 
for the stability of the financial system (Boyd et al. (2004), and Schaeck et al. (2009)), 
fifthly, for the improvement of the monetary policy transmission rate to bank market 
rates (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008), and finally, for overall industrial and economic 
growth (Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), and Allen and Gale (2004)). 
 
On the competition-stability relationship, the literature is inconclusive especially for 
non-industrial countries (Berger et al. 2004). Proponents of the so called ‘charter 
value’ hypothesis argue that banks with greater market power are able to protect their 
charter value because they are not income constrained and are less likely to take on 
more risk that would affect their stability. This according to some studies enables 
banks to act more prudently thus lowering their insolvency risk (Keeley (1990), 
Hellman et al. (2000), Matutes and Vives (2000), and Repullo (2004)). There are 
others who reject this hypothesis with the view that banks in uncompetitive markets 
are prone to not only originating riskier loans which are detrimental to their stability, 
they are also prone to exacerbating moral hazard issues by setting high loan rates that 
affect borrowers’ financial position (Mishkin (1999), and Caminal and Matutes 
(2002), Boyd and Nicolo, (2005)). This chapter revisits the debate on the competition-
stability nexus, by examining the relationship between competition, diversification 
and stability. Specifically, it empirically analyse these questions: Is bank 
diversification a response to the competitive environment? Does the decision to 
diversify affect bank stability?  In support of a non-structural new empirical industrial 
organisation; portfolio and intermediation theories, the results suggest that strategic 
decisions by banks to diversify their activities in response to the competitive 
environment affects their stability.   54
Vives (2010) conducts a survey on the trade-off between competition and stability in 
banking and reveals two basic channels through which competition affects stability. 
Competition may affect stability either by exacerbating the coordination problem of 
depositors/investors on the liability side and fostering bank runs and/ or panics which 
may be of a systemic nature, or increasing the incentive to take risk on either the 
liability and/or assets side thereby raising failure probabilities. The 2007 financial 
crisis has also identified bank funding structure and financial innovation in bank 
activities as potential sources through which competition may affect stability.  Banks 
especially in the UK and US that mostly rely on wholesale funding have been seen to 
be severely affected by the crisis, while those in Canada and Australia have been 
resilient because of their reliance on depository funding (OECD 2010).  Equally, 
financial instruments such as loans sales, credit defaults and derivatives have also 
turned out to be important sources of instability in the financial sector. This study is 
proposing that competition pressurizes banks to adopt strategies to diversify and this 
decision directly affects bank insolvency risk. 
 
Apart from changes in the competitive environment that trigger banks to diversify 
their activities, Gardener and Molyneux (1990); banks other decisions to diversify 
include: a strategy to hedge against insolvency risk that reduces the occurrences of 
costly financial distress (Froot and Stein 1998);  a mechanism to improve profitability 
and operational efficiency especially if the scale and the scope of the bank’s 
operations increase (Landskroner et al. 2005); to reinforce the function of banks as 
delegated monitors, thereby increasing the volume of intermediation, Baele et at. 
(2007); and to lower cyclical variations in profits if returns across bank operations are 
non-perfectly correlated (Acharyer et al. (2006), and Lepetit et al. (2008a)). Despite 
these reasons, the impact of diversification on bank insolvency risk has been mixed. 
Stiroh (2004), Acharya et al. (2006), Hirttle and Stiroh (2007) and Mercieca et al. 
(2007) find no benefits for diversification. On the contrary, researchers such as 
Campa and Kedia (2002), landskroner et al. (2005), Baela et al. (2007) and Sanya and 
Wolfe (2010) reveal that diversification increases bank stability. Though the above 
arguments present a sound theoretical and empirical underpinning of the relationship 
between competition, diversification and stability, to the best of my knowledge this   55
chapter is the first to investigate the role of diversification in the competition-stability 
relationship employing a microeconomic dataset for banks in developing and 
emerging economies. 
 
The main contribution of this chapter is to empirically analyse the significance of 
diversification on the relationship between competition and stability. It is a novel 
approach in this area of research. To achieve this, the three stage least squares (3SLS) 
is employed to simultaneously analyse the effect of diversification on competition and 
stability. It controls for the well-known econometric problems introduced by the 
endogeneity bias from both the competitive measure and revenue diversification.  The 
Panzar and Rosse (1987)’s H-statistic is employed as a measure of banking 
competition. This measure is relatively superior to other methods for competition 
because it is drawn from bank micro data and accounts for bank-specific differences 
in the production function. In addition, the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model provides a 
better theoretical measure of competition and has been used to estimate the 
competitiveness of banking industries. An alternative competitive measure, Lerner 
index and methodological specification, instrumental variables, 2sls estimations 
techniques are also employed to check the robustness of the results. Revenue 
diversification is measured by constructing Herfindahl Hirschman Indices (HHI) for 
each bank. This measure accounts for diversification between banks’ major activities: 
net-interest income and non-interest income (Mercieca et al. 2007). On bank overall 
performance measures, Z-score; risk adjusted profits; bank capitalization level; and 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans are used. The Z-score uses bank 
level data and potentially measures the accounting distant to default for a given bank. 
It measures the overall bank insolvency risk (Boyd et al. 2009); the risk adjusted 
profit is used as a measure of profitability; the volume of non-performing loans to 
total gross loans measures bank loan portfolio risk; while the equity capital to asset 
ratio accounts for the bank capitalization level (Berger et al. 2009). 
 
The results show that competition increases bank stability. This is because banks 
make decisions to diversify their portfolio in response to the competitive environment 
in which they operate. Furthermore, the results show that competition does not only   56
improve stability, it also enhances banks’ performance measured by risk adjusted 
return on assets (RAROA) and on equity (RAROE). More importantly, these 
relationships hold when non-performing loan ratio and bank capitalization are used as 
measures of stability. On contestability, the results reveal that the regulatory initiative 
that requires high regulatory capital and protects property rights reduces insolvency 
risk. The overall contribution of this chapter is to show empirically that competition 
increases bank stability, but the effect could be due to the strategic decision that banks 
make to diversify their portfolio in response to the competitive environment in which 
they operate. Liberalizing emerging economies’ financial sectors also saw a positive 
impact on stability.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section (3.2) reviews both theoretical 
and empirical arguments on the relationship between banking sector competition, 
diversification, and stability, section (3.3) specifies the measurement and construction 
of the key variables used, section (3.4) contains the data and econometric 
specifications, while section (3.5) discusses and presents the empirical results, and 
finally, section (3.6) concludes. 
 
3.2       Literature review 
 
3.2.1  Theoretical overview on competition-stability nexus  
The theoretical literature on the link between competition and stability is 
inconclusive. On one hand competition in banking improves stability and in contrast, 
others argue that competition adversely affects banking stability. Those with the 
‘competition-fragility view’ suggest that monopolistic banks operating in 
uncompetitive banking systems may enhance profits and reduce financial fragility by 
maintaining higher levels of capital that protects them from external economic and 
liquidity shocks. Indeed, a bank with more market power enjoys higher profits and 
has more to lose if it takes on more risk (Vives 2010).  In support of this argument, 
(Keeley, (1990), and Hellman et al. (2000)) provide the so-called ‘franchise value’ 
hypothesis. As a higher franchise value will result in higher opportunity costs when 
bankruptcy occurs, bank managers as well as shareholders may not accept risky   57
investments that could affect the stability of the firm and thereby jeopardize their 
future earning streams. Matutes and Vives (2000) also consider an imperfect 
competition model where banks are differentiated, have limited liability and there are 
social costs of failure. They show that, deposits rate is high when competition is 
intense and the social cost of failure is high. Furthermore, Boot and Thankor, (2000) 
suggest that because large banks tend to engage in credit rationing, they have fewer, 
but higher quality credit investments which enhance their financial soundness. 
Besides, market power in the banking sector could lead to higher quality of loan 
portfolios, improved capital allocation and thus maximize economic growth. (Manove 
et al. (2000), and Cetorelli and Peretto (2000)) models suggest that increased 
concentration in the banking sector and reduction in information asymmetry gives 
incumbent banks the opportunity to screen and differentiate between low and high 
quality borrowers. Larger banks are also in a position to diversify their loan-portfolio 
risks more efficiently because of their economies of scale and operations. In addition, 
large banks engage in cross-border activities which enable them to gain economies of 
scale and scope through geographic risk diversification (Boyd and Prescott (1986), 
and Meon and Weill (2005)). On the issue of monitoring, Allen and Gale (2000) argue 
that a banking system with fewer large banks may be easier to monitor. Therefore, 
supervision of banks may be effective and the risk of systemic crisis resulting from 
contagion may be diminished.  
 
The proponents of the ‘competition-stability view’ on the other hand, argue that larger 
banks are often more likely to receive public guarantees and thus, are inefficiently 
managed and likely to fail. Under Mishkin (1999), the so-called ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
concept posits that as banks become too large, the moral hazard problem becomes 
more severe for the manager who takes on risky investments with the knowledge of 
being protected under the government’s safety net. Moreover, the higher loan rates 
charge by monopolistic banks may induce borrowers to take on risky investments to 
compensate higher loan repayments. Thus, the likelihood of loan defaults may 
increase and induce a higher probability of bank failure (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). 
It is argued that a bank’s size is associated with organisational complexity making it 
difficult to manage efficiently. Also, the bank’s size allows it to expand across   58
multiple geographical markets, business lines and complex financial instruments 
which can be detrimental to their stability.  
 
There are others who find competition-stability relationship to be ambiguous 
(Caminal and Matutes, (2002), Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), and Martinez-Miera and 
Repullo (2008)). The ambiguity of the relationship has to do with issues related to the 
cost of monitoring and credit rationing. Caminal and Matutes (2002) argue that when 
monitoring costs of loans are high, banks do not monitor their borrowers regardless of 
the market structure they operate, though banks in a competitive market are more 
likely to fail due to their low lending rates. Again, on monitoring costs, it is only a 
bank with monopoly power that has a bigger incentive to exert monitoring effort and 
thus faces no need to credit-ration loan applicants. In such a situation Caminal and 
Matutes (2002) argue that a monopoly bank will be exposed to more aggregate risk 
than a competitive bank and thus more likely to fail. However, in a case where the 
monitoring cost is very low, every bank will monitor and this results in quality capital. 
In this latter case a bank failure is independent of market structure (Caminal and 
Matutes, 2002). Thus when both firms and banks have to monitor their investments 
there is a potential ambiguous relationship between competition and risk-taking. 
 
3.2.2  Evidence on competition-stability relationship 
Recent empirical literature on the relationship between competition and banking 
system stability has revealed ambiguous results. De Nicolo et al. (2004) use the 500 
largest conglomerate financial firms across 90 countries and reveal that a higher level 
of systemic risk is positively associated with a concentrated banking system. 
Similarly, De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2006) use a large sample of bank 
observations in 133 developing countries and find a positive and significant 
relationship between bank concentration and bank risk of failure. The result is even 
stronger when bank ownership is controlled and strongest when state-owned banks 
have sizeable market shares. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) use a dataset of 25 
countries within the EU and find a negative relationship between bank concentration 
and financial soundness. In contrast to De Nicolo et al. (2004), De Nicolo and 
Loukoianova (2006), and Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009)), Beck et al. (2006a. 2006b)   59
provide empirical evidence that suggest that increased banking concentration does not 
result in higher banking system fragility. They use a dataset on 69 countries over the 
period 1980-1997. Schaeck and Cihak (2010) and Schaeck et al. (2009), find evidence 
for the trade off between competition and banks’ risk-taking behaviour. Their study 
reveals that banks hold higher capital buffers when operating in a more competitive 
environment and that competitive banking system are less prone to experience 
systemic crisis. Berger at al. (2009) find support for the ‘two views’, using dataset of 
23 industrialised economies. On the competition-stability, their study reveals that 
banks with a higher degree of market power bear significantly more loan portfolio 
risk. For the competition-fragility view, their findings suggest that banks with more 
market power have less overall risk exposure. Boyd et al. (2009) employ two dataset 
(2,500 US banks and a panel dataset of about 2,600 banks in 134 emerging 
economies) find that banks’ probability of failure is positively and significantly 
related to concentration. Turk Ariss (2010) reveals that an increase in the degree of 
market power increases bank stability as well as banks’ profit efficiency for a sample 
of 821 banks across 60 countries. A comprehensive review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the likely trade-off between competition and stability shows 
that competition may increase instability because of the failure of banks to effectively 
manage their liabilities as well as banks having incentives to take risk (Vives, 2010).  
 
3.2.3  What drives these differences in the literature? 
Theoretical literature as reviewed in section 3.2.1 provides no distinction among the 
various competitive measures. However, the empirical evidence makes a series of 
ambiguous and contrasting results, depending on the data, sample size, period 
examines and the measurements of competition and stability as well as the channel of 
the instability. Three different approaches (structural, contestability and direct or non-
structural) have been used in the literature to measure competition, with each having a 
different impact on financial sector stability. For example, studies such (Beck et al. 
(2006a), De Nicolo and Loukoianova, (2006), Boyd et al. (2009), and Uhde and 
Heimesoff (2009)) employ structural methodology like concentration ratio as a proxy 
for competition and have contrasting effect on Z-score, a measure of stability. Those 
who use the so called new empirical industrial organisation approach such as H-  60
statistic and Lerner index, to some extent produce similar effects of competition on 
stability. These include (Berger et al. (2009), Schaeck et al. (2009), and Schaeck and 
Cihak, (2010)). Thus the tension in the literature has to do with the measurement of 
the market structure and the endogeniety problem associated with measurement. 
Furthermore, the empirical literature on the competition-stability relationship makes 
very little of the channel through which banking sector competition may affect 
stability. This gap is what Chapter III attempts to provide.  
 
3.2.4  Does diversification influence the relationship between competition and 
stability? 
Studies that investigate the direct relationship between diversification and stability 
also produce inconclusive results. Kwan (1998) employs 23 U.S domestic holding 
bank reveals that diversifying of US holding bank into securities activities increases 
risk. This view is supported by (Morgan and Samolyk (2003), Stiroh (2004), Acharya 
et al (2006), and Mercieca et al. (2007)). Morgan and Samolyk (2003) document that 
diversification is not associated with better loan performance. Stiroh (2004) shows 
that non-interest income is quite volatile, highly correlated with net-interest income, 
and it is linked with higher risk and lower risk-adjusted profits, while Mercieca et al. 
(2007) show no benefits from diversification for small European banks. This view has 
recently been countered by the argument that diversification reduces risk of bank 
portfolio and improves performance and stability. De Jonghe and Vande Venet (2008) 
conduct a panel data analysis over the period 1989-2004 and find diversification 
across non-interest income generating activities improves bank’s franchise values 
within the European banking system. Using cross-country data, Elsas et al. (2010) 
find that firms’ performance improves while stability was enhanced when banks 
diversify their activities. Sanya and Wolfe (2010) on their part employ a cross-country 
study of revenue diversification of banks in emerging markets and find that banks 
insolvency risk decreases and profitability enhanced when diversified both across and 
within non-interest generating activities. All these studies on the effect of 
diversification on insolvency risk did not take into consideration the market structure 
in which the banks are operating. This is where this chapter sheds some light by   61
investigating the effect of revenue diversification on the relationship between 
competition and stability. 
 
In summary, regarding the relationship of interest, studies using non-structural new 
empirical industrial organisation (such as H-statistic and Lerner index) measure of 
bank market structure are more unanimous on whether or not competition affects 
stability than those that employ structural methodology (like concentration ratio) in 
measuring bank market power. Further investigation into causes of the discord in this 
strand of the literature reveals that the channels of instability, the measurement of 
market structure, that of stability, and estimation techniques are factors that continue 
to foster the disparity in results, with data and the country and sample analysed 
playing a less critical role. Table 3.1 summarises some of the key papers in the 
literature on the competition-stability nexus that has been reviewed in this chapter. 
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Table 3.1: Overview on empirical literature on competition stability relationship 
Author (s)  Measure of 
competition 
Measure of stability  Estimating methods  Results 
Keeley (1990)  Market-to- book 
assets ratios 
Capital-to-asset ratios 
and interest cost of large 
CD’s 
150 largest US’s BHC’s.  2SLS 
estimators was used 
Banks with more market power hold more 
capital and have lower default risk 
De Nicolo et al. (2004)  Consolidation and 
conglomeration 
Z-index  Largest 500 financial firms across 90 
countries. OLS was used to test the 
relationship 
Bank consolidation and conglomeration 
may not yield more resilient banking 
system 
Gan (2004)   The log of one 
plus the number of 
thrifts in town. 
Inverse measure 
of concentration 
Bank market value and 
risk measured as the 
ratio of real estate 
investment and/or 
brokered deposit to total 
assets 
252 US thrift firms. OLS estimators 
were used.  
Competition reduces franchise value and 
the reduced franchise value induces risk 
taking 
De Nicolo and Loukoianova 
(2006) 
Concentration  Z-score  A data on 133 non-industrialised 
countries. Panel regression was used 
for the estimation  
Concentrated banking markets are more 
prone to risk of failure when ownership is 
included in the estimation 
Beck et al. (2006a)  Concentration  A discrete regress that 
take 1 if the country is 
going through systemic 
crisis and 0 if it is no 
A data on 69 countries. A robust logit 
probability model was used to test the 
relation  
Crises are less likely with economies of 
more concentrated banking systems 
Schaeck and Cihak (2010)  H-statistic and 
concentration 
Banks’ capital to assets 
ratio 
2,600 European banks  Banks in competitive environments tend 
to hold more capital 
Uhde and Heimesoff (2009)  Concentration  Z-score  225 banks across 25 EU countries 
and estimation were conducted using 
panel regression with country-
specific random-effect model. 
The national banking market 
concentration has a negative impact on 
European banks’ financial soundness. 
Berger et al. (2009)  Lerner index  Z-index and the ratio of 
non-performing loans to 
total loans 
8,235 across 23 industrialised 
countries. GMM estimators were 
used 
Banks with a higher degree of market 
power have less overall risk exposure. 
The result also show that market power 
increases loan portfolio risk 
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Overview on empirical literature on competition stability relationship (cont.) 
Author(s) Measure  of 
Competition 
Measure of stability  Estimating methods  Results 
Schaeck et al. (2009)  H-statistic  A discrete regress that 
take 1 if the country is 
going through systemic 
crisis and 0 if it is not 
Across 45 countries. Duration 
analysis and a logit probability model 
Competitive banking systems are less 
prone to experience a systemic crisis. 
Also, it exhibits increased time to crisis 
Boyd et al. (2009)  Concentration  Z-score  Two dataset: (1) 2,500 U.S banks and 
(2) 2,600 banks across 134 emerging 
economies. Cross-sectional and panel 
data regression 
Banks’ probability of failure is positively 
related to concentration 
Turk Ariss (2010)  Lerner index  Z-index, risk-adjusted 
return on assets and risk-
adjusted return on equity 
A sample of 821 banks in 60 
developing countries 
An increase in the degree of market 
power leads to greater efficiency and 
bank stability 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
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Thus, there is no consensus regarding the relationship between market structure and 
banking stability and no prior study examines banking competition vis-à-vis 
diversification and stability. To the best of my knowledge, this chapter of the thesis is 
the first to investigate the relationship between competition, diversification and 
stability of banks in emerging and developing economies. Though prior research 
mainly in industrialised economies presents a sound theoretical and empirical 
evidence of the effect of competition in banking on stability; they have excluded 
banks decision to diversify which is particularly important when the competitive 
environment is high among financial intermediaries. 
 
3.3 Evaluation  methods 
The overriding objective of this chapter is to investigate whether or not revenue 
diversification influences the relationship between competition and stability. First, it 
is to evaluate competitive conditions across emerging and developing countries. 
Using two distinct indicators, as the literature on market structure are inconclusive 
regarding the best measure of competitive environments. In the second subsection, 
different measures of revenue diversification are presented. Five different measures 
are used to explain overall bank performance. Bank-specific characteristics, 
regulatory and institutional variables are also controlled to analyse the relationship of 
interest. 
 
3.3.1  Measurement of the degree of banking competition 
Panzar and Rosse’ H-Statistic 
Studies on banking competition have used different instruments to measure 
competition. For example there are those that employ techniques from the new 
empirical industrial organisation literature (non-structural) such as the Lerner index; 
the Breshnahan mark-up test; and the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic. While other 
studies use methodology that is structural and not based on industrial organisation, for 
example the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm of (Mason (1939), Bain 
(1951), and Berger (1995)) versus efficient structure hypothesis of (Demesetz (1973), 
and Peltzman (1977)). This method uses banking concentration such as Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measures competition with higher score signalling higher   65
market power. However, Claessens and Laeven (2004) have shown that banking 
concentration does not necessarily measures the degree of competition and this can 
not be used to denote bank market structure.  
 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic is used as a measure of banking sector 
competition. Panzar and Rosse (1987) define a measure of competition, the H , as the 
sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenue function with respect to factor 
prices. They show that this statistic can reflect the structure and the conduct of the 
market to which the firm belongs; it represents the percentage variation of the 
equilibrium revenue derived from the unit percent increase in price of all factors used 
by the firm. Matthews et al. (2007) illustrated that the profit for bank i is given as 
revenue minus costs as: 
 
n i x w q C z n q R i k i i i i i i i ....... 2 , 1 ), , , ( ) , , ( ,
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Where 
'
i R represent revenue and 
'
i C is the costs of banki. Output of banki is denoted 
by  i q and n represents the number of banks in the industry.  i w  is the vector of m  
input prices for banki while  i z and  i x represent vectors of exogenous variables that 
shift the revenue and cost functions respectively. Bank ithus maximises profit where 
marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost as: 
 
  n i x w q
q
C
z n q
q
R
i i i
i
i
i i
i
i ... .......... 2 , 1 , 0 , , , ,  





       (3.2) 
 
Adopting a similar line of argument for market level yield, in equilibrium, the zero 
profit condition will yield the following equation as: 
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Where the asterisks represent equilibrium values. H-statistic measures market power 
by the extent to which the revenue  
*
i R    is affected by a change in factor   66
prices 
*
k w  . The Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic measures competition as a sum 
of the input price elasticities as: 
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According to Panzar and Rosse (1987), H is negative when the competitive structure 
is a monopoly, a perfectly colluding oligopoly, or a conjectural variations short-run 
oligopoly; as under this condition an increase in input price will increase marginal 
cost, reduce equilibrium output and subsequently reduce total firm revenue. Under 
perfect competition, where there is free entry and free exit (this is based on 
Chamberlinian model) and where bank products are regarded as perfect substitutes for 
one another, will produce the perfectly competitive solution as demand elasticity 
approaches infinity. In this case H is equal to one. An increase in input prices raises 
both marginal and average cost without altering the optimal output of any individual 
bank (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). If H is between zero and unity, the market structure is 
characterised by monopolistic competition. 
 
H is an increasing function of the demand elasticity e, that is, the less market power is 
exercised on the part of banks, the higher H becomes. This implies that, H is not only 
used to reject certain types of market behaviour, but its magnitude serves as a measure 
of competition. The H is estimated from the following reduced-form revenue 
equation on pooled samples for each country as:
10 
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Where P  is the ratio of net total income to total assets (proxy for output price),  l W , 
f W , and  k W indicate respective input prices for labour, deposit funds and physical 
cost of capital. Some control variables are included at the individual bank level. 
                                                 
10 See Gutierrez de Rozas (2007) for detailed derivation of the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model.   67
Specifically,  1 X  is the ratio of equity to total assets;  2 X is the ratio of total loans to 
total assets,  3 X  is the loanable (funding) fund to total assets and  4 X controls for 
potential size effect and is calculated as the logarithm of total assets. Dis a vector of 
year dummies to reflect the effect of technological changes, which translate into the 
movement of the cost function over the period. 
 
Traditional approaches in the literature have used either gross interest or total income 
as a dependent variable. The use of net total income as non-interest income has 
increased dramatically in recent times. According to Casu and Girardone (2006) in a 
competitive environment, the distinction between interest and non-interest income is 
less relevant, as banks compete for profits on both fronts. Moreover, the existence of 
accounting differences across the countries (Bonin et al. 2005) is an additional 
argument in favour of a broader view of bank revenue. The net total income concept 
comprises of interest income, net commission income, net trading income and other 
net operating income.  
 
On the input prices, there seems to be no disagreement on the inputs used by banking 
firms namely the price of deposit funds, the price of labour, and physical capital. 
These are respectively calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and 
money market funding, labour cost to total assets
11, and other operating and 
administrative expenses to total assets. The input prices are followed by setting bank-
specific factors which are intended to allow for bank heterogeneity and to control for 
the differences in business mix, risk and size. These variables account for risk 
propensity captured by the equity to assets ratio; variations in the relative weight of 
the loan portfolio measured as total loans to total assets, the importance of deposits in 
the balance sheet captured by loanable funds to total assets and the possible impact of 
scale economies measured by the logarithm of total assets. 
 
Following (Claessens and Laeven (2005), Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki 
(2006), Yeyati and Micco (2007), and Gutierrez de Rozas (2007)) the natural log of 
                                                 
11 In the absence of data on total number of employees, the ratio of labour cost to total assets is used as 
a proxy for the unit cost of labour.    68
all variables is taken to estimate equation (3.4) using OLS with year fixed and bank-
specific effects and GLS with fixed bank-specific effects and time dummies. All the 
variables enter into equation (3.4) in logarithmic form in order to improve the 
regression’s goodness of fit and to reduce possible simultaneous bias (De Bandt and 
Davis, 2000). The H-statistics is calculated as the sum of the elasticities of the total 
interest income with respect to the three input prices, that is  3 2 1       H . In order 
that the results provide close estimates of the true value of the H-statistic for each 
jurisdiction, the average of the four ways of estimating H is taken.
12   
 
It is a necessary requirement that the H-statistic test must be taken on observations 
that are in long-run equilibrium. According to Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki 
(2006) this empirical test is justified on the grounds that competitive capital markets 
will equalise risk-adjusted rates of return across banks such that, in equilibrium rates 
of return should not be correlated with input prices. To test for this validity, the 
dependent variable of equation (3.4) is replaced by the Return on Assets (ROA) as 
follows: 
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A value of  0  H indicates non-equilibrium, while  0  H  is equilibrium. It is also 
argued that if a sample is not in long-run equilibrium, it is true that 0  H  no longer 
proves monopoly, but it remains true that  0  H disproves monopoly or conjectural 
variation short-run oligopoly,
13 and in accordance of Belaisch (2003) a test of 
significance is run for the H-statistic to determine whether the market structure is 
monopoly, monopolistic competition or perfect competition.  
                                                 
12 H1 to H4. H1 is estimated using pooled OLS with bank-specific and time dummies and gross 
interest income as dependent variable in the reduced-form revenue equation. H2 is estimated using 
pooled GLS with time dummies and gross interest income as dependent variable in the reduced-form 
revenue equation. H3 is estimated using pooled OLS with bank-specific and time dummies and total 
income as dependent variable in the reduced-form revenue equation. H4 is estimated using pooled 
GLS with time dummies and gross interest income as dependent variable in the reduced-form 
revenue equation. See Claessens and Laeven (2004 and 2005) for detailed calculations. 
13 See Shaffer (2004).   69
Though the theoretical foundation for non-structural new empirical industrial 
organisation measures is stronger than those structural methods but the non-structural 
measures have some drawbacks. For instance, the H-statistic imposes restrictive 
assumptions on banks’ cost functions. It concludes that increases in input prices make 
total revenue and marginal costs not to move together in imperfectly competitive 
markets and it is only valid if the industry is in equilibrium, which is very rare. 
Despite the drawbacks, this approach is increasingly used in empirical research 
because it measures banks’ behaviour and thus competition directly (OECD 2010). 
Table 3.2 summarises the key research in the banking sector that have employed H-
statistics as a measure of the degree of market power.  
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Table 3.2: Summary literature on measuring bank competition using Panzar-
Rosse methodology 
Authors Countries 
considered 
Period Results 
Gelfand and Spiller (1987)  Uruguay  1977-1980 Monopolistic competition 
Nathan and Neave (1989)  Canada  1982-1984 Monopolistic competition 
Molyneux et al. (1994)  5 EU countries  1986-1989 Monopolistic competition, 
Monopoly for Italy 
Vesala (1995)  Finland  1985-1992 Monopolistic competition in 
(1985-1988) then in (1991-
1992), but perfect 
competition in (1989-1990) 
Molyneux et al. (1996)  Japan  1986-1988 Monopoly in (1986), and 
perfect competition in (1988) 
Hondroyiannis et al. (1999)  Greece  1993-1995 Monopolistic competition 
Barajas et al. (2000)  Colombia  1985-1998 Monopolistic competition 
Bikker and Groeneveld (2000)  15 EU countries 1989-1996 Monopolistic  competition 
Bikker and Haaf (2002)  23 OECD 
countries 
1990-1998 Monopolistic competition 
Coccorse (2002)  Italy  1988-1996 Monopolistic competition, 
perfect competition in 
(1992/1994) 
Hempell (2002)  Germany  1993-1998 Monopolistic competition 
Belaisch (2003)  Brazil  1997-2000 Oligopoly 
Yeyati and Micco (2003)  8 Latin America 
countries 
1993-2002 Monopolistic competition 
Drakos and Konstantinous 
(2005) 
10 Eastern EU 
countries 
1992-2000 Monopolistic competition 
except Latvia Monopoly 
Weill (2004)  12 EU countries  1994-1999 Monopolistic competition 
Claessens and Laeven (2004)  50 countries  1994-2001 Monopolistic competition 
Coccorese (2004)  Italy  1997-1999 Monopolistic competition 
Utrero-Gonzalez (2004)  Spain and UK  1996-2002 Monopolistic competition 
Gelos and Rolds (2004)  8 L. American 
and Eastern EU 
countries 
1994-1999 Monopolistic competition, 
except Argentina and 
Hungary 
Jiang et al. (2004)  Hong Kong 1992-2002 Perfect  competition 
Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-
Fillipaki (2006) 
5 EU countries  1998-2002 Monopolistic competition 
Casu and Girardone (2006)  15 EU countries  1997-2003 Monopolistic competition 
Yildirim and Philippatos 
(2007) 
14 Eastern EU 
countries 
1993-2000 Monopolistic competition 
Gutierrez de Rozas ( 2007)  Spain  1986-2005 Monopolistic competition 
Matthews et al. (2007)  UK  1980-2004 Monopolistic competition 
Schaeck et al. (2009)  35 countries  1998-2005 Monopolistic competition 
Schaeck and Cihak (2010)  10 EU countries  1999-2004 Monopolistic competition 
Delis (2010)  22 CEEC  1996-2006 Some are monopolistic while 
others have market power 
The reports of the main studies that applied Panzar-Rosse approach in banking industry with their respective main result. 
This is an update of Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006)   71
Lerner index 
To test for the robustness of the results, Lerner index is employed as an alternative 
measure of degree of competition for the sample. The index is a type of new empirical 
industrial organisation and provides direct measure of degree of market power as it 
represents the mark-up of price over marginal cost (Berger et al. 2009). Also, it shows 
the degree to which a banking firm increases its marginal price beyond marginal cost 
and shows an accurate indicator of market power compare to the concentration ratio 
measures (OECD 2010). Lerner index is calculated as: 
 
it it it it ice MC ice Lerner Pr / ) (Pr            ( 3 . 6 )  
 
Where  it ice Pr is the price of the total assets.  it MC is the marginal cost of producing 
an additional unit of output. The  it MC is derived from the translog cost function as: 
 


     
3
1
3
1
, ,
2 2
1 0 ln ln ln ln
2
ln ln
kk
it k it k it k kt it it it W Q W Q Q Cost  

   
        
  
 
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
2
, , , ln ) 2 / ( ln ln
k
k
k
kj i
ij t i it j it k ij trend W W W      
               j tj ij t
i
i trend Q v trend W     

ln ln ,
3
1
      ( 3 . 7 )  
 
Where  it Cost is the bank’s total costs including financial and operating cost; 
it Q represents a proxy for bank output measured as total assets and  it k W , , represent the 
three input prices discussed in section 3.3.1. The cost function is estimated separately 
using a panel data for each country in the sample. This allows for the parameters of 
the cost function to vary from one country to another reflecting different technology. 
Fixed effects are also introduced to capture the influence of variables specific to each 
bank. Once the cost function is estimated, its first derivative with respect to the output 
evaluated for each bank in the sample, is the marginal cost as: 
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The index is interpreted as follows: the Lerner index with higher value implies higher 
pricing power and less competitive market conditions. 
 
3.3.2  Diversification measures  
In line with Stiroh (2004) and Mercieca et al. (2007) revenue diversification is 
measured by constructing Herfindahl Hirschmann Index (HHI) for each bank. This 
measure accounts for diversification between major activities. The revenue HHI(REV) 
diversification for each bank is therefore calculated as follows: 
 
2 2
) ( 




  




 
NETOP
NET
NETOP
NON
HHI REV         ( 3 . 9 )  
Where: 
NET NON NETOP             
NON represents non-interest income; net-interest income is captured by NET ; and 
NETOP  accounts for net-operating income. Equation (3.9) is interpreted as: a rise in 
HHI shows an increase in revenue concentration and less diversification. This process 
is repeated for the construction of diversification within non-interest activities: 
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Where: 
  OTOP TRD COM NON         
 
Revenue from commission income is captured by  . COM TRDis trading income and 
OTOPcaptures other operating income.  Higher values indicate greater concentration. 
 
3.3.3 Overall  performance  measures 
This chapter does not employ episodes of banking crises as a proxy for banking 
instability, in contrast to (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), Beck et al. (2006a),   73
and Schaeck et al. (2009)). Though the number of bankruptcies could serve as an 
indicator for financial crisis, its significance according to Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) 
may be distorted. The reasons being that: banking crises are announced and described 
differently across countries, thus, it is difficult to define and determine the actual start 
and the end date of a banking system failure. Secondly, having banking crises may 
imply a regulatory failure. Therefore competent supervisory bodies may be reluctant 
or fail to announce banking failures that have occurred within their national boarders, 
thirdly, failures of systemic banks are typically prevented by implementing financial 
restructuring programmes to forestall contagion and thus systemic crises. For these 
reasons, the measure as used by (Boyd et al. (2009), Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), 
and Berger et al. (2009)) is followed to estimate bank insolvency risk using the (Z-
score), risk-adjusted profit, (RAROA and RAROE) for bank profitability, loan 
portfolio risk (Bad loan/loan ratio) and capitalization level (equity/asset ratio). 
Detailed measurement of each of the performance variables are discussed below. 
 
Insolvency risk (Z-score) 
Z-score is used as a measure of insolvency risk. It measures the number of standard 
deviations that a bank’s profit must fall to drive it into insolvency. The index 
potentially measures the accounting distant to default for a given institution and it is 
calculated as: 
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Where,  ROA average  is the average rate of return on assets of a bank,  TA E average / 
represents average bank equity in percent of total assets and  ROA  is the standard 
deviation of return on assets. According to De Nicolo et al. (2004), the bank stability 
indicator increases with higher profitability and capitalization levels, and decreases 
with unstable earnings reflected by a higher standard deviation of return on assets. 
Thus from an economic point of view, the Z-score initially measures the probability 
of a bank becoming insolvent when the value of assets becomes lower than the value   74
of debt. This means that a higher (lower) Z-score implies a lower (higher) probability 
of insolvency risk
14. 
 
Risk adjusted performance measure 
Additionally, bank-specific data is used to calculate two risk adjusted performance 
measures of return on assets  ) (ROA and return on equity  ) (ROE  and then dividing 
ROAandROE by their respective standard deviation  ) ( as: 
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Where ROAis the ratio of income before tax to total assets and ROE is calculated as 
net income divided by total equity.   
 
Non-performing loans (Bad loans) 
The ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans is used to proxy for loan 
portfolio risk. The use of loan losses as a proxy for loan portfolio risk must take into 
account two caveats according to Boyd et al. (2009): (1) the risk should not imply a 
higher risk of bank failure if the assets allocation tilts towards a larger holding of risk 
free assets. (2) the measures at best should capture the default risk related to the loan 
portfolio. For the purpose of this chapter, the measures of loan quality have an 
independent effect in so far as they related to the probability of borrower failure to 
honour their obligation and that a higher value indicates a riskier loan portfolio. It is 
calculated as non-performing loans to total loans (For the rest of the discussion the 
term bad loans will be use to represent the ratio).  
 
Bank capitalization 
Capitalization ratio is used as a proxy for bank stability because the 1998 Basel 
Accord has made banks increasingly focus on managing their capital base as a buffer 
against default. Martin (1977) also argues that the default risk of banks is directly 
                                                 
14 Ideally, market-risk forward-looking indicators such as expected default frequency (EDF) and 
modified Merton (1974) distance-to-default are employed as a measure of bank risk-taking. However, a 
market database is not available for the large sample of banks in emerging markets.   75
related to the risk inherent in a bank’s asset portfolio and its capitalization. Allen et al. 
(2005) on their part build a model to show that banks’ equity capital are normally 
higher in competitive credit markets where, in their opinion, good lending 
opportunities are scarce. Bank capitalization level is measured as the ratio of equity 
capital to total assets where a higher ratio indicates lower bank insolvency risk. 
 
3.3.4  Controls for bank-specific and regulatory variables 
The following variables are controlled so that any potential independent effect they 
may have on the relationship between competition and stability does not impact on 
the core relationship between competition, revenue diversification and stability. This 
includes bank-specific, institutional and regulatory variables. 
 
The ratio of total loan to total assets (loan/asset) explores banks’ investment mix and 
it is calculated as total loans divided by total assets.  
 
Deposits to total liability ratio (deposit/liability) is used as a measure of funding 
structure and liquidity sources of banks. Following Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010) who examine the effect of funding strategy on bank risk behaviour, and 
Ratnovski and Huang (2009) who explore factors behind Canadian banks’ relative 
resilience during 2007 credit turmoil, the bank funding structure is measured as total 
deposits as a percentage of total liabilities. 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) measures bank performance in terms of the ability to 
generate profits after considering operating expenses. Thus it takes into account 
operating income and expenses. ROA is calculated as profit before tax as a percentage 
of total assets. 
 
Financial liberalisation index is a database constructed by Abiad, Detragiache and 
Tressel (2010)  that recognises the multi-faceted nature of financial reform and 
records financial policy changes along seven different dimensions: credit controls and 
reserve requirements; interest rate controls; entry barriers; state ownership; policies on 
securities markets; prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector and   76
restrictions on the capital account. The liberalization index measures financial reforms 
that have taken place during the period and it ranges from 0 to 21 with the highest 
score indicating fully reformed. The Financial Reform Index (normalised) is a binary 
value (0-1) with 1 indicating fully reformed. However, the only limitation of the 
dataset is that it covers the period up to 2005.  
 
Capitalization index measures overall capital stringency and it has been found to 
reduce bank insolvency risk. Behr et al. (2010) sample 421 banks across 61 countries 
and reveal that regulatory capital is effective in reducing risk-taking in a country 
where the banking system is more competitive. Capitalization index ranges from 0 to 
9, with a higher value indicating greater stringency.  
 
Official supervisory power measures whether the banking regulators have the power 
or the authority to take decisive actions to correct and prevent problems. This 
according to Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001, 2004) describe quantitatively the degree 
to which supervision authorities may intervene to promote prudential banking 
environments. The index ranges from 0 to 16 with higher values indicating more 
supervisory power. Also, their database can be used to assess the relationships 
between official supervisory resources, power and independence to banking sector on 
one hand, and the extent of private-sector monitoring, restrictions on bank activities 
and the level of moral hazard created by deposit insurance scheme on the other (Barth 
et al. 2004). However, this chapter analyse supervisory power in the context of 
regulators ability to take actions to prevent banking problems. 
 
Property rights measures the degree to which a country laws protect private property 
rights and the degree to which government enforces those laws. It is an index from the 
Economic Freedom Indicators of the Heritage Foundation and it is scaled from 0 to 
100 with higher values indicating greater freedom and legal property protection rights 
respectively. 
 
GDP growth is used to control for the general economic development, 
macroeconomic stability, and institutional framework as these are likely to affect   77
banking system performance in a country (Claesens and Laeven, 2004). The nominal 
GDP growth is measured as the annual rate of growth of GDP.
15 
 
Inflation measured as the annual growth rate of the CPI index. While GDP growth 
captures the possible effect of the business cycle, the banking system is less likely to 
be more competitive when it is subject to high inflation, in that, prices of financial 
services such as interest rates will be less informative. 
 
In addition to the variables discussed, the use of instrumental variables (IV) technique 
helps to explicitly specify the instruments. Three instruments that are found in the 
literature to affect competition and banking stability are used: activity restrictions, 
banking and financial freedom and bank size. Schaeck and Cihak (2010) use similar 
instruments with a two stage least square (2SLS) estimator. Activity restrictions 
measure the degree to which national authorities allow banks to engage in activities 
that generate non-interest income. That is, it indicates the limits imposed on 
commercial banks to participate in securities markets, insurance and real estate 
activities. The measure varies from 4 to 16 with higher scores indicating more 
restrictions. The banking freedom variable provides an overall measure of the 
openness of the banking sector and the extent to which banks are free to operate their 
businesses. The measure describes a country’s financial climate and assigns an overall 
score between 0 and 100 percent, with a higher percentage score signifying more 
freedom. Natural logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy for bank size.  
 
3.4  Data Sources and Econometric methods 
 
3.4.1  Data Sources  
This chapter employs both micro-bank level and macro-country level data. Bank level 
data is taken from the most recent Bankscope database. Series are yearly, covering a 
sample of 978 banks across 55 countries during the eight year period, 2000–2007. As 
the study focuses on bank intermediation, I opt for unconsolidated balance sheet data 
whenever possible even though in some cases I have to depend on consolidated 
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statements because of data unavailability. The sample includes all commercial banks, 
cooperative banks, development banks, savings banks, real estate and mortgage banks 
for which annual data is available for some period of the years during the period 
2000-2007. To ensure that I do not omit banks that are important players in the 
deposit and/or loan markets, I also include medium and long term credit banks and 
specialised government institutions as these banks remain important in emerging and 
developing countries. The use of bankscope has an advantage in that the accounting 
information on banks are standardised. The Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic are 
based on a sample that includes observations from countries with at least 50 bank-year 
observations. Macro data are obtained from the World Development Indicator of the 
World Bank and International Financial Statistics database of the International 
Monetary Fund and some cases, the respective central banks. The series includes GDP 
growth, inflation, exchange rates, average policy interest rates, and money market 
rates. Activity restrictions, capital stringency and supervisory power variables are 
obtained from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001, 2004) while the banking freedom and 
property rights variables are obtained from the Heritage Foundation. Liberalization 
index is obtained from Abiad Detragiache and Tressel (2010). 
 
3.4.2  Estimation methods and procedures 
The analysis of the relationship of interest follows a structural model proposed by 
Keeley (1990). The equations are presented simultaneously as follows: 
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Where the  it Z  is a proxy for bank stability of bank iin periodt,  it H  is competition 
measured using Panzar Rosse’s H-Statistic model, the  it D  is bank revenue 
diversification , the variables  j i X ,  are a set of  } {k variables controlling for bank-
specific characteristics, the respective countries’ macroeconomic environments and   79
regulatory variables. s '   are the parameter vectors; and  it  is the unobserved 
disturbances. 
 
To account for an endogeneity bias in the model, a three-stage-least–square (3sls) 
simultaneous equation model is used. Stability, competition and revenue 
diversification are specified as endogenous variables. 3sls estimates systems of 
structural equations that contain endogenous variables among the explanatory 
variables. It produces estimates from a three-step process: firstly, it develops 
instrumented values for all endogenous variables; then obtains a consistent estimate 
for the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances, and finally, performs a GLS-
type estimation using the covariance matrix (Greene, 2003). Furthermore, in the 
presence of an endogeneity bias and correct specification of structural equations 
models, the 3sls produces more consistent and precise estimates of coefficients than 
those produced by two stage least square (2sls) (Mantecon (2009), and Deng et al. 
(2007)).  
 
3.5 Empirical  results 
 
3.5.1 Descriptive  statistics 
Table 3.3 shows summary statistics for the key variables used in this study. All bank-
specific variables are averaged by bank during the period 2000-2007, while that of the 
country-level variables are averaged by country over the period under study. The 
countries are grouped into regions and this follows the World Bank Developing 
indicators groupings. The groupings are Africa, Asian, Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC) and Latin America. 
 
Within the sample period, the average H-statistic is (0.65) showing that the banking 
systems of the selected countries are characterised by monopolistic competition. 
Moreover, Latin America appears to have the most competitive banking system in the 
sample, with an average H-statistic of (0.68). On the measures of overall bank 
performance, while Asian banks appear to be the most stable and most profitable, the 
region with the highest insolvency risk is Africa. However, over the period, banks in   80
Latin America on average hold the highest level of capital ratios, of about (20%) of 
their total assets compared to the aggregate sample of (15%). The 15 percent 
aggregate equity ratio implies that just less than a quarter of the assets of the selected 
banks are financed with equity capital. 
 
Regarding revenue diversification, CEEC banks are less diversified within non-
interest income generating activities. On the pattern of intermediation, on average 
(51%) of the sample banks’ assets are extended as loans with Asian banks providing 
more than (56%) of their assets as loans. The least in the sample is the African banks 
whose total average loan portfolio is (48%). Of the liabilities of the sample banks, 
(79%) constitute core deposits. This means that more than three quarters of emerging 
countries assets are finance by core deposits. Total asset measures denominated in US 
dollars is used as a proxy for bank size. Asian banks are largest in the sample. The 
average size of an Asian bank is 30.1billion US dollars.  
 
Table 3.4 shows competitive environment indicators for the selected countries 
banking system. Panzar and Ross (1987) H-statistic is employed as a proxy for the 
degree of competition. It is calculated as the average of implied H-statistics from four 
different structural models estimated for each country for the eight year-period; 2000-
2007 and it is based on the Claessen and Laeven (2004) estimation methodology. H1 
is estimated using pooled OLS with bank-specific and time dummies and gross 
interest income as the dependent variable in the reduced-form revenue equation. H2 is 
estimated using pooled GLS with time dummies and gross interest income as the 
dependent variable in the reduced-form revenue equation. H3 is estimated using 
pooled OLS with bank-specific and time dummies and total income as the dependent 
variable in the reduced-form revenue equation. H4 is estimated using pooled GLS 
with time dummies and gross interest income as the dependent variable in the 
reduced-form revenue equation. The four different measures according to (Claessen 
and Laeven, 2004) provide relatively close estimates, suggesting that the techniques 
are robust to estimate H-statistic for each country. As each technique has some related 
merits and demerits, the average of the four estimates are considered as the measure 
of competitive indicator. The score of H-statistic (with the exception of Tanzania)   81
varies between 0.65 and 0.80 meaning that the best description of the degree of 
competition among selected banks is monopolistic competition. Also, the estimation 
result provides no strong pattern among the countries within the groupings. 
 
Pair-wise correlation coefficients presented in table 3.5 is a first step in analysing 
whether or not revenue diversification influences the relationship between 
competition and stability. The correlation coefficient between H-statistic and the 
corresponding overall performance measure (Z-score, RAROA, RAROE, Bad loans, 
and equity/assets) suggest some degree of benefit accruing to banks operating in a 
highly competitive environment. However, the insignificant coefficient between H-
statistic and Z-score could imply that competition per se does not necessarily 
influence stability.  The decision to diversify within a market reduces bank insolvency 
risk, improves performance and enhances competition. On the exposure of banks to 
non-interest income generating activities (Non_inc
2) and reliance on fee and 
commission income (com_inc
2), the results suggest non-linearity. This means that, 
there could be a point of operation where further exposure would decrease banks 
performance. 
 
Bank portfolio mix captured by (loan/asset) ratio is associated with reduced 
insolvency risk, increased risk-adjusted profits (RAROA and RAROE), increased 
competitive indicators and enhanced diversification within non-interest income 
generating activities. The possible explanation for this correlated relationship is that 
banks with large loan portfolios may first seek to diversify their activities especially 
in the existing market as a growth strategy. Then use the return from their loan 
portfolio to finance new business activities. Furthermore, the pair-wise correlation 
coefficient results also show that bank size is positively correlated with loan/asset 
ratio, insolvency risk and risk-adjusted performance.  
 
Finally, on macroeconomic controls, the correlation coefficients reveal that economic 
growth increases stability and enhances profits, but reduces the holding of equity 
capital. The rate of inflation on the other hand has an insignificant correlation 
coefficient on all bank performance indicators.   82
3.5.2  Does revenue diversification affect the competition-stability relationship? 
This section analyses the relationship between competitive indicators and the 
measures of performance, as well as further investigating whether revenue 
diversification affects these relationships. Table 3.6 reports the 3SLS regression 
results that have bank insolvency risk (Z-score) for column 1, risk-adjusted profits 
(RAROA and RAROE) for column 2 and 3 respectively, capitalisation ratio 
(equity/assets) for column 4 and loan portfolio risk with the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans (bad loans) for column 5 as the dependent variables. Column 6 
uses an alternative measure of revenue diversification (HHIrev). In addition, the table 
reports the F-statistics which provides a test for the joint significance of the regression 
coefficients as well as the set of three instruments employed in the regression 
estimates. 
 
Table 3.6 is also divided into two panels.  Panel A presents the main relationship of 
interest between competition and performance. It also shows the independent effect of 
competition on bank performance. Panel B on the other hand shows the impact of 
competition on revenue diversification. As earlier stated, the main argument of this 
chapter is to examine whether or not revenue diversification influences the 
competition-stability relationship. Panel B shows if this hypothesis holds for the 
selected sample of banks in the developing and emerging economies. That is, Panel B 
indicates whether or not banks diversify their activities as a result of greater 
competition. 
 
In Panel A of table 3.6, the coefficient of H-statistic is positive and statistically 
significant implying that an increase in banking competition has a significant positive 
effect on the overall stability of banks in emerging and developing markets. This 
finding correspond to the ‘competitive-stability view’ in the theoretical literature and 
is generally consistent with empirical findings of (De Nicolo et al. (2004), and Uhde 
and Heimesheff (2009)) - that an increase in the competitiveness of national banking 
systems increases bank financial soundness. However, this result contrasts by not 
supporting theory (Beck et al. 2006a) or empirical work on the ‘competition-fragility 
view’ (Berger et al. 2009). The next analysis is the association between H-statistic and   83
risk-adjusted return on assets (RAROA) and that of Equity (RAROE). The H-statistic 
has a positive association with both RAROA and RAROE suggesting that banks in 
emerging countries profit from operating in more competitive banking environments. 
This finding is also in line with the general concept that competition brings about 
efficiency and innovation, which reduces costs, and which in turn translates into 
higher rates of return. This return is in both absolute terms and on a risk-adjusted 
basis. 
 
Column 4 of table 3.6 seeks to establish whether banks operating in highly 
competitive banking markets hold more equity capital. Banks hold equity capital as a 
cushion to absorb any losses emanating from their operations. The literature is 
inconclusive on the effect of the degree of competition on equity capital holding. 
While Berger et al. (2009) findings suggest that bank capitalisation level is high for 
banks with higher market power, Schaeck and Cihak, (2010) find the opposite, that 
competition provides incentives for banks to maintain higher capital ratios. Table 3.6 
provides no significant evidence to support the fact that banking system structure 
explains capitalisation level of banks in emerging and developing countries. 
Regarding the relationship between H-statistics and loan portfolio risk (bad loan), the 
result is negative and significant. This means that a high degree of competition, 
ceteris paribus, is linked to low loan losses as a proportion of total loans. In an 
environment where banking competition is high, bank interest rate are generally low, 
borrowers return on investment increases which will in turn decrease the risk of 
default and consequently non-performing loans will be lower. Furthermore, low cost 
of capital also enables borrowers to increase their return on capital, increase cashflow 
from the investment and thus be able to pay their bank loans. This finding is also 
consistent with the ‘competition-stability view’ of (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005) that 
greater bank competition is associated with low loan losses.  
 
Bank funding structure (deposit/liabilities) and that of lending (loan/assets) have been 
found to have an impact on bank insolvency risk. Banks depending on wholesale 
funding have been severely affected during the current financial crisis while those in 
Australia and Canada for example have been resilient to the crisis because they relied   84
mostly on depository funding (OECD 2010). These two bank-specific variables are 
controlled and reported in Panel A of table 3.6. The coefficient of loan/assets is 
positive on both insolvency risk and profitability but negative on capitalization and 
loan portfolio risk. This means that bank lending in developing countries is associated 
with a decrease in capitalization ratio, lower loan portfolio risk, and higher 
performance and therefore an increase in the financial soundness of banks. Intuitively, 
banks that provide quality loans hold low levels of capital and consequently do not 
need additional capital to absorb losses. Furthermore, the profitability level of such 
banks is enhanced because low provisions are made in connection to loan losses. The 
result provides no evidence of negative consequences of depository funding of banks 
in developing countries. Growth in GDP improves profitability and reduces the non-
performing loan ratio. 
 
3.5.2.2 Additional analysis of insolvency risk and the role of diversification. 
The relationship between competition and stability as reported in table 3.6 is well 
established in banking literature. The ambiguity is on the channels of instability. In 
order to further analyse whether or not competition affects insolvency risk through 
diversification, there has to be an independent effect of the degree of competition on 
diversification (Sanya 2009). That is, the extent to which high levels of competition 
impact on diversification.  This means that H-statistic must influence HHI(non) and 
HHI(rev) significantly. 
 
Using the equations (3.13) and (3.14), the regression results in Panel B are 
simultaneously estimated with those in Panel A. In table 3.6 the coefficient for H-
statistic reported in Panel B is negative and statistically significant across all 
specifications. The same results are obtained when HHI(rev), an alternative measure 
of revenue diversification is used in column 6. These results imply that competition 
exerts pressure on banks in emerging /developing economies to diversify both across 
and within non-interest income generating activities.
16 The results also show that 
banks prefer to diversify within the market they already operate in compared to a new 
market. This is because the coefficient of the impact of competition on HHI(non) is 
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relatively larger than that of HHI(rev). Again, it could be a precautionary strategy as 
banks take into account risk of entering into a new market. Similar results are reported 
when Lerner index, an alternative measure of the degree of competition is used in 
table 3.7. Thus, Panel B of both table 3.6 and 3.7 confirm that the degree of 
competition has an independent effect on diversification. In a whole, the results of 
table 3.6 and 3.7 provide empirically, an additional channel (revenue diversification) 
through which competition may affect insolvency risk of banks in developing and 
emerging markets.  
   
3.5.3  Alternative measures of market structure 
Table 3.7 presents the relationship between competition, revenue diversification and 
bank insolvency risk using alternative measures of competition. Lerner index 
measures the degree to which a bank can increase its price over and above marginal 
cost and represents a more accurate indicator of market power. Here, the index is used 
to check the robustness of the earlier findings. The results are similar to that of results 
using H-statistic reported in table 3.6. Though the sign and the level of significant is 
the same, the magnitude of the coefficient is slightly different. The high degree of 
competition in developing countries, ceteris paribus, reduces bank insolvency risk, 
increased performance, holding of more equity capital and reduces risk of loan 
portfolio. 
 
In addition to the regression results reported in table 3.6 and 3.7, figures 3.1 to 3.4 are 
used to further discuss the effect of revenue diversification on competition-stability 
relationship. The data is aggregated by averaging individual bank years across 
countries over the period, 2000-2007. Figure 3.1 shows the trend of degree of 
competition (Lerner index), in emerging/developing markets, figure 3.2 depicts the 
level of revenue diversification (HHInon) during the period, while figure 3.3 
illustrates the level of insolvency risk, measured using (Z-score).  The chart on figure 
3.4 represents the performance of the sample banks measured by RAROA. 
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Figure 3.1 
Degree of competition in emerging markets as measured by Lerner index 
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  Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
  Data is aggregated averaging across years, 2000-2007 
 
Figure 3.2 
Revenue diversification of banks in emerging/developing economies (HHInon) 
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  Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
  Data is aggregated averaging across years, 2000-2007 
 
Both figure 3.1 (Lerner index) and 3.2 (HHInon) depict the same trend over the 
sample period. Increasing at the initial period until 2004 and falling thereafter. A 
similar pattern is shown in figure 3.3 and 3.4 in respect to insolvency risk and 
profitability. Greater bank competition is associated with higher revenue 
diversification, greater bank solvency and higher profitability. The degree of 
competition among banks at the early part of 2000s is low and this corresponds with 
the level of diversification during that period.  However, during 2004-2007, when the 
competitive environment of emerging/developing economies increases, diversification 
and stability increase, supporting the assertion that competition by no small means 
exerts pressure on banks to diversify their activities and this enables them to reduce 
their insolvency risk.   87
Figure 3.3 
Insolvency risk level of banks in emerging/developing economies (Z-score)   
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   Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
   Data is aggregated averaging across years, 2000-2007 
 
Figure 3.4 
Performance of banks in emerging/developing economies (RAROA) 
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   Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
   Data is aggregated averaging across years, 2000-2007 
 
3.5.4  Alternative methodological specification 
This section analysis the relationship of interest between competition and bank 
stability using two stage least square (2SLS) regression. Though the use of 2SLS 
regression does not necessarily need an explicit specification of the baseline equation 
(3.13 and 3.14) competitive measures (H-statistic and Lerner index), insolvency risk 
(Z-score) and revenue diversification (HHInon or HHIrev) are still treated as 
endogenous. The same three set of instruments are also used as discussed in section 
3.3.4. In addition, 2sls is used so that diagnostic tests can be conducted to assess the 
fit of the model in a single equation model. 
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The results are presented in table 3.8 and are similar to that reported in table 3.6 and 
3.7. The direction of the sign and the significant of the coefficients remain the same. 
The only different between the results reported on table 3.6 and 3.7 and that of table 
3.8 is the standard error. The standard error of 2sls is relatively larger than those 
produce in table 3.6 and 3.7 using 3sls. This finding supports the earlier argument that 
3sls yields more precise and consistent estimates than 2sls. The use of these two 
estimation techniques shows that greater bank competition increases stability with 
higher level of diversification. The results of bank-specific control variables remain 
unchanged as it is the control of macroeconomic variables.  
 
Furthermore, the use of 2sls allows for several diagnostic tests to be carried out. Two 
test, Sargan N*R2 and Basman tests are reported for over identification restriction 
measures of instruments exogeneity. The result rejects the alternative hypothesis that 
the instruments correlate with the error term in column 1, 4, 5, and 6. The null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the unobserved term. The R
2 
measures the goodness of fit while the p-value of the f-test takes into account the 
significance of instruments. The wu-Hausman F-test and Durbin-wu-Hausman Chi2 
specification compare the difference between the use of instrumental variable (IV) 
and ordinary least squares (OLS). In sum, the results using 2sls estimating techniques 
show that competition improves the financial soundness of banks that diversify their 
activities. 
 
3.5.5  Financial reforms, supervisory and regulatory controls 
Financial liberalisation, regulatory and institutional environments impact on banking 
sector competition. For instance regulatory measures such as lower barriers to entry 
and fewer restrictions on bank activities have been found to improve systemic 
stability (Beck et al. 2006a). Regressions in table 3.9 examine the impact of bank 
overall risk (z-score) while controlling additionally for financial liberalisation index 
(financial reforms), regulatory and institutional variables (capital stringency and 
supervision power) and risk of expropriation (property right). 3sls regression is used 
as an estimator and to address collinearity problems, the additional variables enter into 
the regression one at a time. Even when financial reforms, supervision power,   89
property rights and capital stringency index are controlled, the results suggest that 
greater banking competition and revenue diversification remain positively associated 
with bank stability.  
 
Table 3.9 also reports the results including financial reforms as an additional control 
variable. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant implying that in 
emerging/developing economies that has it banking system fully reforms, increases 
stability. The coefficient on the supervision power is negative, that of property right 
and capital stringency are positive. The negative coefficient of official supervision 
power corresponds to the ‘grabbing-hand view’ that powerful supervision bodies may 
use their powers to benefits favoured constituents (Barth et al. 2004). Legal protection 
on private property and the judicial efficiency in enforcing these laws increase 
stability. The results also provide the effectiveness of capital regulation in reducing 
risk-taking. 
 
3.6  Conclusion  
 
This chapter sheds some light on the relationship between competition and stability. 
Theoretical and empirical examinations of the relationship between competition and 
bank insolvency risk are inconclusive. Competition has long been seen to decrease 
bank stability by exacerbating risk and reducing bank incentives to behave prudently. 
This view has been countered by the argument that competition in the banking sector 
reduces the risk of banks’ portfolios (OECD 2010). This chapter contributes to the 
literature by analysing how revenue diversification of banks in developing and 
emerging economies affects the relationship between competition and stability. 
 
Different risk exposure indicators are used as dependent variables to proxy for bank 
stability: the Z-score as a measure of overall bank risk, the risk adjusted profit as a 
measure of profitability, the volume of non-performing loans to total gross loans is 
used to measure the bank loan portfolio risk, the equity capital to asset ratio to 
account for the bank’s capitalization level. To account for the simultaneity and   90
address endogeneity, and to provide precise and consistent parameter estimates, 3sls 
regression estimates are used. 
 
The results show a positive and significant relationship between competition and 
stability. More importantly, this positive and significant relationship holds when risk 
adjusted profits are used as a dependent variable. This means that greater competition 
in a banking sector enhances stability. On competition and bank capitalization, the 
results show that diversified banks that operate in a competitive environment tend to 
hold relatively more equity capital though the result is relatively insignificant. The 
results also indicate that a competitive and diversified banking system is associated 
with less risky loan portfolios.  
 
Similar results are found when alternative measures of the degree of competition and 
different methodological specifications are employed. Even when financial reforms, 
supervision power, property rights, capital stringency index and macroeconomic 
variables are controlled, the results suggest that competition and revenue 
diversification remain positively associated with bank stability. The core findings of 
this chapter correspond to the ‘competitive-stability view’ in the theoretical literature 
and are generally consistent with prior empirical findings that banks that operate in an 
uncompetitive banking industry are prone to originating riskier loans which are 
detrimental to their stability. The overall results provide empirically, an additional 
channel through which competition may affect insolvency risks of banks in 
developing /emerging markets.    
 
The results thus add more evidence on the current debates on whether or not 
competition improves stability. It also provides valuable insights for regulatory 
authorities, banking supervisors and market participants about the role of 
diversification in competition and stability relationships. In conclusion, the findings 
provide no evidence to support regulatory initiative that restricts both banking sector 
competition and diversification activities. 
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Table 3.3 
Summary statistics on selected bank level variables 
 
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics on selected bank-specific variables. H-statistics is a measure of 
competitiveness in the banking sector as discussed in section 3.3.1. The degree of market power is proxied by the 
Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing 
power.  Z-score is a measure on insolvency risk. Risk adjusted return on assets (RAROA) and of equity (RAROE) 
measure overall performance. Bank equity represents average capitalization level and is used as a proxy for the 
degree of risk. Bad loans are a proportion of non-performing loans to total loans and it is used as a measure of 
bank portfolio risk. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification across interest income and within 
non-interest income generating activities respectively. Commission^2 is a square of commission income to non-
interest income and NON^2 is the square of non-interest income to net operating income. Loans and deposits are 
ratios of loan to assets and deposits to liabilities respectively. They measure portfolio mix of banks. The bank size 
is the average total assets and ROA measures profitability 
 
Variables    Mean Median  SD  Min  Max 
 Market structure            
    H-statistics  Aggregate 0.65  0.64  0.19  0.09  1.08 
 Africa  0.64  0.65  0.19  0.09  1.08 
 Asia  0.66  0.68  0.19  0.17  0.84 
 CEEC  0.62  0.64  0.21  0.13  0.95 
 L.  America  0.68  0.63  0.15  0.43  0.92 
    Lerner index  Aggregate 0.25  0.26  0.24  -0.97  0.99 
 Africa  0.28  0.30  0.26  -0.97  0.99 
 Asia  0.22  0.25  0.21  -0.96  0.99 
 CEEC  0.21  0.23  0.22  -0.90  0.88 
 L.  America  0.27  0.29  0.27  -0.96  0.99 
Bank insolvency risk            
    Insolvency risk (Z-score)  Aggregate  18.69 13.65 17.49  -0.97  171.92 
 Africa  14.47  11.07  14.67  -0.78  171.92 
 Asia  24.15  19.02  19.37  -0.91  128.18 
 CEEC  22.11  17.62  18.45  -0.54  134.24 
 L.  America  15.78  10.71  16.04  -0.97  122.14 
   Risk adjusted return on assets (RAROA)  Aggregate 2.48  1.98  2.90  -5.10  24.35 
 Africa  2.57  2.21  2.92  -5.10  24.35 
 Asia  3.30  2.61  3.53  -2.78  23.76 
 CEEC  2.46  2.09  2.55  -3.32  18.57 
 L.  America  1.92  1.30  2.63  -2.85  14.61 
   Risk adjusted return on equity (RAROE)  Aggregate 2.53  1.97  3.00  -4.82  22.22 
 Africa  2.32  1.94  2.54  -4.82  18.76 
 Asia  3.57  2.72  3.69  -2.78  22.22 
 CEEC  2.47  2.03  2.70  -2.78  20.16 
 L.  America  2.14  1.44  3.04  -3.23  22.04 
   Ratio of equity to assets (Equity)  Aggregate 0.15  0.11  0.15  0.00  1.00 
 Africa  0.15  0.11  0.13  0.01  1.00 
 Asia  0.10  0.07  0.11  0.00  0.87 
 CEEC  0.14  0.10  0.11  0.01  0.98 
 L.  America  0.20  0.12  0.20  0.01  0.99 
   Ratio of bad loan to loans (Bad loans)  Aggregate 0.08  0.04  0.11  0.00  0.99 
 Africa  0.11  0.07  0.12  0.00  0.87 
 Asia  0.08  0.05  0.09  0.00  0.99 
 CEEC  0.06  0.03  0.08  0.00  0.91 
 L.  America  0.08  0.03  0.11  0.00  0.98 
Source: Bankscope and author’s own calculation 
The data comprises of 978 banks across 55 countries over the period, 2000-2007   92
Summary statistics on selected bank level variables (cont.) 
Variables    Mean Median  SD  Min  Max 
 Diversification            
    Revenue diversification (HHIrev)  Aggregate 0.60 0.56  0.14  0.05  0.99 
 Africa  0.59  0.54  0.12  0.50  0.99 
 Asia  0.63  0.59  0.12  0.50  0.99 
 CEEC  0.54  0.53  0.14  0.05  0.99 
 L.  America  0.65  0.62  0.13  0.50  0.99 
   Diversification within non-interest income    
   (HHInon)  
Aggregate 0.54 0.51  0.16  0.24  1.00 
 Africa  0.54  0.50  0.16  0.33  0.99 
 Asia  0.53  0.50  0.16  0.33  0.99 
 CEEC  0.56  0.53  0.14  0.33  0.99 
 L.  America  0.52  0.47  0.17  0.24  0.99 
  Commission income to non-interest income     
  (Com^2) 
Aggregate 0.31 0.27  0.25  0.00  0.99 
 Africa  0.36  0.31  0.26  0.00  0.99 
 Asia  0.24  0.17  0.23  0.00  0.98 
 CEEC  0.35  0.32  0.23  0.00  0.99 
 L.  America  0.28  0.25  0.25  0.00  1.00 
 Non-interest income to net operating revenue  
  (Non ^2) 
Aggregate 0.18 0.13  0.18  0.00  1.00 
 Africa  0.18  0.15  0.15  0.00  0.99 
 Asia  0.13  0.09  0.15  0.00  0.92 
 CEEC  0.17  0.14  0.15  0.00  0.98 
 L.  America  0.21  0.11  0.24  0.00  1.00 
Bank-specific control variables            
  Ratio of loan to assets (Loans)  Aggregate 0.51 0.53  0.21  0.00  0.99 
 Africa  0.48  0.47  0.20  0.01  0.99 
 Asia  0.56  0.55  0.16  0.00  0.98 
 CEEC  0.53  0.57  0.20  0.00  0.97 
 L.  America  0.49  0.51  0.23  0.00  0.99 
  Ratio of deposits to liabilities (Deposits)  Aggregate 0.79 0.88  0.23  0.00  0.99 
 Africa  0.78  0.88  0.24  0.00  0.99 
 Asia  0.78  0.87  0.23  0.00  0.99 
 CEEC  0.85  0.91  0.18  0.00  0.99 
 L.  America  0.74  0.82  0.25  0.00  0.99 
  Total assets in US $billion (Size)  Aggregate 6.9 0.5  45.4  0.0  1266 
 Africa  1.0  0.2  4.6  0.0  68.4 
 Asia  30.1  4.8  104  0.0  1266 
 CEEC  2.1  0.6  4.5  0.0  50.5 
 L.  America  2.5 0.4  6.6  0.0  100. 
  Return on assets (ROA)  Aggregate 0.02 0.02  0.05  -0.87  0.54 
 Africa  0.03  0.03  0.05  -0.62  0.54 
 Asia  0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.22  0.17 
 CEEC  0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.28  0.27 
 L.  America  0.01  0.02  0.06  -0.87  0.29 
Source: Bankscope and author’s own calculation 
The data comprises of 978 banks across 55 countries over the period 2000-2007 
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Table 3.4 
H-statistics of banking system of the selected countries 
 
Panzar and Ross (1987) H-statistic is calculated as the average of implied H-statistics from four 
different structural models estimated for each country for the eight year-period; 2000-2007 and it is 
based on the Claessen and Laeven (2004) approach. H1 is estimated using pooled OLS with bank-
specific and time dummies and gross interest income as dependent variable in the reduced-form 
revenue equation. H2 is estimated using pooled GLS with time dummies and gross interest income as 
dependent variable in the reduced-form revenue equation. H3 is estimated using pooled OLS with 
bank-specific and time dummies and total income as dependent variable in the reduced-form revenue 
equation.H4 is estimated using pooled GLS with time dummies and total income as dependent 
variable in the reduced-form revenue equation. 
  H1 H2 H3 H4  H-statistics 
Benin  0.719 0.341 0.508 0.370  0.484 
Burkina Faso  0.083  -0.013  0.221  0.063  0.089 
Cameroon  0.9952 0.9319 0.7582 0.5503  0.8089 
Cote  d'Ivoire  0.7480 0.7986 0.6596 0.4044  0.6527 
Ghana  0.6468 0.6091 0.5593 0.4646  0.5700 
Nigeria  0.5617 0.6300 0.5159 0.4447  0.5381 
Senegal  0.2910 0.9772 0.4540 0.6954  0.6044 
Kenya  0.8580 0.6010 0.7540 0.8040  0.7543 
Uganda  0.4402 0.5945 0.5309 0.6447  0.5526 
Tanzania  1.4148 1.0222 1.2420 0.6584  1.0843 
Ethiopia  0.3928 0.5542 -0.1230 0.4139  0.3095 
Angola  0.9955 0.3473 0.7455 0.7057  0.6985 
Botswana  0.6988 0.4827 0.6446 0.4715  0.5744 
Malawi  0.7595 0.7664 0.5980 0.5417  0.6664 
Madagascar  0.3022 0.1916 0.3589 0.1847  0.2594 
Mauritius  0.7588 0.7773 0.7588 0.7773  0.7681 
Mozambique  0.2761 0.4058 0.9879 0.5881  0.5645 
Namibia  0.7892 1.0119 0.5492 0.9375  0.8220 
South  Africa  0.8388 0.3728 0.9455 0.6890  0.7115 
Swaziland  1.8683 0.9345 0.3613 0.4042  0.8921 
Zambia  0.2467 0.4536 0.5480 0.4670  0.4288 
Zimbabwe  0.6259 0.7535 0.3259 0.6148  0.5800 
China  0.4982 0.6859 0.5368 0.6921  0.6032 
Hong  Kong  0.8320 0.4771 0.8966 0.5080  0.6784 
India  1.4050 0.5319 0.7184 0.6703  0.8314 
Philippines  0.5514 0.4462 0.3937 0.3126  0.4260 
Singapore -0.3960  -1.0932  1.0725  1.1085  0.1730 
South  Korea  0.8908 0.7876 0.8908 0.7876  0.8392 
Thailand  0.6085 0.6247 0.5460 0.5446  0.5810 
Albania  0.7340 1.7805 0.2205 1.0398  0.9437 
Belarus  0.7629 0.7231 0.8867 0.7836  0.7891 
Bulgaria  0.2798 0.3462 0.4091 0.6017  0.4092 
Croatia  0.5491 0.3997 0.2470 0.2730  0.3672 
Czech 0.4761  0.1805  0.4046 0.2374  0.3246 
Estonia  -1.0090 0.1722 0.7440 0.6166  0.1310 
Hungary  0.7270 1.1808 0.8360 1.0691  0.9532 
Latvia  0.5910 0.5682 0.7350 0.6610  0.6388 
Lithuania  0.5460 0.7821 0.5810 0.7440  0.6633 
Poland  0.9846 0.7679 0.9050 0.7150  0.8431 
Romania  0.8403 0.8687 1.0150 0.8830  0.9018   94
H-statistics of banking system of the selected countries (cont.) 
  H1 H2 H3 H4  H-statistics 
Russia  0.5492 0.4900 0.6579 0.6359  0.5833 
Slovak  Rep  0.1385 0.3415 0.8280 0.6342  0.4856 
Slovenia  0.5784 0.4553 0.5430 0.5838  0.5401 
Ukraine  0.6602 0.6014 0.6874 0.6157  0.6412 
Argentina  0.5773 0.6208 0.5460 0.6460  0.5975 
Bolivia  0.4137 0.3541 0.5782 0.5158  0.4654 
Brazil  0.7020 0.7938 0.8669 0.8684  0.8078 
Chile  0.8290 0.9310 0.7910 1.0334  0.8961 
Columbia  0.2538 0.7602 0.6400 0.5706  0.5562 
Costa  Rica  0.1335 0.4803 0.7887 0.7618  0.5411 
Mexico  0.9220 0.9220 0.9080 0.9080  0.9150 
Panama  0.6885 0.6209 0.5218 0.6720  0.6258 
Paraguay  0.7500 0.7166 0.7808 0.7210  0.7421 
Uruguay  -0.0036 0.2735 0.7486 0.7171  0.4339 
Venezuela  1.0715 0.1817 0.7413 0.7180  0.6781 
Source: Bankscope and author’s own calculation 
The data comprises of 978 banks across 55 countries over the period 2000-2007 
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Table 3.5 
Pair-wise correlation coefficient between key selected variables 
 
The table presents pair-wise correlation coefficients estimated on sample of 978 banks across 55 countries for the period, 2000-2007. * implies significant at 5% or more. Z-score is a measure 
on insolvency risk. Risk adjusted return on assets (RAROA) and of equity (RAROE) measure overall performance. Bank equity represents average capitalization level and is used as a proxy for 
the degree of risk. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. H-
statistics is a measure of competitiveness in the banking sector as discussed in section 3.3.1. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification across interest income and within non-
interest income generating activities respectively. Commission^2 is a square of commission income to non-interest income and NON^2 is the square of non-interest income to net operating 
income. Loan is a ratio of loan to total assets and it is used as a measure of bank loan portfolio. The GDP growth accounts for the differences in economic developments across countries. 
Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI 
 
 Z-score  RAROA  RAROE  Equity  Lerner  index  H-statistics  HHI(non) HHI(rev)  NON^2  Com^2  Loans Size  GDP  growth  Inflation 
Z-score 1.000                        
RAROA 0.689*  1.000                      
RAROE 0.512*  0.758*  1.000                    
Equity 0.134*  -0.135*  -0.162*  1.000                     
Lerner index  0.067*  0.236*  0.218*  0.131*  1.000                   
H-statistics -0.017  0.034*  0.024*  -0.027*  -0.061*  1.000                 
HHI(non) -0.053*  -0.037*  -0.068*  0.045*  0.070*  0.015  1.000              
HHI(rev) 0.020  0.007  0.016  0.117*  0.118*  -0.043*  -0.002  1.000           
NON^2 -0.127*  -0.121*  -0.133* 0.075* 0.033*  -0.070*  0.108*  -0.018 1.000           
Com^2  -0.019  0.074* 0.047* -0.110*  -0.039*  0.041*  0.531* -0.032* -0.206* 1.000         
Loans 0.107*  0.100*  0.105*  -0.124*  -0.057*  0.042*  -0.080*  0.066*  -0.264*  0.098*  1.000       
Size  0.061* 0.102* 0.051* -0.081*  0.035*  0.016  0.036* 0.088*  -0.067* 0.055* 0.037*  1.000     
GDP  growth  0.048*  0.095*  0.092*  -0.086*  0.080*  -0.020  0.063*  -0.037*  -0.021 0.036*  0.026*  0.089* 1.000   
Inflation -0.022  -0.012  -0.022  0.020  0.016  -0.013  -0.019  0.025*  -0.015  0.000  -0.037*  -0.002  -0.199*  1.000 
Source: Bankscope, World Development Indicator and author’s own calculations 
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Table 3.6 
Three stage least square (3SLS) regression results of bank performance 
  
The dependant variables for panel A are measures of bank overall performance: Z-score, RAROA, RAROE, 
Equity/asset, and Bad loan ratio and dependent variable for panel B are measures of revenue diversification: 
HHI(non) and HHI(rev). These are regressed on selected explanatory variables: H-statistics is a measure of 
competitiveness in the banking sector as discussed in section 3.3.1. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue 
diversification across interest income and within non-interest income generating activities respectively. NON^2 is 
the square of non-interest income to net operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loan to assets and 
deposits to liabilities respectively. Commission^2 is a square of commission income to non-interest income. ROA 
is return on assets and it measures profitability. The regression use instruments for H-statistics and the instruments 
used are (1) activity restrictions, an index of regulatory restriction on bank activities; (2) banking freedom provide 
overall measures of the openness of the banking sector and (3) natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US$ 
(size). The dependent variables and the measures of competitive structure are treated as endogenous. The 
parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicates 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. P-value of f-test takes into account for the 
significance of identifying instruments. 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent variables 
 
Z-score RAROA  RAROE  Equity/assets  Bad loan   Z-score 
  Alternative 
measure of 
revenue 
diversification 
 
 
HHI(rev) 
Panel A            
H-statistics 0.897***  1.030***  1.166***  0.004  -0.127***  1.439*** 
  (0.257) (0.304) (0.306)  (0.031)  (0.025) (0.300) 
HHI(non)  -0.909*** -0.208  -0.357*  -0.105**  -0.054***  
  (0.157) (0.190) (0.194)  (0.019)  (0.018)  
Non income^2  -0.703***  -0.698***  -0.765***  0.024**  0.043***  -0.745*** 
  (0.092) (0.112) (0.115)  (0.011)  (0.012) (0.090) 
Loans 0.290***  0.102  0.013  -0.033***  -0.039***  0.496*** 
  (0.080) (0.097) (0.100)  (0.009)  (0.010) (0.091) 
Deposits 0.034  0.172*  0.162*  -0.101***  -0.004  0.016 
  (0.075) (0.091) (0.093)  (0.009)  (0.009) (0.107) 
GDP growth  0.028  0.111***  0.107***  -0.008**  -0.038**  0.0002 
  (0.028) (0.034) (0.035)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.026) 
HHI(rev)         -1.527** 
 
         (0.758) 
Panel B                                 Dependent variables 
  HHI(non) HHI(non) HHI(non)  HHI(non)  HHI(non) HHI(rev) 
H-statistics  -0.270*** -0.265*** -0.259***  -0.274***  -0.153*** -0.098*** 
  (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.029) (0.035) 
Com  income^2 0.371*** 0.369*** 0.371***  0.372***  0.415*** -0.013* 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) (0.007) 
Loans  -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.084***  -0.085***  -0.046*** 0.063*** 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.012) (0.009) 
ROA  -0.116 0.093  0.096 -0.195***  -0.054 0.338*** 
  (0.075) (0.090) (0.094)  (0.071)  (0.083) (0.067) 
Deposits  -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.128***  -0.133***  -0.122*** -0.097*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011) (0.009) 
GDP growth  0.006  0.009**  0.009**  0.006*  0.009**  -0.006** 
 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Panel A  No of obs 
F-stats 
4137 
32.91*** 
3879 
15.29*** 
3841 
16.69*** 
4166 
29.29*** 
2758 
35.05*** 
4871 
36.67*** 
Panel B  No. obs 
F-stats 
4137 
347.06*** 
3879 
324.69*** 
3841 
325.03** 
4166 
351.82** 
2758 
318.70*** 
4871 
31.88**   97
Table 3.7 
Three stage least square (3SLS) regression results of bank performance 
using alternative measure of market structure 
  
The dependant variables for panel A are measures of bank overall performance: Z-score, RAROA, RAROE, 
Equity/asset, and Bad loan ratio and dependent variable for panel B are measures of revenue diversification: 
HHI(non) and HHI(rev). These are regressed on selected explanatory variables: The degree of market power is 
proxied by the Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the higher scores indicating a higher 
degree of pricing power. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification across interest income and 
within non-interest income generating activities respectively. NON^2 is the square of non-interest income to net 
operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loan to assets and deposits to liabilities respectively. 
Commission^2 is a square of commission income to non-interest income. Ratio of securities/assets is measured as total 
investment of banks in securities divided by total assets. The regression use instruments for Lerner index and the 
instruments used are (1) activity restrictions, an index of regulatory restriction on bank activities; (2) banking 
freedom provides overall measures of the openness of the banking sector and (3) natural logarithm of total assets in 
millions of US$ (size). The dependent variables and the measures of competitive structure are treated as 
endogenous. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. P-value of f-test takes 
into account for the significance of identifying instruments 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Dependent variables 
Z-score RAROA RAROE  Equity/assets  Bad loan   Z-score 
Alternative 
measure of 
revenue div 
 
 
HHI(rev) 
Panel A              
Lerner index  -0.881**  -1.995***  -1.078**  -0.164***  0.548***  0.471*** 
 (0.360)  (0.394)  (0.441)  (0.044)  (0.063)  (0.073) 
HHI(non) -0.553***  0.231  -0.093  -0.089***  -0.071**   
 (0.157)  (0.194)  (0.198)  (0.020)  (0.028)   
Non income^2  -0.638***  -0.352***  -0.660***  0.065***  -0.030*  -0.900*** 
 (0.094)  (0.117)  (0.127)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.086) 
Loans 0.311***  0.223**  0.022  -0.023**  -0.028*  0.367*** 
 (0.082)  (0.101)  (0.104)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.085) 
Deposits -0.121  0.00009  -0.021  -0.121***  0.039**  0.033 
 (0.087)  (0.101)  (0.106)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.083) 
GDP growth  0.013  0.064*  0.078**  -0.001  -0.056***  -0.068*** 
 (0.030)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.024) 
HHI(rev)           -0.380 
 
           (0.488) 
Panel B   
                                   Dependent variables 
 HHI(non)  HHI(non)  HHI(non)  HHI(non)  HHI(non)  HHI(rev) 
Lerner index  0.571*** 0.442***  0.522*** 0.615***  0.452*** 0.057*** 
  (0.085) (0.056)  (0.060) (0.080)  (0.080) (0.009) 
Com income^2  0.390*** 0.381***  0.393*** 0.391***  0.424*** -0.011 
  (0.011) (0.009)  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.008) 
Loans  -0.034 0.013  0.029  -0.067**  0.009 0.245*** 
  (0.034) (0.026)  (0.028) (0.033)  (0.030) (0.020) 
Deposits  -0.045*** -0.072***  -0.056*** -0.039**  -0.076*** -0.087*** 
  (0.017) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.017)  (0.015) (0.009) 
Securities/asset 0.031  0.113*** 0.103***  -0.008  0.040  0.196*** 
  (0.038) (0.028)  (0.030) (0.037)  (0.035) (0.021) 
GDP growth  -0.007 0.001  0.003  -0.009  -0.005 -0.004 
 
 (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
Panel A  No. of obs 
F-stats 
4103 
23.91*** 
4466 
12.48*** 
3811 
11.61*** 
4127 
30.75*** 
2726 
23.87*** 
4161 
35.62*** 
Panel B  No. of obs 
F-stats 
4103 
198.92** 
4466 
274.45*** 
3811 
237.35*** 
4127 
204.24** 
2726 
228.98 
4161 
50.31***   98
Table 3.8 
Regression results of bank performance: IV estimation 
  
The dependant variables are measures of overall performance: Z-score, RAROA, RAROE, Equity/asset, and Bad 
loan ratio. These are regressed on selected explanatory variables: H-statistics is a measure of competitiveness in 
the banking sector as discussed in section 3.3.1. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification across 
interest income and within non-interest income generating activities respectively. NON^2 is the square of non-
interest income to net operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loan to assets and deposits to liabilities 
respectively. GDP growth measures business cycle fluctuation. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI.  
The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the 
higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. The regression for column (1), (2), (3), (4) and (6) use 
instruments for H-statistics and regression for column (5) employ instruments for Lerner index. The instruments 
used for specification are 1,3 4,5 and 6 are  (1) activity restrictions, which is an index of regulatory restriction on 
bank activities; (2) banking freedom provides overall measures of the openness of the banking sector and (3) 
natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US$ (size), while in specification 2, the activity restriction is 
dropped and replace with entry restriction. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard 
errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Panel B reports diagnostic test: Two tests (Sargan N*R
2 and Basmann test) are reported for overidentifying 
restrictions measures instruments exogeneity. The R2 measures the goodness of fit while the p-value of F-test 
measures the significant of identifying instruments. The Wu-Hausman F-test and Durbin-wu-Hausman chi2 
specification compare the difference between the IV and the OLS estimators. Regression column 6 is exactly 
identified and thus has 0.000 for both Sargan N*R sq and Basmum test. Bank and country fixed effect are 
excluded from the estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent variables 
Z-score  RAROA  RAROE  Bad loan   Z-score  Z-score 
Alternative measures of 
competitive structure and 
revenue diversification 
 
 
Lerner index  HHI(rev) 
Panel A           
H-statistics  3.840*** 2.245*** 1.744*** -0.144***    3.653*** 
  (0.444) (0.364) (0.337) (0.046)   (0.585) 
HHI(non) -0.245**  -0.150  -0.303***  -0.019*  -0.051   
  (0.110) (0.113) (0.111) (0.011) (0.127)   
Non  income^2  -0.436*** -0.645*** -0.743*** 0.058***  -0.652***  -0.453*** 
  (0.113) (114)  (0.113) (0.012) (0.135)  (0.118) 
Loans  0.355***  0.110 0.036 -0.044***  0.207*  0.349* 
  (0.092) (0.095) (0.095) (0.010) (0.109)  (0.186) 
Deposits  0.420*** 0.402*** 0.370*** -0.010  -0.495***  0.445 
  (0.095) (0.926) (0.090) (0.010) (0.115)  (0.308) 
GDP  growth  0.127*** 0.108*** 0.0758** -0.034***  0.113***  0.132*** 
  (0.033) (0.329) (0.032) (0.003) (0.040)  (0.038) 
Inflation  -0.174*** -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.001  -0.146***  -0.188*** 
  (0.019) (0.318) (0.019) (0.002) (0.021)  (0.039) 
Lerner  index      -3.721***   
      (0.560)   
HHI(rev)        -0.029 
 
        (2.543) 
Panel B  Diagnostic tests 
Test  for  overid:        
  Sargan N*R-sq test  
  Basmann test  
2.00 
2.00 
34.45*** 
34.64*** 
70.22*** 
71.17*** 
0.117 
0.116 
2.38 
2.37 
0.000 
0.000 
No.  of  observation  4899 4564 4524 3195 4849  5352 
R2  (uncentered)  0.82 0.19 0.24 0.40 0.79  0.82 
F-test  (p-value)  36.91*** 19.81*** 20.43*** 31.49*** 27.93***  35.41*** 
Wu-Hausman  F-test  147.44** 45.95*** 27.66*** 3.43***  131.69***  37.02*** 
 
Durbin-wu-Hausman    143.39** 45.58**  27.55*** 3.44***  128.44***  73.16***   99
Table 3.9 
3SLS regression results of bank insolvency risk: Controlling for regulatory variables  
 
The dependant variable for panel A is Z-score and measures bank insolvency risk and that of panel B is HHI(non) which is a 
measure of revenue diversification. These variables are regressed on selected explanatory variables. H-statistics is a measure of 
competitiveness in the banking sector as discussed in section 3.3.1. HHI(non) measures revenue diversification within non-
interest income generating activities respectively. NON income
2 is the square of non-interest income to net operating income. 
Loans and deposits are ratios of loan to assets and deposits to liabilities respectively. Four regulatory and supervisory variables 
are included in the baseline regression: Financial reforms, supervisory power, property right and capital index. Higher values of 
financial reforms indicate fully reformed. Supervisory power measures whether the authorities have the power to take specific 
action to correct and prevent problems. It also ranges from 0 to 16 with higher values indicating more supervisory power. Higher 
score of property right indicate certainty of legal protection of property right and limited expropriation risks. Capital index 
measures overall capital stringency. It ranges from 0 to 9, with a higher value indicating greater stringency. The regression use 
instruments for H-statistics and the instruments used are (1) activity restrictions which is an index of regulatory restriction on 
bank activities; (2) banking freedom provides overall measures of the openness of the banking sector and (3) natural logarithm of 
total assets in millions of US$ (size). The dependent variables and the measures of competitive structure are treated as 
endogenous. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicates 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Country and bank fixed effects are not included in the estimates. 
 
Dependent variable: Z-score   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A  H-statistics  0.897*** 2.327*** 1.863*** 1.194*** 2.394*** 
  (0.257) (0.262) (0.249) (0.256) (0.264) 
HHI(non)  -0.909*** -0.629*** -0.590*** -0.490*** -0.543*** 
  (0.157) (0.170) (0.164) (0.158) (0.172) 
Non income
2  -0.703*** -0.463*** -0.546*** -0.508*** -0.423*** 
  (0.092) (0.098) (0.094) (0.091) (0.099) 
Loans  0.290*** 0.347*** 0.279*** 0.346*** 0.387*** 
  (0.080) (0.086) (0.084) (0.079) (0.086) 
Deposits 0.034  0.142*  0.115  0.164**  0.205** 
  (0.075) (0.082) (0.078) (0.075) (0.082) 
GDP  growth  0.028  0.102*** 0.058**  0.118*** 0.103*** 
  (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030) 
Financial  reform     0.272***     
   (0.107)     
Supervision  power    -0.376***    
    (0.083)    
Property  right     0.475***   
     (0.045)   
Capital  index      0.239*** 
 
      (0.037) 
Panel B  Dependent variables   
HHI(non)  HHI(non)  HHI(non)  HHI(non)  HHI(non) 
H-statistics  -0.270*** -0.301*** -0.283*** -0.284*** -0.264*** 
  (0.034) (0.032) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) 
Com  income^2  0.371*** 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.371*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Loans  -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.086*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)_  (0.010) 
ROA  -0.116 -0.023 -0.043 -0.068 -0.028 
  (0.075) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) 
Deposits  -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.129*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010  (0.010) (0.010) 
GDP  growth  0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 
 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Panel A  Number of observations 
F-statistic 
4137 
32.91*** 
4137 
33.20*** 
4137 
28.46*** 
4137 
50.34*** 
4137 
33.30*** 
Panel B  Number of observations 
F-statistic 
4137 
347.06*** 
4137 
339.93*** 
4137 
350.68** 
4137 
344.89*** 
4137 
350.38** 
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The impact of market power and funding strategy  
on bank performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates the implications of market power and funding strategies for 
bank performance using a sample of 978 banks in 55 emerging and developing 
countries over an eight year period, 2000-2007. It provides additional insight by 
examining the complex interlocking of three key variables that are important for 
regulators: the degree of market power, funding sources and banks’ performance. The 
results show that market power increases when banks use internal funding to diversify 
into non-interest income generating activities. The core finding is that, high 
performance of banks in emerging and developing countries can be explained by the 
degree of market power, credit risk, implicit interest payments and internal bank 
capital. On the whole, the results suggest that performance of banks with market 
power is significantly more sensitive to internally generated funds than they are to 
deposit and wholesale funding. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Banks play a key role in financing economic activities in a country. By its very nature, 
banking is an attempt to manage multiple and seemingly opposing needs. Banks 
accept deposit and assure savers that their deposits are liquid and secure. They extend 
credit as well as liquidity to borrowers through lines of credit (Kashyap et al., 2002). 
Channelling funds from lenders to borrowers is the primary intermediation function of 
banks. In order to achieve this greater social welfare, it is important that the 
intermediation function is carried out with the lowest possible cost. Accordingly, the 
lower the cost of banks’ interest margin, the lower the social cost of financial 
intermediation. The effectiveness of a banking system in the intermediation process is 
often measured by examining the spread between lending and deposit rates as well as 
assessing the extent of operational efficiencies of the banking system (Taci and 
Zampieri, 1998). In line with this, the banking literature has concentrated on analysing 
the determinants of bank performance especially that of interest margins. This was 
pioneered by the seminal paper of Ho and Saunders (1981). Their paper which 
conceptualise banking firms as intermediaries between lenders and borrowers, finds 
that the interest margin has two basic components; the degree of competition of the 
markets and the interest rate risk to which the bank is exposed. Allen (1988) widens it 
to permit the existence of different types of credits and deposits; McShane and Sharpe 
(1985) change the source of interest rate risk using money markets instead of the 
interest rates on credits and deposits. Angbazo (1997) extends the model to take into 
account credit risk as well as interest rate risk. Wong (1997) demonstrates how cost, 
regulation, credit risk and interest rate conditions jointly determine the optimal bank 
interest decision and with market power positively influences interest margin. 
 
These earlier studies do not reflect the variation of interest margins across-countries 
and across levels of economic development. A close look at figure 1 suggests that 
interest margins vary widely across countries with the interest margin of low and 
middle income economies being higher than that of high income countries. For 
example in 2005, the average interest margin of low income countries (12.75%) was 
thrice that of higher income economies (3.89%). The relative size of cross-economies 
interest margins appears to be the same over the period 1997-2005. What is not   104
known is whether the higher interest margins in these low income economies are good 
or bad from a social welfare point of view. On one hand according to Saunders and 
Schumacher (2000) narrow margins may be indicative of relatively competitive 
banking systems with a low level of intermediation costs and regulatory taxes; and on 
the other hand, relatively large margins may bring a degree of stability for a banking 
system as banks buffer their profit to capital so as to insulate themselves from 
macroeconomic shocks. 
 
Figure 4.1 
Interest rate spread across countries based on the level of income 
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Source: World Development indicator (September 2009) and author’s estimation 
 
Employing a cross-country study, Saunders and Schumacher (2000) decompose bank 
margin into a regulatory component, market structure and risk premium component 
and reveal a trade-off between assuring bank solvency (high capital–to-asset ratios) 
and lowering the cost of financial services to consumers (low net-interest margins) 
among six OECD countries. Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008), show that 
concentration, operational efficiency, capital adequacy and risk behaviour are factors 
influencing the interest margin of Central and Eastern European countries. Maudos 
and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) demonstrate that the fall in interest margins in the 
European banking system is due to relaxation of competitive conditions and the Carbo 
Valverde and Fernandez (2007) study reveals that the relationship between bank 
margins and market power varies significantly across bank specialization with market 
power increasing as output becomes more diversified towards non-traditional 
activities for European countries. However, these studies do not empirical analyse the 
link between three key variables that are important for regulators: performance,   105
degree of market power and the funding strategies of banks. Pagano (1993) shows that 
market power allows banks to charge higher loan rates and compensate savers with 
lower deposit rates thus, reducing the equilibrium quantities of funds available for 
credit and hence generating a direct negative effect on the rate at which an economy 
can grow. However, an increase in the degree of market power enhances the 
profitability level which according to (Saunders and Schumacher, (2000), and Turk 
Ariss, (2010)) provides greater bank stability. This chapter therefore investigates the 
implications of bank market power and funding strategies on overall performance. 
This study is being conducted in the context of developing countries as figure 4.1 
shows that banks in emerging and developing countries make high profits. 
 
The objective of this chapter is two fold: first, is to examine the determinants of 
market power and funding structure of banks in developing countries. It is important 
from an economic policy perspective to identify the various sources of market power 
as it is only when these sources are identified that action might be taken to reduce the 
social inefficiency associated with the existence of market power (Maudos and 
Nagore, 2005). Second, it investigates the implications of bank market power and 
funding strategies for bank performance. Here instead of documenting trends in the 
relative importance of funding strategies (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010) and 
market power (Maudos and De Guevara (2007), it takes the determinants of market 
power and the funding structure as estimated in the first objective and examine the 
relationship as well as the sensitivity of market power and funding modes on interest 
margin, return on assets and insolvency risk at the individual bank level. The second 
objective includes testing of the impact of market structure, bank funding structure 
and the stance of monetary policy on bank insolvency risk. This is very important as 
changes in the financial system of developing countries couple with the changes in the 
prudential regulation could have increased the effect of the perception, pricing and the 
risk management behaviour of banks (Borio and Zhu 2008). 
 
The Lerner index is used to construct a measure of market power, and to avoid any 
bias emanating from a bank exercising market power in the deposits market, and as 
there is no consensus in the literature regarding how best to assess the degree of bank   106
market power (Carbó et al.2009), the study employs two different specifications of 
Lerner: a conventional Lerner (Berger et al., 2009) and a funding-adjusted Lerner 
(Maudos and De Guevara, 2007) to investigate the impact of market power on bank 
performance. Three funding modes have been identified in the sample: deposit 
funding, non-deposit /wholesale funding and internal capital funding. Finally, three 
measures of performance are used in this chapter: net-interest margin for the spread 
between deposit and lending rates, return on assets for bank profitability, and Z-score 
for the measurement of overall bank insolvency risk.  
 
The results demonstrate that on average funding-adjusted Lerner index is larger than 
that of the conventional Lerner index suggesting that the latter has been 
underestimating the degree of market power. Moreover, the results reveal that larger, 
growing and highly capitalised banks have market power. Similarly, diversifying into 
non-interest income activities using internal capital enhances bank market power. 
Equally, smaller, highly capitalised and efficiently managed banks employ internally 
generated funds for their investments. High net-interest margin, high return of assets 
of banks in emerging and developing countries can be explained by the degree of 
market power, credit risk and implicit interest payments and internal bank capital. 
Also, the result shows that banks that rely on internal capital and deposit funding are 
safer than those that finance their assets with wholesale funds. On the whole, the 
results suggest that performance of banks in emerging economies with market power 
is significantly more sensitive to internally generated funds than they are to either 
deposit or wholesale funding. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section (4.2) reviews detailed existing 
literature, summarising theoretical, empirical, methodology and results of other 
studies analysing the determinants of bank performance.  Section (4.3) constructs 
various specifications of Lerner index, proxy for the degree of market power, the three 
funding modes, other controlled variables used and estimation methodology used to 
achieve the stated objectives. Section (4.4) contains the data and empirical results. 
Section (4.5) concludes. 
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4.2 Literature  review 
 
This section provides a review of the related literature on bank performance.  It begins 
with a theoretical overview of the three principles underlying net-interest margins, 
then follows with a discussion of the empirical literature including methods and 
results on the micro-bank-specific and macro-country level variables that affect bank 
profitability and insolvency risk. 
 
4.2.1  Theoretical literature explaining net-interest margin 
Theoretical principles explaining bank net-interest margin can either be described in 
terms of a ‘monopoly model’, ‘dealership model’ or ‘behavioural model. 
  
Monopoly model 
The monopoly model developed by the seminal work of Klein (1971) considers the 
banking firm’s main activity as the production of deposits and loans through 
intermediation services and is represented by the following cost function: 
 
) , ( L D f C             ( 4 . 1 )  
 
Where D is the volume of deposits while L is the volume of loans produced by the 
bank. The assumption in line with equation (4.1) is that a banking firm pursues its 
activities in an environment characterised by the presence of imperfect competition in 
both deposit and credit markets. That is, the bank has monopolistic power to set 
interest rates in at least one of the markets where it conducts its operations (especially 
in the credit market where it behaves as a price setter). Klein (1971) contends that the 
monopoly power of a bank can then be used to explain the scale of operations, its 
asset and liability structure as well as its decision to affect the rate of return on 
liabilities (deposits) and assets (loans). Thus, with this approach, a banking firm’s 
spread reflects primarily its ability to charge a price higher than the marginal cost of 
providing the services in both loan and deposit markets. Oreiro and de Paula (2010) 
provide a context where r is the prevailing interest rate on the inter-bank market;  L r is 
the interest rate charged on loans generated by the bank; and  D r  is the interest rate   108
paid to depositors with the bank.  is the reserve requirements expressed as a 
proportion of the deposits; the  L  is  the interest elasticity of loan demand;   D   is the 
interest elasticity of deposit supply; L C  is the marginal cost of loan services; and  D C is 
the marginal cost of deposits services. Assuming that the banking firm is risk neutral 
and that its behaviour is directed to maximising profits, the optimal interest margin on 
loan and deposits according to Freixas and Rochet (1997) is presented as: 
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Equations (4.2) and (4.3) suggest that a bank operating in an imperfectly competitive 
environment sets the prices of its loans and deposit services in a manner equal to the 
Lerner index which is the inverse of the interest elasticity of the loan demand and 
deposit supply functions. Equation (4.2) and (4.3) are interpreted as, the lesser the 
sensitivity of loan demand and deposit supply functions to interest rate variations, the 
greater the bank’s margin in both loan and deposit taking operations, and, thus the 
greater the banking firm spread. However, if the banking firm operates in an 
oligopolistic market where it grants loan and takes deposit, then the optimal interest 
margin on loans and deposits is given as: 
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Here, s is the market share of the 
th n  bank. Equations (4.4) and (4.5) illustrate bank 
interest margins on loan supply and deposit taking and it is a growing function of a 
bank’s market share. It is interpreted to mean that: a reduction in the number of   109
banking firms resulting from either a merger or acquisition increases bank 
concentration and thus interest spreads. The key result of this model according to 
(Costa da Silva et al. 2007) is that, banking firm spread is a growing function of the 
degree of overall banking sector concentration. 
 
Dealership model 
The second model to explain bank spreads is the dealership model introduced by Ho 
and Saunders (1981). This views the bank as a dynamic dealer, setting interest rates 
on loans and deposits to balance the asymmetric arrival of loan demand and deposit 
supplies. The Non-synchronous arrival of loans and deposits generates a cost for the 
bank given that it will have to hold either a long or short position in the money market. 
This therefore exposes the bank to changes in the money market interest rate (i.e. 
interest rate risk). Estrada et al. (2006) provide an intuitive illustration: suppose a new 
deposit (loan) is contracted at a long-term interest rate,  D r    L r . If this deposit (loan) 
arrives earlier than a new loan (deposit), the bank will have to invest (borrow) the 
funds at the short-term money market interest rate, r . In performing its intermediary 
function, the bank faces a reinvestment (refinancing) risk at the end of the decision 
period should the short-term interest rate, r ,  fall (rise). The bank therefore transfers 
these costs associated with the uncertainty in the provision of deposits and loan 
operations to the economic agents. Thus, participation of each bank in the market 
occurs by setting a deposit and loan interest rate,  D r  and   L r  that depends on these 
costs:  
 
a r rD               ( 4 . 6 )  
b r rL    
 
Where r is the expected interest rate in the money market, aand b are the financial 
cost related to the provision of deposits and loans respectively. In the dealership 
model, the profit maximizing bank is expected to maximise its utility of terminal 
wealth as: 
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According to Ho and Saunders (1981), s is the pure margin, a is the mark up on 
deposits, b  is the mark up on loans,    measures the relative market power, R  is 
the bank’s risk aversion, 
2
i  is the variance of the interest rate on loans and deposits 
and the Qis the size of the banks’ transaction. There have been extensions to Ho and 
Saunders (1981) model to account for time series and cross section (McShane and 
Sharpe, 1985), for cross–elasticities of demand between bank products (Allen, 1988), 
for default risk and different size classes of bank (Angbazo, 1997), for bank 
operational cost (Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004), for identical banks with 
respect to their degree of risk aversion (Estrada, 2006), for a multi-product 
framework that reflects more adequately the diversification of banks’ output (Carbo 
Valverde and Rodriguez Fernandez, 2007), and for the cost of goods (Madura and 
Zarruk, (1995), and Wong, (1997)). 
 
Behaviour model 
The monopoly model as well as the dealership model and its extensions have two 
main limitations. According to Hanweck and Ryu (2005), monopoly and dealership 
models are single-horizon, static models in which bank assets and liabilities are 
considered homogenous and accordingly priced at prevailing loan and deposit rates 
and on the basis of the reference rate. In practice however, bank portfolios are 
characterised by heterogeneous assets and liabilities with different security, maturity 
and re-pricing structure that mostly go beyond a single horizon. The second 
limitation on these models is that the banking sector is treated as either being 
homogenous or as having heterogeneous traits that is based only on the assets size of 
banks. Conversely, banks with different products usually differ in terms of their 
business models, pricing power and more importantly the funding structure and 
exogenous shock. All these accounts for the net-interest margin sensitivity to interest-
rate and other related shocks. Perhaps, the best known behavioural model on interest 
margin is one developed by Hanweck and Ryu (2005). The model of bank behaviour 
in relation to net-interest margins assume that at each period a bank can significantly 
but not completely select the amount of its investment in assets and liabilities of   111
different re-pricing frequencies, given past choices that are immutable. In modelling 
bank responses to credit and interest rates risks and shareholders maximization value, 
Hanweck and Ryu (2005) argue that ‘not only do bank managers have to choose the 
optimal financial service product mix and geography diversification, they also need 
to set the lending rate and fees, hedge credit quality and volatility changes, manage 
their liability structure and gauge the moods of the equity and debt markets to 
favourable or unfavourable news so as to increase or protect shareholder value.’ 
Given these motivations and the ability of banks to change their portfolios and their 
positions as interest rate takers, and assuming that banks operate to maximise 
shareholders value over a 12 month horizon, Hanweck and Ryu (2005) model the 
determinants of interest margin as being the function of changes for different groups 
of banks in response to credit, interest-rates and term-structural shocks. 
 
Another important contribution using a behavioural model on interest margin is that 
of Lepetit et al. (2008b). They test for possible cross-selling behaviour of interest and 
non-interest products by examining the determinants of the risk premium charged by 
banks on their loans using the European banking system. Their results reveal that 
higher reliance on fee-based activities is associated with lower lending rates and that 
borrower default risk is under priced in the lending rates charged by banks with fee-
income shares. Carbo Valverde and Rodriguez Fernandez (2007) on their part make a 
significant contribution by developing a theoretical model that includes how 
traditional and non-traditional activities impact on bank net-interest margin. The 
objective of their model is to identify the effect of specialization on bank margins 
using a multi-output model for European banks. In order to achieve this objective, 
they estimate a dynamic model with the view that banks need to match the random 
deposit supply function and the random demand of lending and non-traditional 
activities across periods. Their results show that expansion into non-traditional 
activities causes an increase in market power, and a marginal decrease in spread due 
to cross-subsidization.   112
4.2.2  Evidence of determinants of net-interest margin 
The empirical literature on bank spreads suggests that bank interest margins are 
mostly influenced by the type and the level of bank market structure, administrative 
and other operating costs, the fraction on non-performing loans, the size of the 
operating capacity, the level of risk aversion, regulatory, monetary and 
macroeconomic shocks. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) decompose bank margins 
of selected OECD countries into a regulatory component, market structure and risk 
premium component and reveal a trade-off between assuring bank solvency and 
lowering the cost of financial services to consumers. Claeys and Vennet, (2008), 
investigate the determinants of bank interest margins in Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries and suggest that relatively high bank margins in CEE countries are 
influenced by imperfect competitive markets, low operational efficiency, low capital 
adequacy and high influence of foreign and state owned banks. The fall in bank 
spreads in the European banking sector during 1993-2000 is mainly due to the 
relaxation of competitive conditions in addition to the reduction of operating costs, 
interest rate risk and credit risk (Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2007). On the 
relationship between bank spreads and the degree of competition, Carbo Valverde and 
Rodriguez Fernandez (2007) contend that market power varies significantly across 
bank specifications with market power increasing as bank output of seven European 
countries become more diversified towards non-interest activities. Similarly, 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) find that high net-interest margin and large overhead cost 
of banks is closely associated with banks that are smaller, less liquid, less capitalised, 
have low non-interest income and banks with a large market share.  
 
Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) study bank spreads of seven Latin American countries 
in 1990s and find that while at micro level, liquidity and capital risk affect banks’ 
margin, interest rate volatility, inflation and GDP growth influence bank spreads at 
the macro level. However, the results differ across countries according to Brock and 
Rojas-Suarez (2000). Employing a large data from 1999-2002, Gelos (2009) finds that, 
the prevalence of high bank spreads among 14 Latin American countries is as a result 
of high interest rates, less efficiency and large reserve requirements. In Brazil, high   113
spreads can be largely accounted for by the policy that required banks to invest half of 
their deposits in reserves and mandatory credit (Sousa-Sobrinho, 2010). 
 
Cross-country studies on Sub-Saharan African banking spreads emphasise bank size, 
activity diversification and private ownership as variables that affect banks return on 
assets (Flamini et al., 2009). On an Africa country specific study, Birungi (2005) and 
Beck and Hesse (2009) identify bank net-interest margins in Uganda to be driven by 
overhead costs, sectoral composition of loans and other time invariant bank 
characteristics. Chirwa and Mlachila (2004) reveal that Malawian bank spreads are 
influenced by monopoly power, reserve requirements, high bank discount rates and 
inflation, while Enendu (2003) and Hesse (2007) find that regulatory, monetary policy 
as well as macroeconomic factors impact on ex-ante bank spread in Nigeria. These 
studies are yet to provide reasonable channels through which policy shocks and 
imperfect competitive environments impact on bank spreads and allocation of 
resources to the private sector.  
 
4.2.3  Funding structure and bank performance 
This section reviews details findings of the key studies in the funding structure of 
bank and assess the effect of the funding strategies on overall bank performance 
measures (used in this chapter as net-interest margin, return on assets and insolvency 
risk). A fall in deposit lowers the net-interest margin of banks if a decline in deposits 
from customers is offset with increase in wholesale (non-deposits) funding reduces 
the net-interest income of a bank (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010). This is 
because change in the funding structure given a particular assets mix will result in 
higher interest expense. Norden and Weber (2009) investigate the funding modes of 
German banks and its implication on profitability during 1992-2002, reveal that a 
declining of amount deposits and its substitution with wholesale funding unfavourably 
affects the bank net-interest margin. 
 
Some of the prior literature on funding structure and banks’ risk taking is centred on 
the ability of resource providers to monitor the activities of banks. Diamond (1984) 
established theoretically that, banks need to be partially equity-financed in order to   114
provide bankers with appropriate incentive to monitor projects they financed. In 
contrast, Calomiris (1999) shows that subordinated debts can perform the functions of 
monitoring a bank if it cannot avail of deposit insurance. Thus non-deposit funding in 
a bank funding structure can reduce bank fragility through better monitoring. Though 
both deposit and non-deposit funding improve bank risk taking through monitoring, 
studies suggest that both tend to carry different risks in causing potential liquidity 
crisis
17 and also different in terms of speed and the size of charges in funding cost. On 
potential liquidity crisis and relying on wholesale funding, Huang and Ratnovski 
(2010) content that wholesale financiers may have an incentive to withdrawal funding 
because of cheap and noisy signals of bank solvency, thus making solvent banks fail. 
Regarding the differences in terms of speed and funding cost, Rajan (1992) finds that 
wholesale financing may duly foreclose on a firm that has a project with negative 
present value, but higher interest rate is levied if the project is to continue. Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2010) reveal that banking strategies that rely mostly on attracting 
non-deposit funding negative affect banks’ risk. They sample 1,334 banks across 101 
countries and argue that their findings are consistent with the demise of the U.S 
investment banking sector. Poghosyan and Cihak (2009) on their part examine 5,708 
banks in the 25 European Union countries from 1996-2008 and find that non-deposit 
funding can distinguish sound banks from vulnerable banks. Ratnovski and Huang 
(2009) analyse pre-balance sheet structural fundamentals of Canadian banks and 
compared with banks in OECD countries. The result is that the deposit funding has 
been the key factor behind the relative resilience of Canadian banks during the 2007 
financial crisis. 
 
4.3  The research model and variables construction 
 
4.3.1  The research model 
The technique used in investigating the link between market power, funding structure 
and overall bank performance, does not only consider credit and interest rate risk in a 
bank behavioural model, or assess  the implications of funding modes on risk and 
return,  but it is also firmly rooted of in the new empirical industrial organisation 
                                                 
17 That is either through a bank run or a sudden halting of wholesale funding.   115
literature on bank funding strategies. Various funding sources, their interaction with 
the competitive measures and the bank performance are examined. The technique is 
based on the assumption that bank performance, in each of the product service mix of 
banks’ loans and deposits (here include all the funding modes of banks), results from 
the monopolistic competition among the banks operating in the markets. For a profit 
maximizing bank that faces an inelastic demand function for loans or an inelastic 
supply function of deposits, the performance of a banking firm, financing its assets 
from various sources in a given period depends on the market structure that the bank 
operates in, its funding strategies, bank-specific characteristics, as well as regulatory, 
macro and monetary environments of the bank. The empirical model which 
investigates these relationships is presented as follows:  
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Where  c it e performanc ,  is the overall bank performance measure (net-interest margin, 
return on assets and insolvency risk) of bank iin country c at periodt; 
1 ,  c it e performanc  is the observation on the same bank in the same county in the 
previous year.  c it Lerner ,  is the Lerner index, a proxy for degree of market power of a 
bank i in country cin period t,  c it fs ,  is the funding structure for bank i in country 
cin period t,   c it c it fs Lerner , ,   is the interaction between market power and the 
funding sources of bank iin country c at period t, the variable  j i X , are a set of 
} {k variables controlling for bank-specific characteristics, respective countries’ 
macroeconomic environments and contestability variables. s '   are the parameter 
vectors; and  it  is the unobserved disturbance. 
 
4.3.2 Market  Power 
Prior studies on banking structure use different instruments to measure the 
competitive environments of the banking firm. These instruments include new 
empirical industrial organisation literature such as: the Lerner index; the Breshnahan   116
mark-up test; the Panzar and Rosse’ H-statistic; conduct parameter and those that are 
not based on industrial organisation which include the structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) paradigm of Mason (1939) versus the efficient structure hypothesis of Berger 
(1995). In this chapter a Lerner index is employed to measure market power. This 
index captures more information about the actual price-setting behaviour of banks in 
relation to their cost structure than the size of banks measured either in terms of 
deposits, relative size of balance sheets or income generated (Hawtrey and Liang, 
2008). The construction of a Lerner index follows that of Maudos and Nagore (2005) 
and Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005) which is based on the Monti-Klien imperfect 
competition model by Freixas and Rochet (1997). In line with Fernandez de Guevara 
et al. (2005) empirical approach, and employing the definition of Lerner (1943), the 
spread between price and marginal cost can be expressed as a percentage and defined 
as the ‘Lerner Index as:  
 
it TA it TA it TA P MC P Index erner L , , , / ) (                    (4.9) 
 
The Lerner index in equation (4.9) suggests the extent to which the monopolist’s 
market power allows it to fix a price above marginal cost. The primary assumption is 
that the flow of banking goods and services produced by banks which is proportional 
to its total assets (Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2005). With this assumption, price is 
constructed to include both interest and non-interest income, where  TA P is the price of 
the total assets.  TA MC  is the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output. 
The  TA MC  is derived from the following translog cost function as: 
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Where Cost is the bank’s total costs including financial and operating cost; 
i TA represents a proxy for bank output measured as total assets and  1 W ,  2 W and 
3 W indicate the input price of deposit funds, labour and capital and these are 
respectively calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money 
market funding, labour cost to total assets,
18 and other operating and administrative 
expenses to total assets. The cost function is estimated separately using a panel data 
for each country in the sample. This allows for the parameters of the cost function to 
vary from one country to another and reflecting different technologies. Fixed effects 
are also introduced to capture the influence of variables specific to each bank. Once 
the cost function is estimated, its first derivative with respect to the output (total assets) 
evaluated for each bank in the sample, is the marginal cost. Hence, a marginal cost is 
calculated for each banking firm as: 
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The index is interpreted as follows: the Lerner index with higher value implies higher 
pricing power and less competitive market conditions. There is a possible setback 
associated with the Lerner index (termed here conventional Lerner) as estimated 
above. The MC estimation following equation (4.10) is likely to reflect some form of 
monopoly power emanating from deposit markets, based on the bank’s ability to fund 
at a relatively low price. In pricing their loans, bank managers cover their funding 
costs, factor in a risk premium to reflect the uncertainty surrounding the loan 
contracting problem and charge an extra premium to reflect their market power (Turk 
Ariss 2010). Thus, a form of deposit market power is already reflected in the loan 
pricing. According to Maudos and De Guevara (2007) adding financing costs and 
consequently the price of deposits in the cost function captures the effect of market 
power in banking and this may bias the results. They add that excluding funding costs 
in the equation will lead to what they term a ‘raw’ pricing power that is not biased by 
market power which had already been obtained in the deposit market while securing 
funds. Therefore, to estimate a version of equation (4.10) that excludes financing costs 
                                                 
18 In the absence of data on total employees, the unit cost of labour is expressed in terms of total assets.    118
in the translog cost function. After calculating an operating MC for each bank at each 
time period following equation (4.11) but including only two factors (labour cost and 
physical cost of capital), and derive a funding-adjusted Lerner index from the 
structural model specified in equation (4.10). Thus, this chapter employs two different 
specifications of Lerner to analyse the impact of market power and funding strategies 
of banks on performance: a conventional Lerner (Berger et al., 2009) and a funding-
adjusted Lerner (Maudos and De Guevara, 2007). Contrary to the conventional Lerner 
index, the funding-adjusted version accounts for market power that may have not been 
previously obtained in the deposit market and which may provide a better basis for 
analysing the implication of the degree of market power on funding strategies and on 
performance. 
 
4.3.3  Bank performance 
There are variations in the banking literature of what constitute bank performance. In 
theoretical literature, measure such as loan rates, deposit rates and spreads are used, 
while empirical literature uses measures such as return on assets, return on equity and 
net-interest margins. In this chapter, net-interest margin (accounting for spread 
between interest cost and interest income), return on assets (for profitability) and 
insolvency risk of bank (for bank stability) constitute bank performance. 
 
Net-interest margin 
Net-interest margin (NIM) is defined as the difference between interest revenue and 
interest expense expressed as a percentage of average total assets. Spread on the other 
hand is the difference between the yield rate on average interest earning assets and the 
cost rate on interest bearing funds, with both elements expressed in percentage 
terms.
19 According to Olson and Simonson (1982) a bank’s interest margin and spread 
need not be the same unless there are zero non-interest bearing funds. Accordingly, 
bank interest margin is measured as the difference between interest revenue and 
interest expenses as a proportion of earning assets (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008).  
 
                                                 
19 For a detailed difference between interest margin and spread see Wong, (1997).   119
Return on Assets 
Return on asset (ROA) is used as a measure of bank profitability. It is calculated as a 
profit before tax as a percentage of total assets. 
 
Insolvency risk 
Z-score is used as a measure of insolvency and is defined as 
) ( / ) / ( ROA TA E ROA Z    , where ROAis the rate of return on assets,  TA E / is the 
total equity to total assets ratio, and  ) (ROA   is an estimate of the standard deviation 
of return on assets. Z-score measures the number of standard deviations that a bank’s 
profit must fall to drive it into insolvency. It is a measure of risk that is monotonically 
associated with a bank’s probability of failure and has been widely used in the 
empirical banking and finance literature (Boyd et al 2009). 
 
4.3.4 Funding  modes 
Due to globalization, liberalization and competitive credit markets, deposits as a 
source of funds for banks have steadily declined in importance (Edwards and Mishkin, 
1995). The following three sources of funding have been identified in the samples. 
Deposits funding 
This is the funding source from deposits made by a bank’s customers and it includes 
demand, saving and time deposits. Customer deposits are traditionally considered to 
be the main funding source of banks and to be cheap relative to other sources of 
funding, and allow banks to maintain relatively high interest spreads (Dinger and von 
Hagen, (2005), and Ianotta et al., (2007)). Thus, a decline in deposits funding that is 
offset by increased wholesale funding according to Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010) reduces the bank’s net-interest margin, as the new funding mix, given a 
particular asset structure will result in higher interest expense. Following Norden and 
Weber (2009) who examine the evolution of funding modes of German banks, 
deposits funding is measured as total deposits as a percentage of total assets. 
Non-deposit funding 
This is the funding resources from other banks and other sources that include notes, 
debenture, short-term bills and all other related debts not covered in the deposits   120
sources. It is a purchased fund as the banks purchase these funds from other financial 
institutions. It is a short-term funding with relatively higher interest cost compared to 
deposits from customers. However, to the extent that non-deposit funding is uninsured 
and could not be bailed out in the event of non-performance, the providers of these 
funds have the incentive to monitor the bank and will withdraw their financing if they 
are in doubt about the bank performance (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Non-
deposit funding is measured as all other debts (except deposits) divided by total assets. 
Internal funding 
As the name suggests, it is an internally accumulated fund and regarded as the 
cheapest source of investment financing. It is the firm owns resources accumulated 
over the period. The appropriate measure of internally generated funds for banking 
institutions differs from that of non-financial institutions. Studies of non-financial 
institutions generally measure internally generated cashflow as net-income before 
extraordinary items plus deprecation. However, according to Houston et al. (1997) 
banks are not constrained by cashflow as non-financial institutions, though they are 
limited by the amount of debt financing they can utilise. The definition of internally 
generated funds is similar to that of Houston et al. (1997) and Ashcraft (2006) as the 
sum of net profits before extraordinary items and loan loss provisions relative to bank 
loans at the end of the period.  
 
4.3.5  Other control variables 
In analysing the relationship between market power, bank performance as well as the 
funding strategies of banks in developing countries, a number of control variables that 
affect these relationships are employed. These controls include bank-specific 
characteristics, institutional variables, and characteristics of the macroeconomic and 
monetary environments.  
 
Bank-specific characteristics 
Degree of risk aversion, credit risk, operating size, implicit payments, managerial 
quality and non-interest income, are the bank-specific variables used to examine the 
relationships. These variables have been shown to be significant in explaining the 
relationship between the Lerner index, the bank performance as well as the funding   121
strategies of banks (Saunders and Schumacher, (2000), Maudos and Fernandez de 
Guevara, (2004), Maudos and Nagore, (2005), Carbo Valverde and Rodriguez 
Fernandez, (2007), Maudos and De Guevara, (2007), Claeys and Vander Vennet, 
(2008), and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, (2010)).  
 
The ideal specification for a bank’s degree of risk aversion has not been well defined 
in the literature. Hawtrey and Liang (2008) use securities plus other assets as a 
proportion of total loans as a proxy for risk aversion. Though the measure could be 
appropriate, the components of securities and other assets are difficult to define. In 
this study, following the approach used by (Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara 
(2004), Maudos and Nagore (2005), and Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008)), the ratio 
of bank’s equity to total assets is employed as a measure of the degree of risk aversion 
and the level of capitalization. Ceteris paribus, risk adverse bank managers tend to 
impose an extra premium on interest margin as a compensation for holding non-
diversifiable risk. Secondly, banks with high equity ratios face lower bankruptcy and 
funding costs and consequently have a higher Lerner index. 
 
Credit risk according to BIS (2000), ‘is the potential that a bank borrower or 
counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms’. Ratio 
of total loans to assets is used as a proxy for credit risk. The argument put forward for 
the use of this measurement is that banks charge additional interest margin to 
compensate for exposure to expected and unexpected credit risk, thus banks net-
interest margin as well as market power will be high. Again risk of default or non-
payment requires the bank to apply implicitly a risk premium in charging interest 
rates for its operations (Claeys and Vander Vennet, (2008), and Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara, (2004)). 
 
Operating/bank size, as there is no information available to proxy the transactions 
made, the logarithm of loans is used as a proxy of banks operating capacity. This 
variable has been found to have explanatory power for bank performance especially 
net-interest margin (Maudos and Solisa, 2009). However, in analysing the impact of 
Lerner index and funding strategies of banks, the logarithm of total assets is used as a   122
proxy for bank size as suggested by (Maudos and Nagore (2005), and Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2010)).  
 
Implicit interest payment is payment of interest on deposits through service charge 
remissions and other types of depositor subsidy due to regulatory restrictions on 
explicit interest payments. In their attempt to cover all banking services, banks impose 
extra margins in the form of an ‘implicit interest payment’. Following Saunders and 
Schumacher (2000), Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) and Hawtrey and 
Liang (2008) implicit payments are calculated as the difference between operating 
expenses and non-interest income divided by total assets.  
 
The higher the quality of management the higher the interest margins that the bank 
imposes on the basis that a high quality management translates into a profitable 
composition of assets and a low cost composition of liabilities (Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara, 2004). Different measures have been employed as a proxy for 
management efficiency. Angbazo (1997) use the ratio of earning assets to total assets 
as a measure of management efficiency; Brock and Franken (2003) employ a loans to 
employee ratio and find that management efficiency has a negative impact on interest 
margin and Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) utilise the inverse of total overhead 
costs to total assets to measure efficiency and find a negative relationship with interest 
margins for Central and Eastern European banks. On their part, Maudos and Nagore 
(2005) use cost to income ratio as a determinant of bank market power while 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) use overhead costs as a percent of total assets as 
a variable explaining funding strategies of banks. In this chapter, operating expenses 
as a ratio of gross income is used as the proxy of quality of management.   
 
Included in the explanatory variable in explaining the determinants of market power 
and the funding strategies of banks is the non-interest income. This is to assess 
whether diversification into non-interest activities enhances banks’ ability to acquire 
market power as well as adopting a particular funding strategy to finance that power. 
Following (Carbo Valverde and Rodriguez Fernandez (2007), and Lepetit et al.   123
(2008b)) the ratio of non-interest income as a percentage of total operating income is 
used as a measure of non-interest income.  
 
Regulatory variables 
The liberalization index constructed by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2010) is 
used as our regulatory variable. The advantage of using the liberalization index is that, 
the database recognises the multi-faceted nature of financial reform and records 
financial policy changes along seven different dimensions: credit controls and reserve 
requirements; interest rate controls; entry barriers; state ownership; policies on 
securities markets; prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector and 
restrictions on the capital account. The liberalization index measures financial reforms 
that have taken place during the period and it ranges from 0 to 21 with highest score 
indicating fully reformed. The Financial Reform Index (normalised) is a binary value 
(0-1) with 1 showing fully reformed. Banks can also be affected by freedom to which 
they operate. The banking freedom index provides the overall measures of the 
openness of the banking sector and the extent to which banks are free to operate their 
businesses. The study uses the banking freedom index from the Economic Freedom 
Indicators of the Heritage Foundation. The property right is included as a measure of 
risk of expropriation. It measures the degree to which individual country laws protect 
private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. Its 
score ranges from 0 to 100 with the higher score indicate certainty of legal protection 
of property right and limited expropriation risks (The Heritage Foundation 2010). 
 
General level of development 
The chapter also controls for the countries’ general economic development, 
macroeconomic stability, and institutional framework as these are likely to affect 
banking system performance (Claesens and Laeven, 2004). Boyd et al. (2001) find 
evidence supporting the adverse impact of inflation on banking lending activities. 
Inflation, GDP growth and per capita GDP are used as macroeconomic environments.  
Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the Consumers Price Index (CPI). GDP 
growth measures business cycle fluctuations while per capita GDP accounts for the   124
differences in economic developments across countries. Short-term interest rate is 
included to capture the differences in the stance of monetary policy.  
 
4.3.6 Estimation  methods 
Concerning the cross-country determinants of market power and funding patterns of 
banks, Equation (4.12) and (4.13) are estimated using country and time fixed effects 
and clustering at the bank level. The inclusion of fixed effects in estimation of these 
equations (4.12 and 4.13) is to control for other bank specific characteristics that 
remain quite stable during the estimation period.  
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Where  c it mp ,  is the market power of bank iin country c at period tand measured by 
the Lerner Index,  c it fs ,  is the funding source for a bank i in country cat period t; the 
variable  j i X ,  are set of  } {k variables controlling for bank-specific characteristics, 
respective countries’ macroeconomic environments and regulatory variables.  s '   are 
the parameter vectors; and  it   are the unobserved disturbances. 
 
For equation (4.14) the study follows the argument put forward by Carbo Valverde 
and Rodriguez Fernandez (2007) that banks maximise wealth by considering both 
initial and end-of-period information and that previous values of bank performance 
may affect current performance values. This is because banks need to match the 
random deposit supply function and the random demand of lending activities and non-
traditional activities across the period. Therefore the dynamic model technique is 
employed to estimate the implication of market power and funding structure on bank 
performance
20: 
                                                 
20 Even though equations (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14) represent plausible simultaneous equation 
estimation, each equation is estimated separately so as to satisfy specific research hypotheses.    125
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c it e performanc , is the overall bank performance measure (net-interest margin, return 
on assets and insolvency risk) of bank iin country c at periodt;  1 ,  c it e performanc is 
the observation on the same bank in the previous year.  c it mp ,  is the market power, 
c it fs ,  is the funding source for a bank i in country in period t, the variable  j i X ,  are 
set of  } {k variables controlling for bank-specific characteristics, respective countries’ 
macroeconomic environments and regulatory variables. s '   are the parameter vectors; 
and  it  is the unobserved disturbance. Here the disturbance term  it  has two 
components: the  i   is an unobserved time-invariant bank-specific effect, and  it   is 
the disturbance term.  
 
One immediate problem in applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in estimating 
equation (4.14) is that  1 ,  c it e performanc  is correlated with fixed effects in the error 
term which gives rise to ‘dynamic panel bias’. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest 
that OLS produces biases when an attempt is made to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and simultaneity. Therefore the estimation strategy used in this section 
is based on the methodology proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Alvarez and 
Arellano (2003) in estimating systems of equations in both first difference and levels. 
As pointed out  in Roodman (2009) and Maudos and Solisa (2009), the system GMM 
estimator combines the standard set equations in first-difference with a suitable lagged 
level as instruments, and an additional set of equations in levels with a suitable lagged 
first differences as instruments. Generally, linear difference and system GMM 
estimators have one–and–two step variants. The two-step System GMM, Windmeijer 
(2005) correct standard error, small-sample adjustments, and orthogonal deviation are   126
used for this chapter. The two step variant uses residuals from the one-step estimates 
and is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step.
21  
 
4.4  Data and empirical results 
 
4.4.1 Data   
Micro-bank-firm level and macro-country level data are used. Bank level data are 
taken from the most recent Bankscope database maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau 
Van Dijk. Series are yearly, covering a sample of 978 banks across 55 developing 
countries during the eight year period, 2000-2007. As the study focuses on bank 
intermediation, unconsolidated balance sheet data are opted for whenever possible 
even though in some cases the researcher has to depend on consolidated statements 
because of data unavailability. The sample includes all commercial banks, cooperative 
banks, development banks, savings banks, real estate and mortgage banks for which 
annual data is available for some period during the years 2000-2007. To make sure 
that banks that are important players in the deposit and/or loan markets are not 
omitted, medium and long term credit banks and specialised government institutions 
are included in the sample. The use of bankscope has an advantage since the 
accounting information on banks are standardised. This is after necessary adjustments 
are made for differences in accounting and reporting standards across countries. 
Liberalization index is obtained from Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2010) while 
banking freedom index is from the Economic Freedom Indicators of the Heritage 
Foundation. Macro data are obtained from the World Bank Development Indicator 
and the International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund 
and the respective central banks. The series include GDP/GDP per capita growth, 
inflation, exchange rates, average policy interest rates, the Treasury bill rate, inter-
bank rate and money market rate.  
 
                                                 
21 Table 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 report the results for the full sample as 
well as for the regional groups. The diagnostic tests include: (1) The instruments count, (2) The Hansen 
test for over-identification restriction for which the null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous (3) 
The Arellano-Bond tests for first and second order serial correlation in the residuals for which the null 
hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation and (4) The F-test for joint significance of instruments. 
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4.4.2  Summary descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 provides bank-specific variables averaged by countries over the period 
2000-2007, table 4.2 provides descriptive statistic for the mean values of funding 
pattern while table 4.3 deals with bank market power and performance. Asian banks 
are the largest banks in terms of size. The average bank size of the Asian banks is 
more than 34,154.691 million US Dollars. Latin American banks are the most 
capitalised and Argentina’s banks having the highest capitalization level in that region. 
On efficiency measured as cost to income, Asian banks are more efficient with 
growing banks in Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). However, Latin 
American banks are more diversified in terms of generating non-interest incomes. On 
average 54.9 percent of Asian banks’ assets in the sample are extended as loans, the 
highest in the sample. The least is the African banks whose total average loan 
portfolio is 49.8 percent. Table 4.2 represents mean values of funding modes of 
selected banks in the developing countries. Most of the assets of the banks selected 
are financed by deposits with 71 percent being the highest; CEEC bank assets are 
financed with deposits. The least deposits funding is for Latin American banks. Figure 
4.2 presents funding trends of banks in the selected countries that show that deposit 
funding has been increasing since 2001 but falls in 2006 when internal funding begins 
to increase. The rise of internal funding from 2005 shows the importance banks in 
developing countries attach to that source of funding. Table 4.3 shows the results of 
the country means of the Lerner index which is in two specifications: conventional 
and funding-adjusted Lerner index. The figures from the conventional version vary 
across the countries over 25% with African banks on average pricing around 27% 
over marginal cost. Similarly, figures from the funding-adjusted version of the Lerner 
index showing 65% over the marginal cost with the Asian banks being the banks’ that 
exhibit highest market power. The figures from table 4.3 and that of figure 4.3 
demonstrate that on average funding-adjusted Lerner index is larger than that of the 
conventional Lerner index suggesting that the latter has been underestimating the 
degree of market power. This result, thus justifies the alternative use of both 
specifications in our analysis. African banks are most profitable in terms of net-
interest margin and return on assets while Asian banks have the highest Z-score, 
making them the most stable banks among the sample.   128
Figure 4.2 
Funding trends of banks in the selected countries 
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Data is aggregated by averaging across years 
 
Figure 4.3 
The trend of degree of market power 
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Source: Bankscope and authors’ estimations 
Data is aggregated by averaging across years 
 
Table 4.4 presents pair-wise correlation coefficient as a preliminary analysis of the 
relationship between various Lerner specifications, funding modes and the overall 
bank performances. The correlation coefficient between Lerner indices and the 
corresponding overall performance measures (net-interest margin, Return on Assets 
and insolvency risk) is positive and statistically significant indicating that banks in the 
emerging and developing countries profit as their share of market power increases. 
This is intuitive, since banks with large market share are able to mobilise finest 
resources, benefit from economies of scale, producing at lower cost and thereby 
increase their return. However, the funding-adjusted version of the Lerner index 
shows an insignificantly negative relationship with net-interest margin (NIM). On the   129
correlation between funding structure and overall performance, banks profitability 
improves with non-deposit and internal capital funding while bank solvency declines 
with the non-deposits funding.  
 
Next is the pair-wise correlation coefficient between Lerner indices and the various 
funding strategies. The results show that Lerner indices and the non-deposit funding 
and internal generated funding (IGF) have positive and statistically significant 
correlation coefficient with the IGF having a stronger coefficient. Thus banks with the 
higher market share tend to finance their investments with more IGF. 
 
On the pair-wise correlation coefficient between the interaction of Lerner index and 
the funding strategy and performance suggest that NIM of banks with market power 
are significantly more sensitive to the funding sources. Again, the IGF appears to 
have bigger coefficient implying that the performance of banks with higher market 
share response to the changing in the internal capital than that of the deposits and non-
deposit sources of funding.  
 
Regarding macroeconomic variables, the correlation relationship between GDP 
growth on one hand and NIM and Z-score on the other, is respectively negative and 
statistically significant. Thus during economic boom, banks profitability falls and the 
risk of insolvency increases. Conversely, the correlation between inflation and NIM 
and ROA is positive and significant while that of Z-score is negative and also 
significant. The stance of monetary policy is positively correlated with the NIM and 
ROA and negatively related to Z-score. Taken together these finding suggest that 
tightening of monetary policy increases profitability margins of banks in emerging 
and developing countries, while expansion of the stance of monetary policy reduces 
bank insolvency risk. 
 
4.4.3 Regression  results 
The primary objective of this chapter is to investigate the link between market power, 
funding structure and the overall performance measures. This is conducted first by 
identifying the various sources of market power and the variations in funding   130
structure of banks. Then evaluate the factors that affect NIM and ROA and finally 
assess how market power and the funding strategies affect banks’ insolvency risk. 
 
4.4.3.1 What factors influence bank market power? 
This section analyses the empirical results with the aim of identifying various sources 
of market power of banks in emerging and developing countries. It is only when the 
sources of market power are identified and the variation in funding patterns of banks 
are analysed that possible action could be taken to reduce the social inefficiency 
associated with the existence of market power (Maudos and Nagore, 2005). To begin, 
table 4.5 presents the results of the regressions that use bank-specific variables, 
accounting for the respective countries’ level of development and monetary policy 
stance. Following Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), the estimated results include 
country and year fixed effects, and clustering of the errors at the bank level. Two 
varieties of the Lerner indices are estimated, a conventional Lerner and a funding-
adjusted Lerner. Column 1 and 2 relate to convention Lerner, while column 3 and 4 
relate to funding-adjusted Lerner.  
 
The size of the bank affects both Lerner indices positively suggesting that larger 
banks tend to have market power. This result is consistent with the argument that 
larger banks are efficient, gaining economies of scale and scope and producing at 
lower cost which enables them to have higher margins (Meon and Weill, 2005). 
Similarly, non-interest income has a positive and significant relationship with the 
Lerner index indicating that banks that specialised in generating non-interest income 
tend to have higher market power. Bank equity is positively related to conventional 
version of Lerner and significant and negatively to funding adjusted Lerner. The 
different coefficient sign between the conventional and funding-adjusted indicate that 
banks with high levels of capital have higher market power if they exercise power in 
deposit markets. Also, the positive relationship with the conventional Lerner suggest 
that such banks are able to pay less for deposits and the depositors considered such 
banks to be more stable. Another significant factor that affects bank market power is 
the quality of management. The results show that, banks with high quality 
management have higher market power. The result shows that the inflation level does   131
not influence bank market power. Macroeconomic variables have a different degree of 
impact on market power. For instance if the business cycle increases by 1%, the 
Lerner index decreases by more than 4%, while a 1% increase in the level of 
economic development transforms to a 3% increase in the level of market power. 
Conventional and funding-adjusted Lerner indexes are affected with the same 
variables except equity ratio and bank and GDP growth. While equity has a positive 
relationship with the conventional Lerner, it associates negatively with funding-
adjusted. In the case of bank and GDP growth, it is significant with the conventional 
Lerner and insignificant with funding-adjusted Lerner. It has to be emphasized that 
the rest of the explanatory variables of bank market power maintain their coefficient 
sign as well as their magnitude after inclusion of the economic freedom and banking 
freedom variables. 
 
4.4.3.2  The determinants of funding strategies of banks 
The next analysis is on the determinants of bank funding patterns where deposit, non-
deposit (wholesale) and internally generated funding are used as dependent variables. 
The findings are presented in table 4.6 with columns: 1 and 2 for deposit funding; 3 
and 4 for non-deposit funding and 5 and 6 for internal funding. Bank size has negative 
association with deposit funding; positive with non-deposit funding and negative with 
internal funding only when a funding adjusted Lerner index variable is added to the 
regression. The result suggests that larger banks rely heavily on wholesale funds in 
financing their operations. As expected, equity ratio has a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with both deposit and non-deposit funding and positive 
coefficient on internal funding; indicating that highly capitalised banks finance their 
investment using internal funds and thus reduce their leverage. In addition, banks in 
developing countries finance their growth with internally generated funds. The results 
also show that the coefficient of management quality variable is positive and 
significant in all the funding modes indicating that efficient banks in developing 
countries are able to proportionately finance their activities with deposit, non-deposit 
and internal funds. The conventional version of the Lerner index is included in 
column 1 for deposit funding, in column 3 for non-deposit funding and column 5 for 
internal funding. The results show positive and significant association with deposit   132
and internal funding meaning that banks with market power have deposit and internal 
funds as their key sources of funding and these sources are considered safe and cheap 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Interestingly, funding-adjusted version of 
Lerner has no significant relationship with the funding modes except internal funds 
showing that banks that have not already exercised market power in deposits markets 
increase their internal capital. In addition to the bank-specific and macroeconomic 
variables, the study includes liberalization index which measures the level of financial 
reforms that the respective countries have undertaken during the period under study. 
Liberalisation index has a positive relationship with deposit funding and negative with 
both non-deposit and internal funds indicating that in a developing country where the 
financial sector is fully liberalised, deposit funding tends to increase. All the 
macroeconomic and monetary policy variables included in the regression do not 
impact on any of the funding modes except per capita income. An increase in GDP 
per capita increases deposit funding of the selected banks in developing economies. 
 
4.4.3.2 Evaluation of net-interest margin of banks in emerging market 
In this section, the relationship between bank market power and funding patterns of 
banks on one hand and bank net-interest margin on the other are analysed. Table 4.7 
presents the regression results that has net-interest margin (NIM) as the dependent 
variable. The different columns reported relate to different empirical approaches to 
funding modes (deposit funding, non-deposit funding and internal funding) and the 
varieties of Lerner index used (conventional and funding-adjusted). All regressions 
are estimated using dynamic panel-data estimation, Two-step System GMM, 
Windmeijer-correct standard error, small-sample adjustments, and orthogonal 
deviation. The regression results show that in general, all the variables considered in 
the study significantly influence NIM except equity to asset ratio that measures risk 
aversion of banks. The only positive impact of equity to asset ratio on NIM is when 
the funding-adjusted Lerner index is controlled. Also the lagged dependent variable, 
NIM among the explanatory variables is positive and statistically significant 
illustrating the importance of accounting for previous values of the dependent 
variable. Credit risk has a positive and significant sign meaning that banks apply a 
risk premium implicitly to the interest rates charged for their operations. The volume   133
of total loans granted measuring the operating capacity of bank is negative meaning 
that banks that specialised in lending appear to offer lower margins. The implicit 
payment has its coefficient as positive and significant. This according to Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara (2004) shows that banks that charge an extra fee for their 
services more implicitly through lower remuneration of liabilities, present higher 
interest margins. Cost to income ratio measures operating efficiency of management 
in generating income with high value indicating management inefficiency. The sign 
is negative and significant meaning that an increase in the cost to income ratio by 1% 
decreases the NIM by 4% ceteris paribus. Inflation has a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with NIM, likewise GDP per capita growth. These results 
show that banks tend to reduce their interest rates margin during economic turmoil. 
This result is consistent to Boyd et al.’s (2001) who show a strong negative 
correlation between inflation and the amount of bank credit, indicating that NIM 
decreases as inflation increases. However, the positive sign of monetary policy stance 
shows that banks in developing countries profit from tightening in monetary policy. 
In column 2, the funding adjusted version of Lerner index is incorporated in the 
estimation process and the results show that NIM increases when banks increase their 
market power. When the deposit funding is added in column 3, the Lerner index is 
still positive and statistically significant. Likewise for deposit funding, it is positive 
indicating that banks with market power finance their investment with low cost of 
deposit funds and this increases their NIM. These findings suggest that deposit 
discipline exists more in developing countries (Martnez Peria and Schmukler, 1999) 
and that they (depositors) demand relatively low return from banks they perceive to 
have market power, more capitalised and more stability. In addition, the finding is 
consistent with Berlin and Mester (1999) findings that banks with high market power 
have considerable access to cheap deposit funding through a solid local deposit 
market penetration that enables them to maintain high interest margins. In column 4, 
as expected, the non-deposit funding is negative and significant meaning that banks 
in developing countries, though the capital market is relatively undeveloped, finance 
their loans with purchased funds and that reduces their margins. The explanatory 
capacity of internal funding deserves special mention. Its statistical significance 
shows the importance of introducing it in the regression. The sign is positive and its   134
coefficient is higher compared with the deposit funding. This means that ceteris 
paribus a 1% increase in internal funding generates additional NIM of 8% while 
deposit funding increasing by only 3%. The high coefficient and significance of 
internal funding in contrast to deposit and non-deposit funding helps to support the 
hypothesis that external financing is expensive relative to internally generated funds. 
This finding also suggest that banks in developing countries are shifting their asset 
financing with internally generated funds which have been the preserve of holding 
companies in advanced economies. Houston et al. (1997) find a strong positive 
relation between loan growth of US bank holding companies and internally capital.  
 
Next, table 4.8 reports results of regressions on the same variables as that of table 4.7. 
The difference here is that of the measurement of the Lerner index. In table 4.8, the 
conventional version of Lerner index is used. It shows similar results in terms of sign 
and magnitude except for column 3 where deposit funding has a negative coefficient. 
These findings reiterated the earlier argument on the weaknesses of the conventional 
version of Lerner and also justify the use of other alternative Lerner specifications in 
measuring the degree of market power. Table 4.9 reports the interaction of the Lerner 
index and the funding strategies of banks. This is to enable the researcher to 
investigate whether Lerner index sensitivity of net-interest margin variation depends 
on the funding strategies of the banks. The results indicate that the sensitivity of net-
interest margin to internally generated funds increases as bank market power 
increases. However, there is no evidence to suggest that interest margin increases for 
banks with market power and with deposits and non-deposit funding.  
 
Having identified a differential response of banks’ NIM to Lerner index and funding 
modes the next step is to identify whether there are regional differences in the 
determinants of bank net-interest margin. Here, banks are grouped into four regions 
in accordance with the World Bank Development Indicators: Africa, Asia, Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEEC) and Latin America. The regression results 
are reported in table 4.10. Credit risk impacts positively and statistically significantly 
on banks in Africa and CEEC signifying that banks in these countries add an extra 
premium to their loans due to perceived high risk. Implicit interest payment is   135
positive to all banks showing that banking institutions in emerging and developing 
countries with high implicit payment set higher margins. Operating capacity has no 
influence on the banks except Asian banks. Internal funding influences banks’ margin 
positively, with the exception of Asian banks where the sign is negative. The 
negative sign suggest that Asian banks have a high cost of internal funds which 
minimises margin. In a whole, there is no significant variation on the determinants of 
NIM of the sample banks. 
 
4.4.3.4 Alternative measurement of bank’s performance: Return on assets 
After analysing the relationship between the banks’ market power and the funding 
pattern of banks on one hand and the bank net-interest margin on the other, the next 
section considers how an alternative measure of bank performance, return on assets is 
affected by Lerner index and funding pattern. Table 4.11 reports regression results of 
return on assets. Bank equity to assets ratio is used as a measure of the degree of risk 
aversion and the result is positive and significant. Likewise banks that assume greater 
credit risk present higher returns, indicating that highly capitalised banks in developing 
countries take greater risk that enable them to charge an extra premium to cover 
operating costs. In this section, the natural logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy 
for banks size. This accounts for the depreciation cost element on fixed assets. The 
coefficient here is negative meaning that though larger banks charge high lending rate, 
incur high other operating cost and that reduces their profits. More implicit payments 
decrease return on assets. On the influence of macroeconomic factors on banks’ return 
on asset, the study reveals that GDP per capita growth and inflation do not seem to 
impact on banks’ profits. GDP per capita income only impacts profits when Lerner 
index and non-deposit funding are incorporated as explanatory variables. The non 
impact of macroeconomic variables on banks’ profit is consistent with studies on 
developing countries. For instance Al-Haschimi (2007) find that macroeconomic 
environment has only limited effect on banks’ margins and; Beck and Hesse (2009) and 
Chirwa and Mlachila (2004) find similar results for Uganda and Malawi respectively. 
Generally, in developing countries demand for bank loans declines during economic 
boom and rises when economic activities fall. Thus the poor link of GDP growth to 
bank profitability could be attributed to the borrowers’ preference of trade credit to   136
bank loans. This finding is in support of  (Coricelli and Roalnd 2008) result that shows 
that during the periods of increased economic activities, non-financial firms especially 
those in the emerging economies finance their activities with alternative (such as trade 
credit) sources to banking credit and vice versa.   The introduction of the Lerner index 
in column 2 is to capture the influence of banks with market power on profits. The 
results are similar except the management quality variable that now has a positive and 
significant coefficient, suggesting that efficient managers enable banks to acquire 
market power which enhances their profit level. Deposit and non-deposit funding in 
column 3 and 4 respectively do not impact on profitability of banks. However, as 
expected, internally generated funds significantly influence bank profits. 
 
4.4.3.5 Market power, funding strategies and insolvency risk of banks 
This section analyses how a bank’s Z-score, an index of bank’s insolvent risk, is related 
to Lerner index, a measure of degree of market power and the funding strategies of 
banks in emerging and developing countries. The results are presented in table 4.12 that 
are analogous to the net-interest margin reported in table 4.7 and 4.8 and rate of return 
on assets regression in table 4.11. Beginning with column 1, the regression results show 
that Z-score is positively and statistically significantly related to the Lerner index 
(conventional version of the measure of degree of market power). This finding suggests 
that an increase in a share of market power increases bank stability. Furthermore, bigger 
banks with higher capitalization level (equity/assets) and higher loan to assets ratio are 
estimated to be more stable, while banks operating in emerging and developing 
economies with higher GDP growth and inflation appear to be less stable. In column 2 
the deposit funding enters the regression with a positive coefficient, though statistically 
insignificant. The next estimation is the column 3 that includes both the Lerner index 
and non-deposit funding, while the Lerner index is positive the non-deposit funding 
shares is negative. The negative coefficient of the non-deposit funding shares support 
the existing finding that banking strategy that depend predominantly attracting non-
deposit funding are more risky (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2010). Finally, column 4 
is estimated employing internal funding as a funding strategy of banks. The result is 
positive and statistically significant indicating that banks that finance their investment 
with internal generated funds reduces insolvent risk.   137
The Z-score regressions with funding-adjusted version of Lerner index reported in table 
4.13 are very similar to those presented in table 4.12
22. Specifically, in column 1 and 2, 
Lerner index continues to have positive and significant coefficients. Similarly, in 
column 3, the Lerner index and non-deposit funding continues to obtain positive and 
negative signs respectively, but now the coefficient of Lerner index is significant. To 
conclude this section, it is interesting to analyse the effect of the stance of monetary 
policy on bank risk. Though the coefficient is statistically insignificant, the positive sign 
for both column 1, 2 and 3 of table 4.12 and table 4.13 indicate that expansion of the 
stance of monetary policy will increase insolvency risk of banks in the developing 
economies.  
 
4.4.3.6 Determinants of bank performance: controlling for regulatory and 
supervisory environments 
In order to provide precise inference on the relationship between market power, funding 
structure and bank performance, the regulatory and supervision environments in 
developing and emerging  countries needs to considered thoroughly. There are two 
reasons for these considerations: first, banks operating in developing economies could 
drive some benefits resulting from institutional reforms such as liberalization index, 
adherent to regulatory capital requirement like capital stringency, and freely from 
governmental controls and influence like banking and financial freedom. Thus, over 
reliance and emphasizes of the effect of market power and the funding strategies if these 
reforms are not explicitly included in the model. Second, the effect of all institutional 
reforms can not possibly be isolated as there are expectations that they are deeply 
embedded in the fundamentals of banks operations. As a result, the only aspects of the 
regulatory and supervisory framework that may directly bias the findings are controlled 
in the estimation. Below are the three regulatory initiatives as well as the resulting 
effect that holding these variables constant may have on the relationship between 
market power, funding strategies and performance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 The objective is to assess whether a different version of estimating Lerner index will affect bank risk 
differently.   138
4.4.3.7 Banking and financial freedom 
First of all, the Heritage Foundation index of banking and financial freedom “Banking 
freedom” is incorporated into the model to assess the extent to which (if any) banking 
freedom index influence the relationship of interest. The index is a measure of banking 
security as well as a measure of independence from government control. The country 
specific annual banking freedom captures three issues: 1) the extent of state intervention 
in banks and other financial services; 2) the difficult of opening and operating a 
financial firm for both domestic and foreign individuals; and 3) government influence 
on the allocation credits (The Heritage Foundation 2010). The index ranges from 0 to 
100 with the higher score indicates greater freedom to conduct banking operation. The 
result of the regression with the inclusion of “Banking freedom” as a control variable is 
presented in table 4.14. There is some level of evidence to suggest that higher banking 
freedom increases performance of banks in developing and emerging economies 
especially when internal generated funds are employed as source of funding. The results 
of the relationship of interest remain unchanged. 
 
4.4.3.8 Financial liberalization 
Next is to investigate further some unresolved issues in the financial literature on 
whether financial liberalization has led to more financial development, more stable 
financial systems, and improved banking efficiency. To this end, additional control 
variable “Financial reform” is included to re-estimate the benchmark model to control 
for financial liberalization on performance. The index constructed by Abiad, 
Detragiache and Tressel (2010) recognises the multi-faceted nature of financial reform 
and records financial policy changes along seven different dimensions: 1-credit controls 
and reserve requirements; 2-interest rate controls; 3-entry barriers; 4-state ownership; 5-
policies on securities markets; 6-prudential regulations and supervision of the banking 
sector and 7-restrictions on the capital account. The liberalization index measures 
financial reforms that have taken place during the period and it ranges from 0 to 21 with 
highest score indicating fully reformed. Table 4.15 reports the results including 
“financial reforms” as an additional control variable. The coefficient of financial reform 
is positive on NIM, positive on ROA and negative on Z-score. The negative association 
between Z-score and the financial reform is irrespective of source of finance though   139
significant with wholesale funding. These findings suggest that financial liberalization 
increases risk taking of banks in developing countries especially banks that finance their 
assets with wholesale funds. 
 
4.4.3.9 Risk of Expropriation 
Furthermore, even though the legal protection on private property and the judicial 
efficiency in enforcing these laws affect bank performance in both developed and 
developing economies, studies show that they differs across countries and even within 
firms in the same countries. La Porta et al. (2002) find evidence suggesting that firms’ 
value is higher in countries that have better protection of minority shareholders as well 
as firms with higher cash flow ownership. They use a sample of 539 large firms from 27 
industrialised countries. Klapper and Love (2004) on their part employ firm-level data 
of 14 developing countries find that firm-level corporate governance provisions matter 
more in a country with weak legal environments and that investors positively value firm 
level protection in countries where state level protection is low. Doidge et al. (2007) 
study legal protection systems for both industrialised and non-industrialised countries. 
They find that country level characteristics of developed economies explains significant 
variations of governance rating than that of firm-specific variables, while in developing 
countries firm-specific characteristic have nothing to do with governance rating. They 
concluded that access to international capital markets provide incentive for better 
corporate governance. Given these findings, limiting expropriation risk could have 
independent positive impact on bank profitability as well as solvency risk of banks 
especially where it promotes less volatile capital flows, enhances stable ownership 
partners in banks and increases access to external capital. In this subsection, “property 
rights” is included as a measure of risk of expropriation. It measures the degree to 
which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which it 
government enforces those laws. Its score ranges from 0 to 100 with the higher score 
indicate certainty of legal protection of property right and limited expropriation risks 
(The Heritage Foundation 2010). Though the coefficient of property rights is 
insignificant statistically, the positive sign suggest that performance of banks improve 
in a country where the government and the legal systems protect individual as well as 
corporate property rights. The result is presented in table 4.16.   140
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The main contribution of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence on how bank 
market power and funding patterns perform in terms of producing profitable and 
stable banks in emerging and developing countries. In particular, using panel dataset 
of 978 banks in emerging and developing economies during 2000-2007 and 
employing systems generalised methods of moment estimator (system GMM) the 
study analyse how funding strategies of banks with market power affect their net-
interest margin, return on their assets as well as their insolvency risk. As there is no 
consensus in the literature regarding how best to assess the degree of bank market 
power (Carbo et al., 2009), two different specifications of Lerner indices are 
constructed: conventional Lerner (Burger et al. 2009); and funding-adjusted Lerner 
(Maudos and De Guevara 2007) to first investigate competitive environment of the 
sample banks. The chapter provides the following key results: 
 
First, on determinants of the Lerner index, the results reveal that larger, growing and 
highly capitalised banks have a greater degree of market power. This result is 
consistent with the argument that larger banks are efficient, well resourced and gain 
and operate economies of scale and scope; have the ability to produce at lower cost 
and that enables them to have high margin (Meon and Weill, 2005). Similarly, 
diversifying into non-interest income activities enhances bank market power. With 
funding strategy, smaller, highly capitalised and efficiently managed banks employ 
internally generated funds for their investment activities. Internal capital has been 
found to be increasing and that propels banks in these regions to increase their market 
power. 
 
Second, with regard to the evaluation of net-interest margin, the study reveals that 
NIM among the explanatory variables is positively and statistically significant 
illustrating the importance of accounting for previous values of the dependent variable. 
Preceding year interest margin enables banks to charge higher premium with the 
assets being financed with internal capital.  Operating size and cost to income ratio 
affect NIM negatively while credit risk and implicit payment have positive   141
relationship with the NIM. The study finds evidence that support the fact that the 
banking system structure explains bank NIM. The results suggest that net-interest 
margin among banks with market power is significantly more sensitive to internally 
generated funds than it is with deposits and wholesale funding.  
 
Third, the result also shows that the high degree of market power does not only 
increase the net-interest margin and profitability level of banks in emerging and 
developing countries, it also reduces their insolvency risk. Relating bank funding 
structure to insolvency risk, the results suggest that banks that relay heavily on 
internal and deposit funding are safer than those that finance their assets with 
wholesale funds. The results thus share support to the existing findings that banking 
strategy that depend predominantly attracting non-deposit funding are more risky and 
less resilient to the crisis. (Demirguc-kent and Huizinga, (2010) and OECD (2010)). 
On the whole, the results suggest that performance of banks with market power is 
significantly more sensitive to internally generated funds than it is with either deposit 
or wholesale funding. 
 
Fourth, regarding economic policy implications, the results allow us to conclude that 
policies should be targeted at reducing competition, promoting banking and property 
freedom, fully liberalizing financial systems and increasing the use of banks’ 
internally generated funds in emerging and developing countries.  
 
Finally, other interesting areas also remained open for further research on bank 
performance especially the high net-interest margins of banks in developing countries. 
In particular whether in the absence of well-functioning capital market, the high net-
interest margin of banks in these countries is to enable banks to plough back profit 
into their capital for the purpose of maintaining stability.  
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Table 4.1 
Bank-specific variables: averages for the period 2000-2007 
 
Table 4.1 presents the mean values of countries’ bank-specific variables. Bank size is the average total 
assets. Bank equity represents average capitalization of respective countries’ banks and is used as a proxy 
for the degree of risk aversion, and bank growth is the growth rate of bank assets. The efficiency of 
management is proxied by cost to income ratio which is calculated as operating expenses as a percentage 
of gross income. Non-interest income measures the exposure of a bank to non-interest generating income. 
Loan to assets indicate portfolio mix and measures credit risk of the banks. The mean values of the 
selected banks for the respective countries over the period 2000-2007 are in percentage terms except for 
bank size which is in millions of US dollars. 
Countries  Bank           
size 
Equity  
to asset 
Bank    
growth 
Cost to 
income   
Non- 
interest 
 income 
Loan to 
assets 
Africa          
Benin  252.328  0.093 0.100 0.686 0.180  0.558 
Burkina  Faso  206.334  0.088 0.138 0.636 0.161  0.603 
Cameroon  475.416  0.075 0.148 0.388 0.295  0.511 
Cote d'Ivoire  412.053  0.092 0.093 0.758 0.232  0.625 
Ghana  154.979  0.119 0.383 0.489 0.152  0.404 
Nigeria  1554.379  0.155 0.367 0.538 0.221  0.358 
Senegal  344.841  0.095 0.150 0.661 0.165  0.566 
Kenya 223.723  0.186  0.167 0.610 0.129  0.563 
Uganda  133.983  0.139 0.229 0.489 0.042  0.426 
Tanzania  186.985  0.132 0.258 0.761 0.143  0.385 
Ethiopia  526.012  0.116 0.259 0.408 0.236  0.592 
Angola  653.683  0.128 0.437 0.753 0.318  0.240 
Botswana  409.556  0.193 0.214 0.315 0.131  0.549 
Malawi  62.084  0.134 0.274 0.452 0.198  0.338 
Madagascar 151.211 0.109 0.166 0.417 0.094  0.464 
Mauritius  790.854  0.183 0.135 0.321 0.167  0.583 
Mozambique  223.947  0.155 0.253 0.816 0.204  0.409 
Namibia  520.161  0.311 0.177 0.369 0.122  0.732 
South Africa  8104.817  0.178 0.159 0.453 0.211  0.657 
Swaziland  137.906  0.144 0.128 0.500 0.167  0.705 
Zambia  129.962  0.178 0.257 0.678 0.307  0.285 
Zimbabwe  1358.358  0.163 0.202 0.326 0.109  0.404 
Average  773.344  0.144 0.213 0.537 0.181  0.498 
Asia-Pacific          
China  114463.04  0.076 0.211 0.375 0.060  0.554 
Hong  Kong 36667.383  0.121 0.121 0.265 0.136  0.446 
India  8742.696  0.083 0.187 0.278 0.147  0.535 
Philippines  2021.798  0.155 0.123 0.470 0.171  0.486 
Singapore  19101.744  0.231 0.096 0.238 0.169  0.479 
South Korea  46427.541  0.061 0.126 0.407 0.145  0.632 
Thailand  11658.637  0.114 0.093 0.480 0.095  0.709 
Average  34154.691  0.120 0.137 0.359 0.132  0.549 
CEEC         
Albania  963.041  0.081 0.228 0.423 0.098  0.279 
Belarus  574.866  0.202 0.371 0.490 0.282  0.578 
Bulgaria  804.534  0.140 0.302 0.543 0.153  0.529 
Croatia  2110.268  0.142 0.161 0.487 0.124  0.594 
Czech 8249.652  0.080  0.146 0.361 0.191  0.422 
Estonia  3226.118  0.188 0.317 0.500 0.201  0.533   143
Countries  Bank           
size 
Equity  
to asset 
Bank    
growth 
Cost to 
income    
Non-
interest 
income 
Loan to 
assets 
Hungary  3851.065  0.125 0.138 0.405 0.182  0.557 
Latvia  904.253  0.123 0.302 0.489 0.222  0.453 
Lithuania  1649.149  0.106 0.338 0.546 0.224  0.559 
Poland  2208.249  0.134 0.195 0.426 0.230  0.477 
Romania  1700.239  0.168 0.337 0.513 0.038  0.455 
Russia  952.305  0.163 0.358 0.495 0.178  0.564 
Slovak  Rep 2511.623  0.161 0.094 0.476 0.150  0.449 
Slovenia  3082.484  0.095 0.195 0.420 0.172  0.592 
Ukraine  829.735  0.135 0.494 0.445 0.187  0.701 
Average  2241.172  0.136 0.265 0.468 0.175  0.516 
Latin America          
Argentina  971.715  0.274 0.190 0.573 0.389  0.413 
Bolivia  398.414  0.193 0.031 0.633 0.200  0.613 
Brazil  5375.506  0.213 0.205 0.391 0.119  0.410 
Chile  5419.344  0.178 0.139 0.385 0.146  0.615 
Columbia  2257.257  0.187 0.135 0.479 0.330  0.574 
Costa Rica  529.267  0.187 0.231 0.427 0.091  0.625 
Mexico  6831.983  0.152 0.152 0.328 0.137  0.593 
Panama  967.406  0.109 0.138 0.359 0.109  0.566 
Paraguay  212.786  0.125 0.202 0.322 0.334  0.453 
Uruguay  758.913  0.158 0.025 0.335 0.287  0.357 
Venezuela 1205.535  0.184  0.393 0.497 0.082  0.413 
Average  2266.193  0.178 0.167 0.430 0.202  0.512 
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Table 4.2 
Average Funding Strategies of Banks in Developing Countries 
 
This table represents mean values of funding strategies of selected banks in developing countries. 
Deposit and non-deposit funding is the share of deposit and non-deposit funding to total assets 
respectively. The internal funding is the sum of net profit before extraordinary items and loan loss 
provisions relative bank loans at the end the period. The mean values of the selected banks for the 
respective countries over the period 2000-2007 are in percentage terms. 
 
Countries  Deposit funding  Non-deposit funding  Internal funding 
Africa      
Benin 0.86884  0.01354  0.03233 
Burkina Faso  0.85697  0.01941  0.05586 
Cameroon 0.84615  0.03182  0.05722 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.83949  0.02165  0.01098 
Ghana 0.62753  0.17770  0.13793 
Nigeria 0.64593  0.08265  0.12057 
Senegal 0.81873  0.02921  0.04821 
Kenya 0.75231  0.04858  0.06097 
Uganda 0.56869  0.63818  0.11620 
Tanzania 0.48287  0.54047 0.09090 
Ethiopia 0.73723  0.12096  0.06326 
Angola 0.61822  0.17954  0.17040 
Botswana 0.77534  0.12092  0.09241 
Malawi 0.73915  0.34411  0.19007 
Madagascar 0.80229  0.02876  0.10634 
Mauritius 0.65452  0.21066 0.03114 
Mozambique 0.73470  0.07066  0.05877 
Namibia 0.49443  0.25371  0.08959 
South Africa  0.58264  0.27218  0.07610 
Swaziland 0.64848  0.19686  0.04333 
Zambia 0.65399  0.15721  0.10878 
Zimbabwe 0.30014  0.48968  0.27383 
Average 0.68403  0.18402 0.09251 
Asia- Pacific      
China 0.74501  0.15324  0.02421 
Hong Kong  0.76129  0.12102  0.02122 
India 0.74571  0.12778  0.03945 
Philippines 0.64612  0.16790  0.04866 
Singapore 0.58319  0.16963  0.03924 
South Korea  0.53514  0.40351  0.02295 
Thailand 0.75961  0.10411 0.02997 
Average 0.68229  0.17817 0.03224 
Eastern Europe       
Albania 0.89790  0.01466  0.08840 
Belarus 0.69743  0.11945  0.07035 
Bulgaria 0.75609  0.10971  0.04211 
Croatia 0.71676  0.13119  0.02968 
Czech 0.78832  0.14019  0.03577 
Estonia 0.02325  0.08538  0.01001 
Hungary 0.77324  0.07694 0.04768 
Latvia 0.82329  0.06061  0.05599 
Lithuania 0.83402  0.04621 0.02295 
Poland 0.73683  0.10389  0.03582   145
Countries  Deposit funding  Non-deposit funding  Internal funding 
Russia 0.60089  0.21107  0.06538 
Slovak Rep  0.76638  0.05790  0.03191 
Slovenia 0.72050  0.16013 0.03086 
Ukraine 0.77750  0.07801  0.04284 
Average 0.71130  0.09893 0.04367 
Latin America       
Argentina 0.42761  0.28972  0.06828 
Bolivia 0.76051  0.02478  0.04991 
Brazil 0.35279  0.33089  0.11674 
Chile 0.59111  0.17672  0.03742 
Columbia 0.69186  0.09033  0.06603 
Costa Rica  0.76198  0.03145  0.05023 
Mexico 0.64996  0.11170  0.02640 
Panama 0.78867  0.11367  0.07176 
Paraguay 0.68217  0.16423  0.06095 
Uruguay 0.76022  0.12192 0.04169 
Venezuela 0.80008  0.03482  0.12718 
Average 0.66063  0.13547 0.06515   146
Table 4.3 
 
Bank Market Power and Performance 
 
Table 4.3 presents respective countries’ banks market power and performance variables. The 
degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal 
cost, with the higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. Two varieties of 
Lerner index are reported: a conventional Lerner and a funding-adjusted Lerner. Three 
performance measurement variables are used; Bank net interest margin (NIM) which is 
defined as the ratio of net interest income to total earning assets; Return on Assets (ROA) 
which is defined as profit before tax as a percentage of total assets and Z-score is defined as 
) ( / ) / ( ROA TA E ROA Z    , where ROAis the rate of return on assets,  TA E / is the total 
equity to total assets ratio, and  ROA  is an estimate of the standard deviation of return on 
assets. It measures the number of standard deviations that a bank’s profit must fall to drive it 
into insolvency. 
        Bank market power          Performance variables 
 Conventional 
Lerner 
Funding 
adjusted 
Lerner 
Net-
interest 
margin 
Return on 
assets 
Z-score 
Africa          
Benin 0.1343  0.4768  0.0491  0.0075  10.084 
Burkina Faso  0.0363  0.4454  0.0580  0.0159  12.661 
Cameroon 0.5462  0.7021  0.0409  0.0208  14.988 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.3712  0.2493  0.0474  0.0058  8.343 
Ghana 0.2717  0.6836  0.0910  0.0368  11.756 
Nigeria 0.3181  0.5334  0.0738  0.0316  14.802 
Senegal 0.3365  0.6244  0.0517  0.0179  22.375 
Kenya 0.2584  0.5634  0.0706  0.0208  22.143 
Uganda 0.3663  0.5496  0.1078  0.0369  11.843 
Tanzania 0.3813  0.4934  0.0650  0.0122  13.708 
Ethiopia 0.4244  0.5955  0.0340  0.0273  12.369 
Angola 0.1765  0.5991  0.0538  0.0107  7.208 
Botswana 0.2214  0.7198  0.0694  0.0444  15.830 
Malawi 0.3124  0.6140  0.1097  0.0441  9.584 
Madagascar 0.2769  0.7790  0.0868  0.0388  9.241 
Mauritius 0.2155  0.8098  0.0237 0.0131  27.799 
Mozambique 0.1352 0.4202  0.0769  0.0217 12.673 
Namibia 0.3928  0.8058  0.0683  0.0409  18.415 
South Africa  -0.0133  0.5938  0.0811  0.0386  15.132 
Swaziland 0.2108  0.4442  0.0648  0.0296  29.294 
Zambia 0.3428  0.4460  0.0670  0.0200  8.291 
Zimbabwe 0.2689  0.7202  0.3441  0.0832  3.216 
Sub-average 0.2720 0.5850 0.0789  0.0281  14.171 
Asia-Pacific         
China 0.1944  0.7011  0.0228  0.0091  27.063 
Hong Kong  -0.0492  0.6772  0.0181  0.0123  66.721 
India 0.2812  0.7145  0.0388  0.0144  22.239 
Philippines 0.1431  0.6041  0.0400  0.0123  32.610 
Singapore 0.3509  0.7995  0.0180  0.0168  32.545 
South Korea  0.3593  0.6533  0.0280  0.0092  13.698 
Thailand 0.0726  0.6290  0.0318  0.0083  17.238 
Sub-average 0.1932 0.6827 0.0282  0.0118  30.302   147
Eastern Europe         
Albania 0.0650  0.6039  0.0267  0.0091  15.274 
Belarus 0.2049  0.5792  0.0708  0.0234  19.150 
Bulgaria 0.3143  0.4825  0.0454  0.0167  25.476 
Croatia 0.3580  0.6234  0.0403  0.0127  37.168 
Czech 0.1923  0.6491  0.0218 0.0122  23.780 
Estonia 0.2275  0.4670  0.0307  0.0142  17.272 
Hungary 0.0828  0.5845  0.0446  0.0168  24.562 
Latvia 0.2824  0.6156  0.0309  0.0139  25.116 
Lithuania 0.0948  0.4640  0.0293  0.0075  25.399 
Poland -0.0487  0.6592  0.0355  0.0098  21.645 
Romania 0.0505  0.4895  0.0693  0.0078  14.284 
Russia 0.2601  0.7138  0.0626  0.0211  19.667 
Slovak Rep  0.3040  0.6941  0.0331  0.0120  23.345 
Slovenia 0.3482  0.6298  0.0285  0.0127  26.432 
Ukraine 0.1964  0.6420  0.0606  0.0179  16.914 
Sub-average 0.1955 0.5932 0.0420  0.0138  22.366 
 
Latin America 
       
Argentina 0.3239  0.5998  0.0437  -0.0060  6.321 
Bolivia 0.1225  0.4473  0.0506  0.0000  12.317 
Brazil 0.4493  0.7482  0.1197  0.0415  11.663 
Chile 0.1551  0.6562  0.0427  0.0196  31.522 
Columbia 0.3482  0.6079  0.0379  0.0273  15.563 
Costa Rica  0.2541  0.7210  0.0697  0.0234  36.127 
Mexico 0.2363  0.7876  0.0421  0.0080  13.505 
Panama 0.4116  0.7427  0.0350  0.0157  26.237 
Paraguay -0.1282  0.7174  0.0929  0.0185  16.241 
Uruguay -0.1282  0.7344  0.0462  -0.0125  8.922 
Venezuela 0.2631  0.5563  0.1229  0.0346  14.633 
Sub-average 0.2098 0.6653 0.0640  0.0155  17.550 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   148
Table 4.4 
Pair-wise correlation coefficient between selected variables 
Pair wise correlation coefficient estimated on sample of 978 banks across 55 countries. * implies significant at 5% or more. Net-interest margin is different between 
interest income and interest cost in relation to total earning assets. ROA is the return on assets. Z-score is defined as  ) ( / ) / ( ROA TA E ROA Z    , where 
ROAis the rate of return on assets,  TA E/ is the total equity to total assets ratio, and  ) (ROA  ROA  is an estimate of the standard deviation of return on assets. It 
measures the number of standard deviations that a bank’s profit must fall to drive it into insolvency the ratio of banks’ capital to total assets is used as a proxy to 
measure the degree of risk aversion. Banks’ loan to total assets ratio is used as a measure of credit risk. Size is natural log of total assets. Cost to gross income ratio 
is used as a proxy for efficiency. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index with the higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. 
Internal funding is the funds generated internally and measured as the sum of net profit before extraordinary items and loan loss provisions relative to bank loans at 
the end of the period. Deposit funding is deposit sources of funding while non-deposit fund is calculated as all other debts (except deposits) divided by total assets. 
Short-term interest rate is included to capture the stance of monetary policy. The GDP per capita growth accounts for the differences in economic developments 
across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. Lerner *deposit fund, Lerner*non-deposit funding and Lerner*internal funding measure 
interaction between the Lerner and deposit funding, non-non-deposit funding and internal funding respectively. 
  NIM  ROA  Z-score  Risk aversion  Credit risk  Size  Cost to 
income 
Conventional 
Lerner index 
Funding adjusted 
Lerner index 
NIM  1.0000              
ROA 0.3096*  1.0000               
Z-score -0.0819*  0.1625*  1.0000             
Risk aversion  0.1768*  0.0642*  0.0986*  1.0000           
Credit risk  0.0085  -0.0297*  0.1363*  -0.1247*  1.0000         
Size -0.2235*  0.0173  0.1863*  -0.4269*  0.1754*  1.0000       
Cost to income  0.0637*  -0.2756*  -0.2000* 0.1034*  -0.0431* -0.2565*  1.0000     
Conventional Lerner index  0.1012*  0.4739* 0.1071*  0.0489*  -0.0367*  0.0537*  -0.3377*  1.0000   
Funding adjusted Lerner index  -0.0221  0.2806* 0.1649*  -0.1171*  0.0999* 0.2614* -0.7461*  0.3863* 1.0000 
Internal funding  0.3079*  0.6320*  0.0260*  0.1373* -0.2812*  -0.1057*  -0.1449*  0.3334* 0.2548* 
Deposit funding  -0.1413*  -0.0808*  0.0486*  -0.5491* 0.1104*  0.1557* 0.0005  -0.1055* -0.0388* 
Non-deposit funding  0.1000*  0.0357*  -0.1349*  0.0372* -0.0311*  -0.0811*  -0.0626*  0.0786* 0.0916* 
Lerner*deposit funding  0.0601*  0.3833*  0.1460*  -0.1001* 0.014  0.0866* -0.2699*  0.8840* 0.2651* 
Lerner*non-deposit funding  0.1144*  0.2760*  -0.0623* 0.0824*  -0.0684* -0.0421*  -0.1686*  0.6799*  0.2373* 
Lerner*IGF 0.1959*  0.3245*  -0.014  0.1878* -0.2310*  -0.1016*  -0.1085*  0.3312* 0.0932* 
Inflation 0.3951*  0.0767*  -0.2007*  0.1372*  -0.1885* -0.3022*  0.0681*  0.0037  -0.0284* 
GDP per capital  -0.1503*  -0.0277*  0.0122  -0.0065 0.0054  0.1341*  -0.0232  0.0456*  -0.0300* 
Monetary policy  0.4552*  0.0636*  -0.1621*  0.1109* -0.1986*  -0.3001*  0.0111 -0.0311*  0.0761*   149
Pair Pair-wise correlation coefficient between selected variables (cont.) 
 Internal 
funding 
Deposit 
funding 
Non-
deposit 
funding 
Lerner * 
deposit 
funding 
Lerner*non-
deposit 
funding 
Lerner*Internal 
funding 
Inflation GDP  per 
capita 
Monetary 
policy 
Internal funding  1.0000                 
Deposit funding  -0.1266*  1.0000               
Non-deposit funding  0.0801*  -0.7902*  1.0000             
Lerner*deposit funding  0.2554*  0.1988*  -0.1898*  1.0000           
Lerner*non-deposit funding  0.2380*  -0.4438*  0.5491*  0.3800*  1.0000         
Lerner*IGF 0.4779*  -0.1268*  0.0845*  0.2391*  0.2949*  1.0000       
Inflation 0.1906*  -0.1530*  0.0886*  -0.0292* 0.0521*  0.1693*  1.0000     
GDP per capital  -0.0512*  0.0233  -0.0285 0.0400*  0.0238  0.0077  -0.0318*  1.0000   
Monetary policy  0.2043*  -0.1169*  0.0813*  -0.0746* 0.0468*  0.1773*  0.6696*  -0.2179*  1.0000 
Source: Bankscope, World Development Indicators and the author’s own calculation   150
Table 4.5 
What factors influence bank market power in emerging economies? 
 
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the conventional version of Lerner index, and the dependent 
variable in columns 3 and 4 is the funding-adjusted version. The degree of market power is proxied by the 
Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the higher scores indicating a higher degree of 
pricing power. Bank size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets valued in US dollars. Banks’ 
equity is the bank total equity to asset ratio, measured as equity as a percentage of total assets. Assets 
growth is the growth rate of bank assets. Management quality measures efficiency and the ability of 
management to generate more quality assets. It is measured as earning assets as a percentage to total assets 
with a higher percentage points indicating a higher efficiency. Non-interest income measured the exposure 
of a bank to non-interest generating income. Banking freedom is from the Economic Freedom Indicators of 
Heritage Founding. It is scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater freedom. Inflation is the 
rate of inflation based on the CPI. GDP growth measures business cycle fluctuation while per capita GDP 
accounts for the differences in economic developments across countries. Short-term interest rates are 
included to capture the stance of monetary policy. All regressions are estimated using country and time 
fixed effects and clustering at the bank level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
  
  Conventional Lerner index  Funding adjusted Lerner index 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
       
Bank  size  0.0641*** 0.0638*** 0.0891***  0.0890*** 
  (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0064)  (0.0064) 
Equity  0.4555*** 0.4648*** -0.0787**  -0.0701* 
  (0.0958) (0.0959) (0.0393)  (0.0393) 
Bank  growth  0.0658*** 0.0665*** 0.0001  0.0007 
  (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0089)  (0.0089) 
Management  quality  0.1888** 0.2042** 0.0823**  0.0952*** 
  (0.0795) (0.0799) (0.0329)  (0.0330) 
Non-interest  income  0.2055*** 0.2053*** 0.0741***  0.0741*** 
  (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0181)  (0.0181) 
Banking freedom    0.0528*    0.0419*** 
   (0.0289)    (0.0118) 
Inflation  -0.0132 -0.0128 0.0028  0.0032 
  (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0034)  (0.0034) 
GDP  growth  -0.0499* -0.0459* 0.0013 0.0047 
  (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0112)  (0.0112) 
GDP per capita  0.0311**  0.0307*  -0.0021  -0.0024 
  (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0065)  (0.0065) 
Monetary  policy  0.0730*** 0.0734*** 0.0692***  0.0694*** 
  (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0059)  (0.0059) 
Constant  -0.7075*** -0.9336*** -0.1430** -0.3242*** 
  (0.1534) (0.1970) (0.0632)  (0.0811) 
Observation  4556 4556 4512  4512 
Country fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering  level  Bank Bank Bank  Bank 
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Table 4.6 
What account for the variation of bank funding structure in emerging economies? 
 
The dependent variable is funding structure of bank in the selected sample with columns 1 and 2 taking 
deposit funding; column 3 and 4 for non-deposit funding; and internal funding taking column 5 and 6. 
Deposit and non-deposit funding is the share of deposit and non-deposit funding to total assets respectively. 
The internal funding is the sum of net profit before extraordinary items and loan loss provisions relative bank 
loans at the end the period. Bank size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets valued in US dollars. 
Bank equity is the bank’s total equity to asset ratio, measured as equity as a percentage of total assets. 
Management quality measures efficiency of the ability of management to generate more earning assets. It is 
measured as earning assets as a percentage to total assets with a higher percentage indicating higher 
efficiency. Non-interest income measures the exposure of a bank to non-interest generating income. The 
degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the 
higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. Liberalization is the financial reforms index 
constructed by Abiad et al. (2010). Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. GDP growth measures 
business cycle fluctuation while per capita GDP accounts for the differences in economic developments 
across countries. Short-term interest rate is included to capture the stance of monetary policy. All regressions 
are estimated using country and time fixed effects and clustering at bank level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
  Deposit funding  Non-deposits funding  Internal funding 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bank  size  -0.0109** -0.014***  0.0220*** 0.0229*** -0.00003  -0.015*** 
  (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0039) (0.0040) 
Equity  -0.729*** -0.744*** -0.418*** -0.412*** 0.1487***  0.2174*** 
  (0.0310) (0.0306) (0.0400) (0.0393) (0.0260) (0.0254) 
Bank  growth  -0.0140**  -0.0119*  0.0084 0.0080 0.0056 0.0137** 
  (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0055) (0.0054) 
Management  quality  0.0413* 0.0383  0.0596**  0.0553* 0.1290***  0.1303*** 
  (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0326) (0.0322) (0.0210) (0.0207) 
Non-interest  income  -0.0264*  -0.029**  0.0003 0.0058 0.0346***  0.0406*** 
  (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0165) (0.0161) (0.0117) (0.0114) 
Conventional  Lerner  0.0122**   -0.0038   0.0693***   
  (0.0054)   (0.0066)   (0.0046)  
Funding-adjusted  Lerner   0.0130   -0.0084   0.2252*** 
   (0.0125)   (0.0165)   (0.0104) 
Liberalization  0.1466*** 0.1422*** -0.1031** -0.1000** -0.088*** -0.092*** 
  (0.0391) (0.0390) (0.0493) (0.0488) (0.0330) (0.0325) 
Inflation -0.0014  -0.0017  0.0005 0.0006 -0.0005  -0.0024 
  (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
GDP  growth  -0.01067  -0.0107  0.0046 0.0046 0.0066 0.0069 
  (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0069) (0.0068) 
GDP  per  capita  0.0093* 0.0094* -0.0093 -0.0090 -0.0029 -0.0028 
  (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0043) (0.0042) 
Monetary  policy  0.0026 0.0018 -0.0066  -0.0065  0.0033 -0.0078** 
  (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0063) 90.00380  (0.0038) 
Observation  3754 3736 3102 3079 3759 3739 
Country  fixed  effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time  fixed  effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustering  level  Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table 4.7 
Evaluation of bank net-interest margin using funding-adjusted version of Lerner index 
 
The dependent variable is NIM which is defined as the ratio of net interest income to total earning assets. The 
ratio of banks’ capital to total assets is used as a proxy to measure the degree of risk aversion.  Banks’ loan to 
total assets ratio is used as a measure of credit risk. The volume of loans granted is proxied as the operating 
size of the bank. Implicit payment is total operating expenses net of non-interest revenue expressed as a 
percentage of total assets. Cost to income ratio is used as a measure of operating efficiency. The degree of 
market power is proxied by the funding-adjusted Lerner Index. Deposit fund is a ratio of total deposit to 
assets and non-deposit fund is the share of non-deposit funding to total assets. Internal funds is internally 
generated funds. It is measured as the sum of net profits before extraordinary items and loan loss provisions 
relative to bank loans at the end the period. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. Per capita GDP 
accounts for the differences in economic development across countries. Short-term interest rate is included to 
capture the stance of monetary policy. All regressions are estimated using dynamic panel-data estimation, 
Two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-correct standard error, small-sample adjustments, and orthogonal 
deviation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The following diagnostic tests are also reported: (1) Observation (2) The 
instruments count, (3) The Hansen test for over identification restriction which the null hypothesis is that 
instruments are exogenous (4) The Arellano-Bond tests for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. (5) The F-test for joint significance of 
instruments. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
NIM-1 0.3946***  0.4514***  0.4623***  0.4538***  0.3648*** 
 (0.0873)  (0.0652)  (0.0626)  (0.0663)  (0.0589) 
Risk aversion  0.0590  0.0452**  0.0403  0.0103  0.0218 
 (0.0525)  (0.0226)  (0.0282)  (0.0221)  (0.0183) 
Credit risk  0.0694***  0.0497***  0.0426***  0.0299***  0.0525*** 
 (0.0152)  (0.0102)  (0.0118)  (0.0104)  (0.0096) 
Operating size  -0.0093***  -0.005*** -0.005***  -0.004***  -0.0024* 
 (0.0029)  (0.0018)  (0.0017)  (0.0015)  (0.0013) 
Implicit payment  0.4301***  0.4293***  0.4102***  0.3882***  0.4788*** 
 (0.1208)  (0.0978)  (0.1286)  (0.1210)  (0.1105) 
Cost to income  -0.0473***  -0.0115  -0.0031  0.0068  -0.0133 
 (0.0150)  (0.0208)  (0.0168)  (0.0148)  (0.0111) 
Funding-adjusted Lerner    0.0397*  0.0452*  0.0417*  0.0077 
   (0.0236)  (0.0239)  (0.0221)  (0.0142) 
Deposit fund      0.0259*     
     (0.0147)     
Non-deposit fund        -0.0256*   
       (0.0147)   
Internal funds          0.0763*** 
         (0.0284) 
Inflation -0.0077***  -0.006***  -0.005*** -0.006***  -0.0036** 
 (0.0028)  (0.0019)  (0.0018)  (0.0019)  (0.0015) 
GDP per capita  -0.0092***  -0.007***  -0.0055*  -0.0042*  -0.0047** 
 (0.0030)  (0.0029)  (0.0031)  (0.0025)  (0.0022) 
Monetary policy  0.0102***  0.0136***  0.0120***  0.0137***  0.0141*** 
 (0.0034)  (0.0033)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0029) 
Diagnostics tests         
Number of observations  4297  4658  4521  3699  4547 
Number of instruments  89  143  137  137  164 
Hansen 64.91  130.63  112.33  115.49  134.44 
P-value (0.739)  (0.371)  (0.654)  (0.574)  (0.744) 
AB2   -0.79  -0.66  -0.58  -0.84  0.42 
P-value (0.431)  (0.509)  (0.565)  (0.404)  (0.678) 
F-test 28.24***  32.92***  25.09***  20.80***  50.92***   153
Table 4.8 
Evaluation of bank net-interest margin using conventional version of Lerner index 
 
The dependent variable is NIM which is defined as the ratio of net-interest income to total earning assets. The 
ratio of banks’ capital to total assets is used as a proxy to measure the degree of risk aversion.  Banks’ loan to 
total assets ratio is used as a measure of credit risk. The volume of loans granted is proxied as the operating 
size of the bank. Implicit payment is total operating expenses net of non-interest revenue expressed as a 
percentage of total assets. Cost to income is used as a measure of operating efficiency. The degree of market 
power is proxied by the conventional Lerner Index with the higher scores indicating a higher degree of 
pricing power. Deposit fund is ratio of total deposit to assets and non-deposit fund is the share of non-deposit 
funding to total assets. Internal fund is measured as the sum of net profit before extraordinary items and loan 
loss provisions relative bank loans at the end the period. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. 
The natural logarithm of per capita GDP accounts for the differences in economic developments across 
countries. Short-term interest rate is included to capture the stance of monetary policy. All regressions are 
estimated using dynamic panel-data estimation, Two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-correct standard error, 
small-sample adjustments, and orthogonal deviation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The following diagnostic tests 
are reported: (1) Observations (2) The instruments count, (3) The Hansen test for over identification 
restriction which the null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous (4) The Arellano-Bond tests for first 
and second order serial correlation in the residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial 
correlation. (5) The F-test for joint significance of instruments. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
NIM-1 0.3946***  0.4261***  0.3510***  0.4597***  0.3846*** 
 (0.0873)  (0.0779)  (0.0663)  (0.0694)  (0.0751) 
Risk aversion  0.0590  0.0305  -0.0095  0.0364  0.0058 
 (0.0525)  (0.0240)  (0.0217)  (0.0246)  (0.0176) 
Credit risk  0.0694***  0.0452***  0.0421***  0.0385***  0.0375*** 
 (0.0152)  (0.0110)  (0.0088)  (0.0107)  (0.0090) 
Operating size  -0.009***  -0.0038** -0.0040*** -0.0041**  -0.0012 
 (0.0029)  (0.0017)  (0.0015)  (0.0018)  (0.0013) 
Implicit payment  0.4301***  0.4459***  0.4021***  0.3433**  0.4603*** 
 (0.1208)  (0.1379)  (0.1269)  (0.1355)  (0.1061) 
Cost to income  -0.047***  -0.022**  -0.0211**  -0.0208*  -0.0057 
 (0.0150)  (0.0116)  (0.0102)  (0.0126)  (0.0073) 
Conventional Lerner index    0.0359***  0.0246**  0.0209*  0.0142* 
   (0.0123)  (0.0113)  (0.0112)  (0.0084) 
Deposit fund      -0.0230*     
     (0.0131)     
Non-deposit fund        0.0052   
       (0.0099)   
Internal funds          0.0639** 
         (0.0295) 
Inflation -0.007***  -0.0034  -0.0024  -0.0033  -0.0006 
 (0.0028)  (0.0023)  (0.0020)  (0.0026)  (0.0020) 
GDP per capita  -0.009***  -0.009***  -0.0080***  -0.0011  -0.0033 
 (0.0030)  (0.0031)  (0.0028)  (0.0023)  (0.0024) 
Monetary policy  0.0102***  0.0157***  0.0173***  0.0191***  0.0153*** 
 (0.0034)  (0.0040)  (0.0028)  (0.0040)  (0.0025) 
Diagnostics tests          
Number of observations  4297  4256  4544  3403  4558 
Number of instruments  89  144  164  165  164 
Hansen 64.91  146.04  147.38  158.97  165.86 
P-value (0.739)  (0.119)  (0.452)  (0.236)  (0.125) 
AB2 -0.79  -0.43  -0.45  -0.50  1.47 
P-value (0.431)  (0.670)  (0.650)  (0.614)  (0.141) 
F-test 28.24***  42.43**  32.54  35.75***  46.90***   154
Table 4.9 
The sensitivity of NIM to market power and bank funding strategies 
The dependent variable is NIM. The ratio of bank equity to total assets is used as a proxy to measure the 
degree of risk aversion.  Bank loans to total assets ratio measures of credit risk. The volume of loans granted 
is proxied as the operating size of the bank. Implicit payment is total operating expenses net of non-interest 
revenue expressed as a percentage of total assets. Ratio of cost to income is used as a measure of operating 
efficiency. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index. Deposit fund is ratio of total deposit 
to assets and non-deposit fund is the share of non-deposit funding to total assets respectively. Internal fund is 
the internally generated capital. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The natural logarithm of per 
capita GDP accounts for the differences in economic development. Short-term interest rate is included to 
capture the stance of monetary policy. We estimate all regressions using dynamic panel-data estimation. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
NIM 0.4634***  0.5093***  0.3887***  0.4181*** 
 (0.0632)  (0.0642)  (0.0741)  (0.0938) 
Risk aversion  -0.0206  -0.0018  -0.0272  -0.0422 
 (0.0269)  (0.0313)  (0.0250)  (0.0310) 
Credit risk  0.0326***  0.0234**  0.0403***  0.0317*** 
 (0.0064)  (0.0119)  (0.0086)  (0.0089) 
Operating size  -0.0040**  -0.0030  -0.0020  -0.0006 
 (0.0016)  (0.0022)  (0.0014)  (0.0012) 
Implicit payment  0.4234***  0.4639***  0.5237***  0.6462*** 
 (0.1462)  (0.1602)  (0.1184)  (0.1568) 
Cost to income  -0.0219*  -0.0005  0.0018  -0.0158*** 
 (0.0131)  (0.0102)  (0.0067)  (0.0059) 
Conventional Lerner  0.0037  0.0241**  0.0065  -0.1104* 
 (0.0230)  (0.0110)  (0.0099)  (0.0603) 
Deposit funding  -0.0378*      -0.0572** 
 (0.0210)      (0.0258) 
Lerner X deposit fund  0.0431      0.1205* 
 (0.0307)      (0.0709) 
Non-deposit funding    -0.0203    -0.0586** 
   (0.0194)    (0.0269) 
Lerner X non-deposit funding    0.0459    0.1389* 
   (0.0505)    (0.0763) 
Internal funds      0.1245***  0.1381*** 
     (0.0348)  (0.0415) 
Lerner X Internal funding      0.0501*  0.0892*** 
     (0.0270)  (0.0298) 
inflation -0.0028  -0.0062**  -0.0002  -0.0012 
 (0.0023)  (0.0022)  (0.0019)  (0.0020) 
GDP per capita  -0.0078***  -0.0045**  -0.00432**  -0.0007 
 (0.0025)  (0.0020)  (0.0021)  (0.0020) 
Monetary policy  0.0146***  0.0177***  0.0107***  0.0101*** 
 (0.0031)  (0.0039)  (0.0030)  (0.0033) 
Diagnostics tests 
Number of Observations  4126  3425  4013  2994 
Number of instruments  186  186  186  280 
Hansen 195  194  190.34  276.41 
P-value 0.064  0.075  0.104  0.194 
AB2 -0.19  -0.28  2.03  1.98 
P-value 0.846  0.778  0.042  0.048 
F-test 46.03***  57.23***  95.34***  83.72**   155
Table 4.10 
Evaluation of banks’ NIM: Regional Analysis 
 
The dependent variable is banks’ NIM which is defined as the ratio of net interest income to total earning 
assets. The ratio of bank capital to total assets is used as a proxy to measure the degree of risk aversion. Bank 
loan to total assets ratio is used as a measure of credit risk. The volume of loans granted is proxied as the 
operating size of the bank. Implicit payment is total operating expenses net of non-interest revenue expressed 
as a percentage of total assets. Cost to income ratio is used as a measure of operating efficiency. The degree 
of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index. Internal funds is measured as the sum of net profit before 
extraordinary items and loan loss provisions relative bank loans at the end the period. Banking freedom 
measures overall openness of the sector operation. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The 
natural logarithm of per capita GDP accounts for the differences in economic development across countries. 
Short-term interest rate is included to capture the stance of monetary policy. The results are presented in 
columns, basing on the continental groupings. Africa refers to banks selected in Sub-Saharan African 
countries; Asia for banks in Asia-pacific, Europe for selected banks in Central and Eastern European 
countries and America for selected banks in Latin America countries. All regressions are estimated using 
dynamic panel-data estimation, Two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-correct standard error, small-sample 
adjustments, and orthogonal deviation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  The following diagnostic tests are reported: 
(1) Observations (2) The instruments count, (3) The Hansen test for over identification restriction which the 
null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous (4) The Arellano-Bond tests for first and second order serial 
correlation in the residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. (5) The F-test for 
joint significance of instruments. 
   Africa  Asia  Europe  America  ALL 
NIM-1 0.6229***  0.7632***  0.5466***  0.3531***  0.4063*** 
 (0.0765)  (0.0790)  (0.0831)  (0.0836)  (0.0802) 
Risk aversion  0.0141  0.0803***  0.0049  -0.0401*  -0.0264* 
 (0.0246)  (0.0273)  (0.0169)  (0.0240)  (0.0156) 
Credit risk  0.0611***  -0.0008  0.0472***  0.0088  0.0460*** 
 (0.0134)  (0.0097)  (0.0114)  (0.0246)  (0.0081) 
Operating size  -0.0022  0.0037***  0.0013  0.0003  -0.003*** 
 (0.0014)  (0.0012)  (0.0016)  (0.0024)  (0.0011) 
Implicit payment  0.4463***  0.3423**  0.5302***  0.7109***  0.5624*** 
 (0.1016)  (0.1637)  (0.2024)  (0.1456)  (0.1440) 
Cost to income  -0.0066  0.0249*  -0.0089  -0.0068  -0.0025 
 (0.0117)  (0.0133)  (0.0129)  (0.0129)  (0.0080) 
Conventional Lerner  -0.0001  0.0191  -0.0002  0.0082  0.0199** 
 (0.0140)  (0.0137)  (0.0083)  (0.0112)  (0.0093) 
Internal funds  0.1232***  -0.0257*  0.1098**  0.0942***  0.1154*** 
 (0.0310)  (0.0142)  (0.0434)  (0.0357)  (0.0313) 
Banking freedom  -0.0075  -0.0157**  -0.0025  0.0038  0.0018 
 (0.0055)  (0.0066)  (0.0031)  (0.0053)  (0.0025) 
Inflation -0.0029  -0.0012  -0.0015  0.0020  -0.0031* 
 (0.0023)  (0.0015)  (0.0014)  (0.0034)  (0.0017) 
GDP per capita  -0.0008  0.0008  -0.0005  -0.0034  -0.0050** 
 (0.0017)  (0.0035)  (0.0023)  (0.0024)  (0.0020) 
Monetary policy  0.0076***  0.0082***  0.0050**  0.0066*  0.0088*** 
 (0.0023)  (0.0024)  (0.0021)  (0.0034)  (0.0018) 
Diagnostics tests          
Number of observations  931  789  1400  1041  4161 
Number of instruments  133  123  138  136  138 
Hansen 127.67  119.02  137.99  133.11  144.40 
P-value (0.180)  (0.149)  (0.112)  (0.147)  (0.047) 
AB2 2.03  -1.47  0.55  1.42  1.66 
P-value (0.043)  (0.141)  (0.581)  (0.157)  (0.097) 
F-test 52.16***  29.91***  60.56***  25.85***  53.19***   156
Table 4.11 
Determinants of the Return on Assets (ROA) of bank 
 
The dependent variable is ROA which is defined as profit before tax as a percentage of total assets. The ratio 
of bank equity to total assets is used as a proxy to measure the degree of risk aversion.  Bank loan to total 
assets ratio is used as a measure of credit risk. Implicit payment is total operating expenses net of non-interest 
revenue expressed as a percentage of total assets. Ratio of earning assets to total assets is used as a measure of 
management quality. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index. Deposit funding is the ratio 
of total deposit to assets and non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit funding to total assets 
respectively. Internal funding is the internally generated funds. It is measured as the sum of net profit before 
extraordinary items and loan loss provisions relative bank loans at the end the period. Inflation is the rate of 
inflation based on the CPI. Per capita GDP accounts for the differences in economic development across 
countries. Short-term interest rate is included to capture the stance of monetary policy. All regressions are 
estimated using dynamic panel-data estimation, Two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-correct standard error, 
small-sample adjustments, and orthogonal deviation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  The following diagnostic tests 
are presented: (1) Observations (2) The instruments count, (3) The Hansen test for over identification 
restriction which the null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous (4) The Arellano-Bond tests for first 
and second order serial correlation in the residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial 
correlation. (5) The F-test for joint significance of instruments. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Return on assets-1 0.0974*  0.1358***  0.1255***  0.0976**  0.0907**  0.1009** 
 (0.0570)  (0.0397)  (0.0369)  (0.0451) (0.0400)  (0.0413) 
Risk aversion  0.0564**  0.0640***  0.04296**  0.0752***  0.0433***  -0.0077 
 (0.0256)  (0.0210)  (0.0182)  (0.0233) (0.0133)  (0.0261) 
Credit risk  0.0226**  0.0038  0.0052  0.0133  0.0327***  0.0316*** 
 (0.0096)  (0.0088)  (0.0092)  (0.0107) (0.0063)  (0.0084) 
Total assets  -0.0047**  -0.0051**  -0.005*** -0.0045**  0.0001  -0.0023* 
 (0.0023)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0022) (0.0013)  (0.0013) 
Implicit payment  -0.2985**  -0.1460  -0.1479 -0.2078* -0.0456 -0.0061 
 (0.1356)  (0.1094)  (0.1078)  (0.1082) (0.0657)  (0.0519) 
Management quality  -0.0053  0.0590**  0.0420  0.0922***  0.0310  0.0233 
 (0.0398)  (0.0305)  (0.0276)  (0.0259) (0.0208)  (0.0181) 
Conventional Lerner    0.0366***  0.0416***  0.0296***  0.0255***  0.0197** 
   (0.0112)  (0.0094)  (0.0105)  (0.0068)  (0.0079) 
Deposit funding      -0.0007      -0.0293 
     (0.0141)      (0.0215) 
Non-deposit funding        -0.0013    -0.0404* 
       (0.0061)    (0.0221) 
Internal funds          0.1350***  0.1543*** 
         (0.0196)  (0.0231) 
inflation -0.0008  0.0024  0.0022  -0.0008  -0.0003  -0.0009 
 (0.0032)  (0.0022)  (0.0019)  (0.0018) (0.0012)  (0.0014) 
GDP per capita  0.0020  0.0018  0.0008  -0.0064**  -0.00316*  -0.0033 
 (0.0034)  (0.0028)  (0.0024)  (0.0030) (0.0018)  (0.0020) 
Monetary policy  0.0010  -0.0028  -0.0038  0.0021  0.0036*  0.0052** 
 (0.0042)  (0.0036)  (0.0031)  (0.0032) (0.0021)  (0.0023) 
Diagnostics tests           
No. of observations  4320  4284  4188  3742  4559  3581 
No.  of instruments  89  116  116  143  145  139 
Hansen 78.65  105.65  10.02  109.90  119.64  102.09 
P-value (0.305)  (0.305)  (0.135)  (0.830)  (0.619)  (0.866) 
AB2   -0.29  0.75  0.85  0.34  1.02  0.77 
P-value (0.771)  (0.452)  (0.393)  (0.734)  (0.307)  (0.444) 
F-test 5.16***  9.26***  10.02***  7.08***  15.36***  24.29***   157
Table 4.12 
Determinants of insolvency risk with conventional version of Lerner index 
 
The dependent variable is Z-score defined as  ) ( / ) / ( ROA TA E ROA Z    , where ROAis the rate of 
return on assets,  TA E / is the total equity to total assets ratio, and  ) (ROA  ROA  is an estimate of the 
standard deviation of return on assets. Equity/Assets is used as a proxy to measure the degree of risk aversion.  
Banks’ loan to total assets ratio, loan/Assets is used as a measure of credit risk. The degree of market power is 
proxied by the Lerner Index (conventional version) or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the higher 
scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. Deposit funding is ratio of total deposit to assets and non-
deposit funding is the share of non-deposit funding to total assets respectively. Internal fund is the internally 
generated fund. It is measured as the sum of net profit before extraordinary items and loan loss provisions 
relative bank loans at the end the period. Short-term interest rate is included to capture the stance of monetary 
policy. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The natural logarithm of per capita GDP accounts 
for the differences in economic developments across countries. All regressions are estimated using dynamic 
panel-data estimation, Two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-correct standard error, small-sample adjustments, 
and orthogonal deviation. Constant term included but not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% level respectively. The following 
diagnostic tests are presented: (1) Observations (2) The instruments count, (3) The Hansen test for over 
identification restriction which the null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous (4) The Arellano-Bond 
tests for first and second order serial correlation in the residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no 
serial correlation. (5) The F-test for joint significance of instruments. 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Z-Score_lag 0.6285***  0.6836***  0.7420***  0.6743*** 
  (0.0641) (0.0530) (0.0530) (0.0609) 
Size  0.0538*  0.0624** 0.0631** 0.0376 
  (0.0284) (0.0268) (0.0251) (0.0274) 
Equity/Assets  1.1308***  0.5593 0.3018 0.8848 
  (0.4132) (0.4305) (0.3512) (0.4052) 
Loan/Assets  0.2940**  0.1405 0.1888 0.2699** 
  (0.1362) (0.1254) (0.1379) (0.1366) 
Lerner index  0.3998*  0.4630**  0.2058  -0.1358 
  (0.2168) (0.1919) (0.2161) (0.1617) 
Deposits funding    0.0029     
   (0.1634)     
Non-deposits funding      -0.0637   
     (0.1007)   
Internal  funding     0.6151** 
     (0.2788) 
Monetary policy  0.0442  0.2466*  0.0334  -0.3109 
  (0.1722) (0.1304) (0.1359) (0.2394) 
Inflation -0.4014**  -0.4863***  -0.1721  -0.2329 
  (0.1787) (0.1868) (0.1570) (0.2499) 
GDP  growth  -2.0178**  -2.9781*** -3.0713*** -1.6347** 
  (0.8288) (0.7687) (0.7302) (0.7511) 
Diagnostic tests      
No. of observation  5243  5049  4086  5103 
No. of instruments  110  111  111  116 
Hansen  105.36  95.84 89.08 116.6 
P-value  (0.22)  (0.457) (0.652) (0.123) 
AB2  0.42 0.44 1.58 1.47 
P-value (0.674)  (0.66)  (0.115)  (0.142) 
F-test  47.47*** 47.77*** 54.44*** 48.82*** 
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Table 4.13 
Determinants of insolvency risk with funding-adjusted version of Lerner index 
 
The dependent variable is Z-score defined as  ) ( / ) / ( ROA TA E ROA Z    , where ROAis the rate of 
return on assets,  TA E / is the total equity to total assets ratio, and  ) (ROA  ROA  is an estimate of the 
standard deviation of return on assets. Equity/Assets is used as a proxy to measure the degree of risk aversion.  
Banks’ loan to total assets ratio, loan/Assets is used as a measure of credit risk. The degree of market power is 
proxied by the Lerner Index (funding-adjusted version) or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the 
higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. Deposit funding is ratio of total deposit to assets 
and non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit funding to total assets respectively. Internal fund is the 
internally generated fund. It is measured as the sum of net profit before extraordinary items and loan loss 
provisions relative bank loans at the end the period. Short-term interest rate is included to capture the stance 
of monetary policy. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The natural logarithm of per capita 
GDP accounts for the differences in economic developments across countries. All regressions are estimated 
using dynamic panel-data estimation, Two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-correct standard error, small-
sample adjustments, and orthogonal deviation. Constant term included but not reported. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% level 
respectively. The following diagnostic tests are presented: (1) Observations (2) The instruments count, (3) 
The Hansen test for over identification restriction which the null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous 
(4) The Arellano-Bond tests for first and second order serial correlation in the residuals which the null 
hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. (5) The F-test for joint significance of instruments. 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Z-Score_lag  0.6679*** 0.7141*** 0.7685*** 0.6408*** 
  (0.0649) (0.0604) (0.0562) (0.0546) 
Size  0.0518* 0.0322  0.0440* 0.0292 
  (0.0269) (0.0306) (0.0259) (0.0278) 
Equity/Assets 1.1829***  0.5539  0.4228  0.8216** 
  (0.4149) (0.4520) (0.3445) (0.3683) 
Loan/Assets 0.2620*  0.1211  0.1473  0.2781** 
 
 Conventional Lerner index 
(0.1375) 
0.5023* 
(0.2746) 
(0.1389) 
0.4285*** 
(0.1583) 
(0.1344) 
0.2904** 
(0.1388) 
(0.1395) 
-0.3762 
(0.3337) 
Deposits  funding   0.0254    
   (0.1676)    
Non-deposits funding      -0.0986   
     (0.1065)   
Internal  funding     0.6741** 
     (0.3377) 
Monetary  policy  0.0134 0.2298 0.0418 -0.1398 
  (0.1660) (0.2432) (0.1584) (0.2180) 
Inflation -0.3810**  -0.7361**  -0.2546  -0.3377 
  (0.1817) (0.3047) (0.1740) (0.2435) 
GDP growth  -1.1130  -1.9765***  -2.4436***  -1.5194* 
  (0.7291) (0.7481) (0.6912) (0.8002) 
Diagnostic tests      
No. of observation  5216  5038  4068  5078 
No. of instruments  110  111  111  116 
Hansen 108.21  106.73  90.3  117.1 
P-value  (0.167) (0.193) (0.617) (0.116) 
AB2  0.75 0.39 1.38 1.21 
P-value  (0.453) (0.700) (0.167) (0.226) 
F-test  45.77*** 43.17*** 53.74*** 42.00*** 
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Table 4.14 
Evaluation of bank performance: Controlling for banking freedom 
 
The dependent variables are performance measures, Net-interest margin (NIM), Return on assets (ROA), and bank 
insolvent risk, Z-score. Equity/Assets is used as a proxy to measure the degree of risk aversion.  Banks’ loan to total assets 
ratio, loan/Assets is used as a measure of credit risk. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index. Deposit 
funding is ratio of total deposit to assets and non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit funding to total assets 
respectively. Internal fund is the internally generated fund. It is measured as the sum of net profit before extraordinary 
items and loan loss provisions relative bank loans at the end the period. Higher values of banking freedom signify higher 
freedom from government controls. Short-term interest rate is included to capture the stance of monetary policy. Inflation 
is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The natural logarithm of per capita GDP accounts for the differences in 
economic developments across countries. Dynamic panel-data estimation, Two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-correct 
standard error, small-sample adjustments, and orthogonal deviation are used. Constant term included but not reported. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% level 
respectively. The following diagnostic tests are presented: (1) Observations (2) The instruments count, (3) The Hansen 
test for over identification restriction which the null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous (4) The Arellano-Bond 
tests for first and second order serial correlation in the residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial 
correlation. (5) The F-test for joint significance of instruments. 
 NIM  ROA  Z-Score  NIM  ROA  Z-Score 
NIM_lag  0.670***    0.661***    
  (0.087)    (0.082)    
ROA_lag   0.134***      0.110***   
   (0.040)      (0.038)   
Z-Score_lag     0.789***      0.773*** 
     (0.042)      (0.049) 
Equity/Assets -0.111***  0.001 0.139 -0.020 0.040**  -0.122 
  (0.0263)  (0.019) (0.373) (0.031)  (0.017) (0.408) 
Loan/Assets 0.044***  0.030***  -0.266  0.050***  0.029***  -0.599* 
  (0.015) (0.010) (0.306) (0.011)  (0.006) (0.316) 
Size -0.003  -0.002*  0.038**  -0.006**  -0.001  0.025 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.020) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.024) 
Lerner index  -0.007  0.023**  -0.178  0.0004  0.032***  0.087 
  (0.013) (0.009) (0.214) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.243) 
Non-deposits  funding -0.006 -0.003 -0.104      
  (0.012) (0.006) (0.123)      
Deposits  funding     0.007  0.006  -0.167 
     (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.199) 
Internal Funding  0.088*  0.141*** 0.065  0.085*  0.141*** -0.444 
  (0.048) (0.030) (0.512) (0.046)  (0.024) (0.522) 
Banking freedom  -0.006  0.008 0.049 0.003  0.008**  0.175** 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.112) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.087) 
Monetary policy  0.039  -0.004 -0.063 0.0002 0.006  0.018 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.273) (0.040)  (0.012) (0.393) 
Inflation 0.087**  0.021  0.116 0.091*  0.020 0.287 
  (0.040) (0.037) (0.301) (0.050)  (0.013) (0.482) 
GDP growth  -0.005  -0.078  -0.0784  -0.131  -0.022  -0.099 
  (0.079) (0.065) (0.547) (0.081)  (0.038) (0.494) 
Diagnostic tests         
No. of observation  4027  4019  4035  4977  4948  4962 
No. of instruments  111  111  83  111  111  83 
Hansen 104.19  103.35  86.53  110.61  97.1  85.27 
P-value  (0.201) (0.218) (0.101) (0.103)  (0.365) (0.119) 
AB2 -0.8  -0.55  1.64  -0.25  -0.35  0.98 
P-value  (0.421) (0.581) (0.102) (0.802)  (0.727) (0.326) 
F-test 46.01***  14.79***  74.92*** 41.95***  19.63*** 46.43*** 
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Table 4.15 
Evaluation of bank performance: Controlling for financial reforms 
 
The dependent variables are performance measures, Net-interest margin NIM, Return on assets, ROA and bank insolvent 
risk, Z-score. Equity/Assets is used as a proxy to measure the degree of risk aversion.  Banks’ loan to total assets ratio, 
loan/Assets is used as a measure of credit risk. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index. Deposit 
funding is ratio of total deposit to assets and non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit funding to total assets 
respectively. Internal fund is the internally generated fund. It is measured as the sum of net profit before extraordinary 
items and loan loss provisions relative bank loans at the end the period. Higher values of financial reforms indicate fully 
reformed. Short-term interest rate is included to capture the stance of monetary policy. Inflation is the rate of inflation 
based on the CPI. The natural logarithm of per capita GDP accounts for the differences in economic developments across 
countries. Dynamic panel-data estimation, Two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-correct standard error, small-sample 
adjustments, and orthogonal deviation are used. Constant term included but not reported. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% 5% and 10% level respectively. The following 
diagnostic tests are presented: (1) Observations (2) The instruments count, (3) The Hansen test for over identification 
restriction which the null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous (4) The Arellano-Bond tests for first and second 
order serial correlation in the residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. (5) The F-test for 
joint significance of instruments. 
 
  NIM ROA Z-Score  NIM ROA Z-Score 
NIM_lag  0.613***    0.583***    
  (0.100)    (0.071)    
ROA_lag   0.058      0.101***   
    (0.037)     (0.038)  
Z-Score_lag    0.778***    0.788*** 
    (0.047)    (0.040) 
Equity/Assets -0.085***  -0.002  0.376 -0.029  0.037 0.529 
  (0.030) (0.024) (0.284) (0.027) (0.023) (0.377) 
Loan/Assets  0.043*** 0.028*** 0.062  0.035*** 0.029*** 0.128 
  (0.016) (0.010) (0.184) (0.010) (0.008) (0.153) 
Size  -0.006***  -0.0005 0.054** -0.008***  -0.0004 0.046** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) 
Lerner  index  -0.026*  0.038*** 0.013  -0.0001  0.047*** 0.140 
  (0.015) (0.013) (0.161) (0.008) (0.011) (0.180) 
Non-deposits  funding  -0.003 -0.004 -0.101      
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.124)      
Deposits  funding     0.004  0.013  0.013 
     (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.153) 
Internal Funding  0.097**  0.163*** -0.193  0.048**  0.130*** -0.120 
  (0.040) (0.031) (0.349) (0.022) (0.028) (0.271) 
Financial reforms  0.009 0.017 -0.642*  0.003 0.021 -0.617 
  (0.045) (0.030) (0.375) (0.042) (0.024) (0.393) 
Monetary policy  0.045  -0.0001 -0.110  0.061  0.020  0.010 
  (0.029) (0.027) (0.084) (0.038) (0.027) (0.151) 
Inflation 0.019  0.033  -0.103 -0.020 0.007  -0.264 
  (0.033) (0.026) (0.127) (0.040) (0.020) (0.176) 
GDP  growth  -0.136 -0.021 -2.629***  -0.211**  -0.048 -1.866 
  (0.096) (0.060) (0.703) (0.090) (0.047) (0.701) 
Diagnostic  tests       
No.  of  observation  3486 3485 3455 4249 4230 4213 
No.  of  instruments  111 111 138 111 111 138 
Hansen  91.46  108.95 120.28 98.24  110.44 138.68 
P-value  (0.526) (0.124) (0.476) (0.335) (0.105) (0.117) 
AB2  -1.39 -0.44 1.55  -0.98 -0.24 0.76 
P-value  (0.166) (0.659) (0.122) (0.325) (0.808) (0.445) 
F-test 29.40***  13.25***  51.91*** 33.04*** 16.89*** 59.73*** 
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Table 4.16 
Evaluation of bank performance: Controlling for risk expropriation 
 
The dependent variables are performance measures, Net-interest margin (NIM), Return on assets (ROA), and bank 
insolvent risk, Z-score. Equity/Assets is used as a proxy to measure the degree of risk aversion.  Banks’ loan to total assets 
ratio, loan/Assets is used as a measure of credit risk. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index. Deposit 
funding is ratio of total deposit to assets and non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit funding to total assets 
respectively. Internal fund is the internally generated fund. It is measured as the sum of net profit before extraordinary 
items and loan loss provisions relative bank loans at the end the period. Higher score of property right indicate certainty 
of legal protection of property right and limited expropriation risks. Short-term interest rate is included to capture the 
stance of monetary policy. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The natural logarithm of per capita GDP 
accounts for the differences in economic developments across countries. Dynamic panel-data estimation, Two-step 
System GMM, Windmeijer-correct standard error, small-sample adjustments, and orthogonal deviation are used. Constant 
term included but not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance 
at the 1% 5% and 10% level respectively. The following diagnostic tests are presented: (1) Observations (2) The 
instruments count, (3) The Hansen test for over identification restriction which the null hypothesis is that instruments are 
exogenous (4) The Arellano-Bond tests for first and second order serial correlation in the residuals which the null 
hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. (5) The F-test for joint significance of instruments. 
 
 NIM  ROA  Z-Score  NIM  ROA  Z-Score 
NIM_lag  0.644***    0.593***    
  (0.099)    (0.075)    
ROA_lag   0.033     0.052   
   (0.038)     (0.041)   
Z-Score_lag    0.774***     0.704*** 
    (0.045)     (0.068) 
Equity/Assets -0.064**  -0.007 0.282  -0.035  0.023  0.750 
  (0.025) (0.021) (0.445) (0.025)  (0.024) (0.541) 
Loan/Assets  0.039** 0.023** -0.053  0.037***  0.029  0.376 
  (0.015) (0.010) (0.399) (0.009)  (0.020) (0.368) 
Size -0.004*  -0.001  0.030  -0.007***  -0.001  0.135** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.020) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.044) 
Lerner index  -0.032**  0.037***  -0.1557  -0.002  0.059***  0.055 
  (0.013) (0.011) (0.213) (0.008)  (0.014) (0.262) 
Non-deposits  funding  0.001 0.002 -0.072       
  (0.010) (0.006) (0.123)      
Deposits  funding    -0.001  0.001  0.031 
     (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.182) 
Internal Funding  0.096**  0.163*** 0.109  0.033  0.105*** -0.005 
  (0.039) (0.029) (0.416) (0.023)  (0.026) (0.458) 
Property rights  -0.007  0.009 0.228 0.004  0.008 -0.159 
  (0.010) (0.006) (0.187) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.203) 
Monetary policy  0.0518*  0.006 -0.071  0.043  0.015 0.206 
  (0.026) (0.024) (0.308) (0.028)  (0.018) (0.500) 
Inflation 0.003  0.029  0.251 0.014  0.021 0.614 
  (0.039) (0.031) (0.276) (0.042)  0.031  (0.895) 
GDP growth  -0.126  0.0006  0.553  -0.140*  -0.072  0.412 
  (0.100) (0.048) (0.656) (0.076)  (0.049) (1.150) 
Diagnostic tests         
No.  of  observation  4031 4028 4036 4962  4936 4929 
No.  of  instruments  111 111 83  111  84  84 
Hansen  97.21 102.05  86.61 98.56  73.34 73.84 
P-value  (0.362) (0.245) (0.100) (0.327)  (0.250) (0.252) 
AB2  -1.28 -0.36 1.55  -0.54  -0.22 1.15 
P-value  (0.201) (0.719) (0.121) (0.586)  (0.828) (0.252) 
F-test 30.12***  10.27***  85.65*** 35.48***  19.18*** 71.59*** 
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5.1  OVERVIEW 
This thesis focuses on bank market structure and the effect of changes to this structure 
on intermediation strategies. The consequences of the changes of banking market 
structure on resource allocation is important, as the 2007 financial crisis has shown 
the crucial function of banks is extending credit to the economy especially during and 
after financial distress. This final chapter offers overall concluding remarks for each 
of the three core preceding chapters. It highlights the unique and specific 
contributions of each chapter to the existing literature, acknowledges limitations of 
the selected techniques and methodology, provides public policy implications of this 
research and finally identifies various areas for further research. 
 
5.2  Chapter II:  Bank competition, financial stability and bank lending 
channel in emerging markets 
Chapter II presents the starting point of the analysis of market structure and the 
intermediation strategies of banks. This first core chapter conducts an empirical 
analysis of how the degree of competition and bank risk conditions affect monetary 
policy transmission through the lending channel. Most previous studies on the bank 
lending channel either on country specific or cross-country have centred on the 
existence, gauging of its potency, on its overall importance, on identification and 
distributional effects of monetary policy transmission mechanisms. Little attention has 
been given to the effect of banking structure and bank risk conditions on the response 
of bank lending to monetary policy shock. The argument in favour of the banking 
structure-risk-lending channel hypothesis is that monetary policy does not only affect 
bank reserves either through open market operations or reserve requirements, but also 
impacts on marginal cost through interest rates paid on the banks liabilities. Also, due 
to innovation in the financial system, traditional variables such as bank size, liquidity 
and equity may not be enough to assess banks’ ability to provide additional loans 
(Altunbas 2010). Furthermore, changes in the financial system coupled with changes 
in prudential regulation could have changed the effect of the perception, pricing and 
the risk management behaviour of banks especially those in the developing countries 
(Borio and Zhu 2008). 
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Employing a large panel dataset of 978 banks of 55 countries, and construction of a 
Lerner index model as a measure of market structure, this chapter shows that an 
increase in the degree of bank market power increases the response of bank lending to 
monetary policy stance. This means that in tightening the monetary policy indicator, 
the monetary authorities will succeed in reducing the supply of bank loans in a less 
competitive market. This result provides evidence in support of a stronger link 
between market imperfection and the effectiveness of the monetary policy instruments. 
The result in this chapter also reveals that the level of insolvency risk influences 
banks’ capacity to provide lending. The positive association between bank stability 
and bank loan growth implies that lower risk banks have financial strength to supply 
more loans. The result further suggests that stable banks can attract external finance 
that enables the bank to have positive consequence on the bank supply. The finding is 
also sensitive to three bank-specific control variables; bank size, liquidity and 
capitalisation level. The main implication of these findings are that, bank risk 
conditions and that of its market structure need to be considered in addition to 
traditional indicators (i.e. bank size, liquidity and capitalisation) in assessing banks’ 
ability and willingness to finance economic activities.  
 
5.3  Chapter III:  Does bank competition and diversification lead to greater  
   stability? 
Chapter III builds upon the initial findings of chapter II and extends the analysis of 
market structure to bank performance and insolvency risk. Theoretical and empirical 
examination of competition and bank insolvency risk find their relationship to be 
ambiguous. Competition has long been seen to decrease bank stability because it 
exacerbates risk and reduces bank incentives to behave prudently. This view has been 
countered by the argument that competition in the banking sector reduces bank 
insolvency risk (OECD 2010). To this end, this chapter contains empirical 
investigation of the relationship between competition and stability. The main 
contribution is to empirically analyse the significance of revenue diversification on 
the relationship between competition and stability. Prior studies have not considered 
the role of revenue diversification in the competition-stability relationship. As a result, 
two related hypothesis are tested in this chapter: 1) the level of revenue diversification   167
among emerging banks is positively related to the degree of competition, and 2) 
diversification strategy of banks operating in competitive environments is risk 
efficient. The novelty of this chapter is the role of revenue diversification in assessing 
whether or not the degree of competition affects bank stability. It also provides some 
insight into the effect of the financial reforms, institutional, regulatory and 
supervisory environments on the relationship between competition and stability. 
Using a panel dataset of 978 banks, Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic and the 
Lerner index as measures of degree of competition in banking sector, and employing 
the three stage least squares (3sls) estimation techniques, Chapter III shows that 
competition increases bank stability as diversification across and within both interest 
and non-interest income generating activities of bank increases. The results support 
the previous studies that competition increases bank stability by revealing robust 
evidence for this positive link when revenue diversification of banks is controlled. A 
vast array of robustness checks support the core results. The results hold when 
alternative measures of the degree of competition and different methodological 
specifications are used. Even when financial reforms, supervision power, property 
right, capital stringency index and macroeconomic variables are controlled, the results 
suggest that competition with revenue diversification remain positively associated 
with bank stability. The core findings of this chapter correspond to the ‘competitive-
stability view’ in the theoretical literature and generally consistent with empirical 
findings that banks that operate in an uncompetitive banking industry are prone to 
originating riskier loans which are detrimental to their stability. The overall results 
provide empirically, an additional channel through which competition affects 
insolvency risks of banks in emerging markets.   
 
5.4  Chapter IV:  The impact of market power and funding strategy on bank 
performance 
Chapter IV employs a different approach to analysing bank performance and stability, 
by focusing on bank funding structure and a variety of measures of market power. The 
main contribution of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence on how bank market 
power and funding patterns perform in terms of producing profitable and stable banks 
in developing countries. In particular, using a panel dataset of 978 banks in emerging   168
and developing economies during 2000-2007 and employing systems generalised 
methods of moment estimator (system GMM) the chapter analysis how funding 
strategies of banks with market power affect their net-interest margin, return on their 
assets as well as their insolvency risk. It starts with construction of a choice of Lerner 
indexes: conventional Lerner (Burger et al., 2009); and funding-adjusted Lerner index 
(Maudos and De Guevara, 2007) to investigate competitive environment of the 
sample banks. This is because there is no consensus in literature regarding how best to 
assess the degree of bank market power (Carbo et al., 2009). This chapter provides the 
following key results:  
 
First, on determinants of the Lerner index, the results reveal that larger, growing and 
highly capitalised banks have greater degree of market power. This result is consistent 
with (Meon and Weill, 2005) argument that larger banks are efficient, well resourced 
and operating economies of scale and scope; have the ability to produce at a lower 
cost and that enables them to have high margins. Similarly, diversifying into non-
interest income activities enhances bank market power.  Second, for their funding 
strategy, smaller, highly capitalised and efficiently managed banks employ internally 
generated funds for their investment activities. Third, the high net-interest margins 
(NIM) of banks in emerging and developing countries can be explained by the degree 
of market power, credit risk and implicit interest payments. The results suggest that 
net-interest margin among banks with market power is significantly more sensitive to 
internally generated funds than they are with deposits and wholesale funding. Fourth, 
the high degree of market power does not only increase the NIM and profitability 
level of banks in emerging and developing countries, it also reduces their insolvency 
risk. Finally, relating bank funding structure to insolvency risk, the results reveal that 
banks that rely heavily on internal and deposit funding are safer than those that 
finance their assets with wholesale funds. The results thus support existing findings in 
the literature that banking strategy that depends predominantly on attracting non-
deposit funding is more risky and less resilient to the crisis. (Demirguc-kent and 
Huizinga (2010), and OECD (2010)). 
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5.5  Summary and public policy implications 
This thesis makes several contributions to the growing body of literature on market 
structure and intermediation strategies. In line with this, various specifications are 
proxied for market structure (Panzar and Rosse, 1987) H-statistic, two specifications 
of the Lerner index: conventional and funding-adjusted Lerner index), different 
estimation techniques (system generalised methods of moments (system-GMM) 
estimators, three stage least square (3sls) and General least square  (GLS) including, 
no effect, fixed effects and random effects) a broad measures of performance (net-
interest margin, return on assets, insolvency risk) and a large panel dataset of 978 
banks across 55 countries are employed for the purpose of this thesis. While firm-
level data on emerging market is not readily available, the author of this thesis spent 
an immoderate amount of time and energy collecting this data. Furthermore, though 
the study focuses on the emerging and developing markets and given the relation 
between finance and the real economic, the benefits of conducting research in these 
economies have a chance to make an impact beyond developing economies. Bekaert 
and Harvey (2002) put it that, ‘the benefits and the subsequent impact of research on 
emerging economies on economic growth can not be merely measured in absolute 
dollar terms, but in the number of people that are elevated from a desperate 
subsistence level to a more adequate standard of living’. 
 
The findings of the thesis give rise to five very important public policy considerations. 
First, Chapter II uncovers a strong link between market imperfection and the 
effectiveness of monetary policy indicators, there is a need for policy makers, 
regulatory authorities and banking supervisors to put forward regulatory and 
institutional frameworks that can revolve, resolve and offset the negative 
consequences of further increases in bank market power on the effectiveness of 
monetary policy transmission through the bank lending channel. These measures are 
needed to address the effect of the current crisis on financial development and 
economic growth.  
 
Second, this thesis also unveils the important role of bank insolvency risk in 
determining banks’ ability and willingness to supply new loans and also sheltering   170
them in the long-run from the effect of monetary policy shocks. Thus in formulating 
public policy on how banks can finance economic activities especially in the 
aftermath of a financial crisis, bank market structure and that of its risk conditions 
must be considered in addition to the traditional standard bank-specific characteristics 
(size, liquidity, and capitalisation). 
 
Third, several policy recommendations are made of findings on the relationship 
between competition, revenue diversification and stability. Given the results of 
revenue diversification role in the competition-stability relationship, there is no 
convincing nor compelling evidence to restrict bank activities. Banks must be allowed 
to venture into activities that enable them to generate non-interest income. In this case 
variables such as bank governance, managerial structure and bank-specific 
characteristics that affect bank investment decisions should be subjected to regulatory 
scrutiny.  
 
Fourth, the fact that the level of bank market power and funding strategies affect bank 
performance and stability, to some extend, this should be of high relevance to policy 
makers, regulatory authorities and owners. For policy makers and regulatory 
authorities, Chapter IV has the following recommendations: 1) as high degree of 
market power of banks does not only increase the net-interest margin and profitability 
of the banks, it also reduces their insolvency risk; the regulatory authority should 
introduce guidelines that enhance banks to have a considerable level of market power. 
Considerable bank market power is needed, because too much or too little market 
power will affect negatively bank risk taking behaviour and stability (Liu et al., 2010). 
2) internal capital has been found to play a significant role in enhancing bank market 
power and reducing insolvency risk. So does deposit funding sources. Thus regulatory 
initiative that allows banks to withhold a significant portion of their profits for growth 
purposes must be pursued. For bank managers, mechanisms should be put in place to 
attract deposits or investments as well as adopting strategies that will give rise to more 
internal capital. With regard to market participants, if investors are aware that internal 
capital and a depository source of funding produces profitable and stable banks, the   171
sizeable amount of their investment should be directed towards banks with 
considerable market power. 
 
Finally, findings of this thesis show that market power in itself is not detrimental to 
bank activities, but the level and the application of it could affect bank risk-taking. 
Therefore, regulatory, supervisory and competition authorities should co-ordinate to 
put in place a comprehensive regulatory framework that would allow banks to have a 
substantial amount of market power that is robust and consistent with any competition 
policy.       
     
5.6  LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS 
Though the present thesis offers very strong results and a wide range of implications 
for regulatory authorities, policy makers, owners, bank mangers as well as the general 
public, an evaluation of the fit of the selected techniques, methods and methodology 
is not out of place. 
 
First, is the construction of the H-statistic, a measure of the degree of competition. H-
statistic is a single measure based on the price elasticity of input cost and it is valid if 
the industry is in equilibrium. However, it is very rare to have a industry in 
equilibrium. Also the measure of H-statistic ignores bank differences such as size, 
geographical location and products differentiation even though bank size is controlled. 
The alternative to H-statistic in measuring competition is the Lerner index. Lerner 
index measures price mark-up over marginal cost. It overcomes the single measure of 
H-statistic as it provides separate values for each of the banks in the industry and also 
is able to distinguish different products of a bank. The only setback of this measure is 
the difficulty in gathering data on prices and marginal cost. 
  
This thesis employs both H-statistic and Lerner index as a measure of market structure. 
The use of the two new empirical industrial organisation methods to measure market 
structure provide relatively close estimates of competitive environments of the 
selected samples. Also, as each measure has some related advantages and 
disadvantages, using the two measures in a single study serve as a good indicator of   172
the level of competition among banks. Furthermore, H-statistic and Lerner index are 
increasingly use in empirical research and are so far considered as a better 
measurement of bank behaviour than the concentration ratio which does not 
necessarily measure the level of competition and cannot be used as a proxy for 
differences in market structure (Claesens and Laeven 2004). 
 
Second, the thesis makes use of several estimation techniques including system 
generalised methods of moments (system-GMM) estimators, three Stage Least Square 
(3SLS) and Generalised Least Square (GLS) including, no effect, fixed effects and 
random effects). Though Chapter II uses no effect, fixed effect and random effect 
regression, the best model in this area is selected on the basis of the likelihood ratio 
and Hausman test (Greene 2003).  
 
Third, as fixed and random effects could not account for the endogeneity bias 
especially in the simultaneous equation model, a 3sls simultaneous equation is 
employed in Chapter III, where competition, revenue diversification and stability are 
specified as endogenous. Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) regression also performs 
the same function as that of 3sls, but in the presence of endogeneity and correct 
specification of the structural equations model, the 3sls produces more consistent and 
precise estimates of coefficient than those produced by 2sls (Mantescon 2009).   
 
Fourth, in Chapter IV, the system-GMM methodology as proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) is used to address dynamic panel bias and endogeneity problems. The 
method used is very complex and has a problem of generating many instruments that 
can even weaken the Hansen test. Even though the use of this methodology is new in 
the literature, (Roodman 2009) suggests that the instruments counts should not exceed 
the number of individual units in the panel and the importance of reporting in each 
study, the instrument used and other specifications including either the use of 
difference or system-GMM, first difference or orthogonal deviation, one or two-step 
estimation, on robust cluster-robust or Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust error. 
Chapter IV addresses the endogeneity concerns, reports all the specifications and we 
can see the results are precise, robust and consistent.   173
Finally, concern has been raised about the use of listed bank data in emerging 
economies. The selection of listed banks may cause more than just sample bias. Listed 
banks in the emerging economies are relatively large in size, more stable, have better 
access to technology and innovation, are more liquid, have access to external capital, 
and acquire more market power which puts them in a better position to overcome any 
macroeconomic shocks and thus limit the general applicability of my results. In this 
thesis, selection bias is avoided as all banks are sampled including all commercial 
banks, cooperative banks, development banks, savings banks, real estate and 
mortgage banks for which annual data is available. As the study focuses on bank 
intermediation and market structure, unconsolidated balance sheet data are opted for. 
To ensure that banks that are important players in the deposit and/or loan markets are 
not omitted, medium and long term credit banks and specialised government 
institutions are included as they remain important in these countries. This is after 
necessary adjustments are made for differences in accounting and reporting standards 
across countries. Observations with out-liers such as zero and /or negative 
capitalization are dropped. Also, observations for capitalization above the 98
th 
percentile were dropped. In addition, loan growth rate observations above 99
th 
percentile of the distribution were equally dropped. Thus many efforts are made to 
ensure the reliability of the dataset used in this thesis. 
 
5.7  AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis employs comprehensive analysis, coverage and methodology. Like all 
quality and good research, the results of this thesis ignite research ideas; create a 
forum for discussion while advancing debates in the different areas of the finance and 
banking literature. The following are some areas for further research: 
 
First, considering the graphical results of the link between bank risk conditions and 
the effectiveness of monetary policy presented in Chapter II, further research is 
needed to combine the rich heterogeneity of panel data with that cross-section country 
specific regression analysis. Employing this technique will not only offer the best of 
the two methods, it also allows the researcher to analyse the convergence of the real   174
effect in terms of output as well as the behaviour of the financial intermediaries. This 
cannot be achieved if either method is used. 
 
Second, while Chapter II explores the relationship between competition, bank risk and 
the monetary policy effects, a reverse causality may also be possible. Monetary policy 
may influence competition as well as risk-taking behaviour of banks. A more detailed 
study is needed to unravel whether the current expansion of monetary policy indicator 
(especially after the 2007 financial crisis) affect perception and risk behaviour of 
banks across countries. 
 
Third, a survey methodology should be used to comprehensively solicit views of 
practitioners especially top bank managers of whether or not competition among 
banks influences bank insolvency risk. Furthermore, whether managers decision to 
diversify bank activities play any significant role in the relationship between 
competition and stability.  
 
Fourth and finally, further research is also needed on bank performance, in particular 
the high spreads of banks in developing countries. Whether the absence of well-
functioning capital markets in some of these countries, the high net-interest margin in 
these countries is to enable banks to plough back profit into their capital for the 
purpose of maintaining stability. Elsewhere, Turk Ariss (2010) finds a high degree of 
bank market power, enhances profit efficiency, which leads to stability, but falls short 
of providing whether the degree of market power and efficiency is as a result of high 
net-interest margins. 
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